Logics of belief by Viljoen, Elizabeth
LOGICS OF BELIEF 
by 
ELIZABETH VILJOEN 
submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
in the subject 
COMPUTER SCIENCE 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
SUPERVISOR: PROF W A LABUSCHAGNE 
APRIL 1997 
Abstract 
The inadequacy of the usual possible world semantics of modal languages when the meaning 
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bounded agents. Finally, the AGM postulates for belief revision are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
Classical Background 
Why is the sentence 
'p but I do not believe that p' 
absurd to utter? 
Moore's Problem as stated by Hintikka (1962) 
What motivates the study of logics of belief? 
The ultimate goal of the logician who devises a logic of belief is to give a formal de-
scription of the kind of set of beliefs that a rational agent might have and, with the help 
of this explication, to establish criteria for distinguishing between good and bad arguments 
involving the notion of belief. The explication must take into account the manner in which 
beliefs are adopted, supported and revised by real agents, but the logician's purpose is to 
develop a normative theory, not to give a psychological analysis. 
1.1 Propositional Logics 
Typically, logics of knowledge and belief are formulated in terms of modal languages. For 
the sake of simplicity, we will concentrate on propositional languages. Such languages are 
extensions of the languages of classical propositional logic. Accordingly we first discuss the 
syntax, model theory and proof theory of classical propositional languages. 
1.1.1 Syntax 
The first requirement for any formal language is an alphabet S of symbols. For a proposi-
tional language these symbols include atoms, connectives and parentheses for punctuation. 
The set of atoms P may have any non-zero cardinality although it is customary to choose 
a countable set. For illustrative purposes we will use P = {p,q}. Given P, the alphabet of 
the propositional language is the set 
s = p u { •, v, /\, -t, ....+, (, )}. 
Let S* be the set of all possible strings over S. The well-formed formulae ( wfs) or sen-
tences of the propositional language are the members of the set :F defined as follows: 
1 
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F is the smallest subset of S* such that 
• P~F, 
• if A E F, then •A E F, 
• if A, BE F, then (AV B) E F, 
• if A, BE F, then (A/\ B) E F, 
• if A, BE F, then (A---+ B) E F and 
• if A,B E F, then (A f-+ B) E F. 
For easier readability we may omit parentheses if no ambiguity can arise. 
Examples of well-formed formulae in the language where P = {p, q} are 
••q 
(p---+ (p V q)) or, omitting some parentheses, p---+ (p V q) 
•(p /\ •P) 
( ( q f-+ p) ---+ (p f-+ q)) . 
1.1.2 Model Theory 
We have looked at the syntax of classical propositional languages. Now we take a look at 
the semantics of such languages. Our basic intuition is that when a sentence accurately 
describes a situation (or world or state) of a system, this sentence is true with respect 
to that situation or world or state. Whereas the semantics of predicate languages (to be 
discussed later) will make explicit the worlds, we will be content here to represent worlds by 
indicating which elementary facts (i.e. atoms) hold or do not hold in each of these worlds. 
The elementary facts holding in a world are indicated by an assignment of truth values 
to atoms, namely a function f with domain the set of atoms, P, and as range the set {T ,F} 
of truth values. The atoms p such that f (p )=T are then the elementary facts that hold in 
the world that is implicitly under discussion. 
An assignment of truth values to atoms can be extended in many ways to a function 
with domain the set of all wfs of the language. There is, however, only one way to extend 
an assignment in such a manner that our intuitions with regard to the connectives are 
respected. The valuation VJ extending the assignment f is recursively defined as follows: 
VJ(P) J (p) for every p E P 
VJ( •B) T if vJ(B) =F F if vJ(B) =T 
vJ((B V C)) T if VJ(B) =Tor VJ(C) =Tor both F if vJ(B) = VJ( C) =F 
vJ((B /\ C)) T if VJ(B) = VJ( C) =T F if VJ(B) =For VJ(C) =For both 
vJ((B---+ C)) T if VJ(B) =For vJ(C) =Tor both F if vJ(B) =T and VJ(C) =F 
vJ((B f-+ C)) T if vJ(B) = VJ( C) F if VJ(B) # VJ( C). 
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If v1(A)=T we say that A is 'true' in the world (represented by) f and that the specific 
assignment f satisfies the wf A. If v1(A) =F we say that A is 'false' in the world (represented 
by) f and that the assignment f fails to satisfy the wf A. The world (represented by) f is 
a model of a wf A if and only if A is true in f. This means that an assignment satisfies a 
wf A iff the world represented by the assignment is a model of A. 
The world (represented by) f is a model of a set r of wfs if and only if every member 
of r is true in f. Similarly, an assignment f satisfies a set r of wfs iff it satisfies every wf 
of the set, i.e. an assignment satisfies a set r iff the world represented by the assignment is 
a model of the set r. 
Let V be the set of all possible assignments, i.e. worlds. Let us further agree to call 
subsets of V frames. Then A is valid in the frame W ~ V iff v1(A) =T for all worlds f E W. 
Let us look at an example. In the language with only two atoms, p and q, we can have 
four possible worlds: 
fi(p) =T and fi(q) =T 
h(p) =T and h(q) =F 
h(p) =F and h(q) =T 
f4(P) =F and f4(q) =F. 
In this case, then, V = {f1, h, h, f 4 }. The wf (p V •q) is true in worlds Ji, fz and 
f4 or, equivalently, the wf (p V •q) is valid in the frame {Ji, h, f4}. This means that the 
worlds Ji, h and f4 are all models of the wf (p V •q). The wf q, the wf (p --+ q) and the 
wf (p V q) are all valid in the frame {Ji, h}, so the worlds Ji and hare models of the set 
{q, (p--+ q), (p V q)}. The wf (q V •q) is valid in the frame V. 
Every wf, and indeed every set of wfs, determines a particular frame, namely the set of 
worlds that are models of the specific wf or set of wfs. 
A wf A entails a wf B , written as A I= B, iff B is valid in the frame determined by A, 
i.e. iff B is true in every model of A. The manner in which we assign truth values to wfs 
of the form (A--+ B) ensures that A I= B iff the wf (A--+ B) is true in all worlds w E V, 
i.e. (A--+ B) is valid in the (whole) V. More generally, a set r of wfs entails a wf A iff A is 
valid in the frame determined by r, i.e. A is true in every world in which each member of 
r is true. Unsurprisingly we write it as r I= A. This leads to the definition of the 'closure' 
of a set. The semantic closure Cn(f) of a set r is the set of all wfs that are true in all the 
models of r, i.e. the semantic closure of a set consists of all the wfs entailed by the set. So 
Cn(f) is the set of all wfs that are valid in the frame determined by r. The operator Cn is 
monotonic, i.e. given two sets ~ and r, if ~ ~ r, then Cn( ~) ~ Cn(f). 
1.1.3 Proof Theory 
For many purposes the entailment relation I= is the basic relation of interest. To deter-
mine whether a pair (A, B) belongs to the relation (i.e. whether A I= B), we may do 
a model-theoretic analysis. Say, however, we want to automate the process. Then it be-
comes reasonable to investigate the existence of syntactic algorithms which would determine 
whether A I= B by systematically rewriting the strings A and B instead of embarking on 
the complexities of a model-theoretic analysis. Before the advent of computer science, such 
syntactic algorithms were under-specified: the product to be delivered was specified, namely 
a 'proof', which was defined as a certain kind of sequence of wfs; the manner in which the 
proof was to be generated was left unspecified. In order to facilitate the comparison of 
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several approaches, we adhere to this tradition. 
We have seen that A I= B iff B is valid in the frame consisting of the models of A (and, 
more generally, r I= B iff B is valid in the frame of all the models of r). Say we want to 
investigate validity in a frame which is determined by a wf A (or a set r of wfs ). Then we 
refer to A as an axiom (or to r as a set of axioms). 
Consider first the special case in which we wish to investigate validity in the frame V 
of all possible worlds. Are there axioms which may be regarded as determining this frame? 
Well, the obvious answer is that the set r consisting of all wfs valid in V constitutes such a 
set of axioms. But this renders the question 'Is it the case that r I= B?' trivial. It would 
be far more useful if there were a relatively small set r of wfs which could be checked for 
validity by model-theoretic methods and which would be such that every other wf valid in 
V could be obtained from it by some appropriate syntactic transformation. 
One possible choice of r would involve as axioms all instances of the following three 
schemas: 
1. (A - (B - A)) 
2. ((A - (B - C)) - ((A - B) - (A - C))) 
3. (((•A) - ( •B)) - (B - A)) 
where A, B, C range over the wfs in :F. Let us call this set of wfs fv. The wfs in fv are 
valid in the frame V of all possible worlds and can be shown to axiomatize V in the sense 
that every wf valid in V can be 'proved' from these axioms in the manner described below. 
If we add a wf which is not provable from fv to the set rv, the resultant set will be valid 
in a smaller set of worlds. Thus the enlarged set of axioms will be valid in a smaller frame. 
Let us look at an example. In the language with only two atoms, p and q, we add the wf 
p to the set rv. Which frame is determined by this new set of axioms? Certainly not the 
whole V, because h(p) = f 4 (p) =F. The frame that is determined by the new set of axioms 
is {Ji, h} which is a proper subset of the set of all possible worlds, V. 
Now a wf B is provable from a set r (written as r f- B) iff there exists a sequence 
A1, A2, ... , An of n wfs with the following properties: 
• An= Band 
• each Ai is either an element of r (i.e. an axiom) or there exist prior members Aj, Ak 
of the sequence such that Ak = Aj - Ai. 
Intuitively, B is provable from r (i.e. r f- B) if B can be produced from members of r by 
applying the transformation rule 
'given wfs C and C - D, produce D' 
zero, one or more times. This rule is known as 'modus ponens' or the 'rule of detachment' 
or '--elimination'. The sequence A1 , A2 , ... , An is called a 'proof' or 'deduction' from r. 
Let us look at two examples where a wf is proved from a set of wfs. First we take the 
set fv and we try to deduce the wf (p - p). The following sequence of five wfs (written 
vertically so that we have room to justify the inclusion of each wf) is a proof from fv: 
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1. ((p----+ ((p----+ p)----+ p))----+ ((p----+ (p----+ p))----+ (p----+ p))) (axiom with 
2. (p----+ ((p----+ p)----+ p)) 
3. ((p----+ (p----+ p))----+ (p----+ p)) 
4. (p----+ (p----+ p)) 
5. (p----+ p) 
A = p, B = (p ----+ p), C = p) 
(axiom with 
A= p, B = (p----+ p)) 
(modus ponens, 
from (1) and (2)) 
(axiom with A= B = p) 
(modus ponens, 
from (3) and (4)) 
For the second example of a proof we add the set { (p ----+ q), ( q ----+ r), p} to the set r v. 
We assume we are working with the language where P = {p, q, r }. Then 
1. (p----+ q) 
2. ( q ----+ r) 
3. p 
4. q 
5. r 
(axiom) 
(axiom) 
(axiom) 
(modus ponens, from (1) and (3)) 
(modus ponens, from (2) and (4)). 
By the above we have shown that fv u {(p----+ q), (q----+ r),p} f- r. 
The deductive closure Th(f) of a set r is the set of all wfs that are provable from f. 
The proof-theoretic approach outlined above is sound in the following sense: for any set 
r of wfs where fv ~ r, if r f- A, then r I= A. So if A is provable from r then A is valid in 
the frame consisting of the models of r, thus Th(f) ~ Cn(f). 
The proof-theoretic approach symbolised by f- is also complete in the sense that, for any 
set r of wfs where fv ~ r, if r I= A, then r f- A. So if A is valid in the frame consisting of 
the models of r, then A is provable from r, thus Cn(f) ~ Th(f). 
Say we want to determine whether A I= B where A is arbitrary. Then the proof-theoretic 
approach outlined above can be adopted by taking as our set of axioms r = fv U {A}, in 
other words the wf A becomes an additional axiom and our frame becomes smaller. If we 
succeed in showing that r f- B, we may conclude that A I= B. 
In conclusion, consider the limiting case of the empty frame W = 0. Can we axiomatise 
W in the sense of finding a set r of wfs such that every wf valid in W is provable from f? 
Well, every wf is valid in this (empty) frame, so one choice would be to set r equal to the 
set of all wfs. As noted earlier, though, this is unsatisfactory, because one prefers the set 
of axioms to be a relatively small subset of the set of valid wfs. Whatever set r we choose 
must have W = 0 as its set of models, so if a wf A E r is satisfiable in some world w, 
there must be another member of r, say B, which is not satisfiable in w. For example, B 
might be -iA. The simplest such set, in the case of the language with P = {p, q}, would 
be r = f v U {p, -ip}. Given such contradictory axioms it is possible to deduce any wf A 
in the language. (To see this, note that -ip ----+ (p ----+ A) is valid in V for every wf A and is 
thus by completeness provable from fv. Given a proof of -ip----+ (p----+ A), modus ponens is 
then applied twice to yield A.) A set of axioms from which it is possible to deduce every wf 
is called inconsistent. It is a characteristic of the proof-theoretic approach outlined above 
that a set r is inconsistent iff it is unsatisfiable (i.e. has no models). 
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1.2 Predicate Logics 
Predicate languages (first order languages) are more complicated but also more expressive 
than propositional languages, and therefore more useful for real-world applications. For 
simplicity's sake we do not include any function constants in the predicate languages that 
we are going to consider. We again need an alphabet S which must include the following 
symbols: 
• for each positive n, zero, one or more predicate constants of 'arity' n, indicated by 
Pt, 
• a countably infinite set of individual variables, indicated by Xi, 
• zero, one or more individual constants, indicated by Ci, 
• the connectives •, V, /\,--+ and +--+, 
• punctuation symbols ( and ) and 
• quantifier symbols V and 3. 
An example is the alphabet with one predicate constant, Pl, and two individual con-
stants, c1 and c2. 
Let S* be the set of all possible strings over S. The terms of the language are all 
the constants, Ci, and all the variables, Xi. The atomic formulae or atoms are defined 
as strings of the form Pt( ti, t2, ... , tn) where ti, t2, ... , tn are terms. Let A be the set 
of atoms. For example, the language with the alphabet given above would have A = 
{Pl( c1), Pl( c2), Pl(x1), Pl(x2), .. . }. 
The well-formed formulae ( wfs) of the predicate language are the members of the set :F 
defined as follows: 
:F is the smallest subset of S* such that 
• A<;;; F, 
• if A E F, then ·A E F, 
• if A,B E F, then (AV B) E F, 
• if A, B E F, then (A/\ B) E F, 
• if A, B E F, then (A--+ B) E F, 
• if A, B E F, then (A+--+ B) E F, 
• if A E F, then Vxi(A) E :F and 
• if A E F, then 3xi(A) E F. 
In a wf Vx;(A) we say that A is the scope of the quantifier and similarly for 3x;(A). An 
occurrence of the variable x; in a wf is said to be bound if it occurs within the scope of a 
'ix; or a 3xi or if it is the Xi next to the quantifier symbol. If an occurrence of a variable 
is not bound, it is said to be free. A wf with no free variables is a sentence. (We see that 
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here, in contrast to propositional languages, there are wfs that are not sentences.) An atom 
which is a sentence is a ground atom. 
Let us look at a few examples. In the wf 3x2(Pf(x 1, x 2)) the scope of the quantifier 
3x2 is P[(x1,x2) so that both occurrences of x 2 in 3x2(P'f(x1,x2)) are bound, but the 
occurrence of x1 is free. An example of a sentence is Vx1(3x2(P'f(x1, x2))). An example of 
a ground atom is P[(c3,c5 ). 
In the rest of this section, we follow the substitution approach to quantification as 
explained by Shoenfield [Shoenfield 1967). We start by defining substitution instances of 
wfs. 
Let A be any member of :F. For every variable x and individual constant c the formula 
A~ is given by the following set of rules. 
1. If A E A, then A~ is the result of substituting c for every occurrence of x in A. 
2. If A E :F, then (•A)~= ·A~. 
3. If A, BE :F, then (A 8 B)~ =(A~ 8 B~) where 8 E {V, /\, -., +-+ }. 
4. If A E :F, then (Qx(A))~ = Qx(A) where Q E {V, 3}. 
5. If A E :F, then (Qy(A))~ = Qy(A~) where Q E {V, 3} and x f y. 
More generally, if 'lji maps terms ti to s1 , t2 to s2, ... , tn to Sn, then A Vi = ( ( ( A;i );~) ... ;~ ). 
Let U be any nonempty set, the universe of discourse. An example is the set {Ctn, 
J hb, Dbn, Pta}. Now add the elements of U to the set of individual constants to form the 
set U'. Say we specify our language as having two individual constants, c1 and c2, and one 
predicate constant, Pf. Then we will have U' = {Ctn, Jhb, Dbn, Pta, c1, c2}.) 
A U-Jormula is then defined exactly like a well-formed formula except that the elements 
of U' may also be used as terms. A U -atom, however, is defined as a ground atom containing 
only elements of U. In the example above the set of U-atoms will be 
{P'f (Ctn, Ctn), Pf( Ctn, Jhb ), 
P'f(Ctn, Dbn), P'f(Ctn, Pta), 
P'f(Jhb,Ctn), P[(Jhb,Jhb), 
P'f(Jhb, Dbn), P'f(Jhb, Pta), 
P[(Dbn,Ctn), P[(Dbn,Jhb), 
P'f(Dbn,Dbn), P12(Dbn,Pta), 
P'f(Pta, Ctn), P[(Pta, Jhb), 
P'f (Pta, Dbn ), P{ (Pta, Pta )}. 
Now an assignment is defined as an assignment of truth values to all U-atoms, i.e. f is 
a function from the set of U-atoms to the set {T,F}. In the above example we could specify 
that f(P{(Jhb, Ctn))= f(P{(Jhb, Dbn)) = f(P{(Jhb, Pta)) =T and further specify that 
truth value F is assigned to all other U-atoms. 
An interpretation (or world, or situation, or state) is a triple w = ( </>, f, U) where U is 
the universe of discourse, </> is a mapping from the individual constants of the language to 
the universe of discourse and f is an assignment. In the above example we could specify 
</>( c1 ) = J hb and </>( c2 ) = Ctn. The purpose of the mapping </> is to allow us to go from an 
'ordinary' atom to a U-atom. 
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Let w If- A abbreviate the assertion that the sentence A has truth value T under the 
interpretation w (or in the world or situation or state w). Similarly, by w ~ A is meant 
that the sentence A has truth value F under the interpretation w (or in the world w ). Then 
truth values are given to the sentences of our language by the following rules: 
• w If- A iff A is a ground atom and f(A<f>)=T where A¢ is the string in which every 
constant c in A has been replaced by <f>(c), i.e. A¢ is the U-atom correspoµding, under 
the mapping </>, to the original atom A, I 
• w If- ·A iff w ~ A, 
• w If- (AV B) iff w If- A or w If- B, 
• w If- (A/\ B) iff w If- A and w If- B, 
• w If- (A-+ B) iff w ~A or w If- B, 
• w If- (A~ B) iff w If- A and w If- B, or w ~A and w ~ B, 
• w If- Vx(A) iff for all k E U, w If- (A%) and 
• w If- 3x(A) iff for some k E U, w If- (Ak). 
If a sentence A has truth value T, i.e. if w If- A, we say that A is 'true' in the world w 
and that w is a 'model' of the sentence A. Similarly, if w ~ A we say that the sentence A is 
'false' in the world w and that w is not a model of the sentence A. In the world as specified 
in the above example the sentence P{(c2,ci) will be false because J(P{(Ctn,Jhb)) =F, so 
w is not a model of this sentence. It is, however, a model of the sentence 3x1(P{(ci, x1)). 
Let W be a set of interpretations (worlds) and let us call such a set a frame. Then we 
say that a sentence A is satisfiable in W if it is true under at least one interpretation in W 
and that it is valid in the frame W if it is true under all interpretations in the frame W. 
A set r of sentences is satisfiable in W if every sentence in r is true in at least one world 
of W, i.e. if at least one interpretation in W is a model of every sentence in the set. The 
set r of sentences is valid in the frame W if each sentence in the set is true in every world 
in W, i.e. if each world in the frame is a model of every sentence in r. 
Let us look at an example using the language which has one predicate constant Pf and 
two individual constants c1 and c2 . We take as our universe of discourse U = {10, 13, 15}. 
Then the set of U-atoms is {P{(lO), P{(13), Pf (15)}. We further specify the mapping 
</> as follows: </>(c1 ) = 13 and <f>(c2) = 10. Let the assignment f in the interpretation 
w1 = { </>, J, U} be defined to be 
f(P{(lO)) =T, f(P{(13)) =F, f(P{(15)) =F. 
(We think of P{(x) as 'xis even'.) Is the ground atom A= Pl(c1 ) true in this world? We 
know that J(A<f>) = J(P{(13)) =F, so this ground atom is not true in world w1. 
Is the sentence B = 3x1(Pl(x 1 )) true in the world w1? Well, we know that J(P{(lO)) = 
T, so we have that w1 If- P{(x1 )~6, so we do have that w1 If- 3x1(P{(x1)). The sentence 
Vx1P{(x1), however, is not true in the world wi, because J(Pl(13)) = J(Pf (15)) =F. 
Say we define a world w2 identical to w1 except for the assignment f which is now 
specified to be 
J(P{(lO)) =F, J(P{(13)) =T, J(Pf (15)) =F. 
(We think of P{(x) as 'x is prime'.) Again the sentence B = 3x1 (P{(x1)) is true (in 
the world w2) and the sentence Vx1P{(x 1 ) is not. This means that the sentence B = 
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3x1(Pf (x1)) is valid in the frame { wi, w2}, i.e. every world in this frame is a model of the 
sentence B. 
As with propositional logic, every sentence, and indeed every set of sentences, determines 
a particular frame, namely the set of worlds that are models of the specific sentence or set 
of sentences. If a sentence A is valid in the frame determined by the set of sentences r, we 
write r I= A. A simple extension of the proof-theoretic approach sketched in section 1.1.3 
provides a notion of proof that is sound and complete, i.e. is such that, for all sets r of wfs, 
r I= A iff r I- A, or equivalently, Cn(f) = Th(f). 
1.3 Propositional Modal Logics 
In the above sections we have considered the syntax and semantics of classical propositional 
and predicate logics. Now we introduce modal operators and then look at the possible world 
semantics. 
1.3.1 Modal Operators 
When we define a language we need an alphabet. We use the same set of symbols that served 
for propositional logic, but we add (at least) one member to the set namely the box D. In 
the literature a wide variety of symbols are used for this additional member( s ), for example 
Ka [Fitting 1993], Ka and Ba [Hintikka 1962], L [Lukaszewicz 1990], [Si] [Konolige 1986]. 
Let P be the set of atoms. Then the alphabet of the modal language is defined to be the 
set 
S =PU { •, V, /\,---+, f-+, D, (, )}. 
Let S* be the set of all possible strings over S. The well-formed formulae ( wfs) or sen-
tences of the propositional modal language are the members of the set F defined as follows: 
F is the smallest subset of S* such that 
• P~F, 
• if A E F, then ·A E F, 
• if A, BE F, then (AV B) E F, 
• if A, B E F, then (A/\ B) E F, 
• if A, BE F, then (A---+ B) E F, 
• if A,B E F, then (A f-+ B) E F and 
• if A E F, then o (A) E F. 
As always, we omit parentheses if no ambiguity can arise. 
Examples of wfs in a modal language having P = {p, q} as set of atoms are 
( •p ---+ 0 (p)) 
( (p v q) ---+ ( q v p)) 
(D(p) f-+ D(D(p))) or, omitting some parentheses, Op f-+ D(Dp). 
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1.3.2 Possible World Semantics of Propositional Modal Languages 
Modal logics are logics of qualified truth [Fitting 1993]. Let A E :F. There are a number of 
ways in which DA can be read. Here are a few [Goldblatt 1992]: 
• It is necessarily true that A. 
• It will always be true that A. 
• It ought to be that A. 
• It is known that A. 
• It is believed that A. 
• After the program terminates, A. 
We have a reasonably clear idea of the circumstances under which a nonmodal wf A is 
true in a world w. But under what circumstances may we claim that a wf of the form DA 
is true in a world w? To a degree the answer depends on the way D is intended to be read, 
but we make some general remarks. 
When we discussed the truth of nonmodal propositional sentences and nonmodal pred-
icate languages we found it useful to use the notions 'world' and 'frame'. We also gave 
precise definitions of these notions. In a propositional language worlds may be identified 
with assignments of truth values to atoms. In a predicate language, however, many different 
worlds (or interpretations) may give rise to the same assignment of truth values to atomic 
sentences. Let us look at an example. Consider the predicate language with two individual 
constants ci and c2 and one predicate constant P{. Consider the worlds w1 and W2 defined 
as follows: 
w1 = { </>, J, {O, 1}} with </>( c1) = 0, </>( c2) = 1 and 
J(P{(0,1)) =T, J(P{(O,O)) = J(P{(l,1)) = J(P{(l,O)) =F, 
W2 = {</>,J,{1,2}} with </>(c1) = 1,</>(c2) = 2 and 
J(P{(l, 2)) =T, J(P{(l, 1)) = J(P{(2, 2)) = J(P{(2, 1)) =F. 
In each of the worlds w1 and w2 , the atomic sentence P{( c1, c2) is true while the atomic 
sentences P{(ci,c1), P{(c2,c2) and P{(c2,c1) are false. 
In the semantics of modal languages the notions of world and frame are adapted as 
follows. The truth of a wf will be assessed in terms of a structure outside the language 
which will be called a 'model'. This terminology differs from the previous use of the word 
and is, of course, unfortunate but traditional. This 'model' will consist of a 'frame' and a 
'valuation'. A frame will be, as before, a set of possible worlds but will have an additional 
feature: the worlds may be related to each other in a nontrivial way. The worlds themselves 
need not necessarily be assignments or interpretations although, of course, there is nothing 
that prevents us from choosing the worlds in such a way. We should think of them as 
abstract points or labels to which we may attribute some concrete meaning. An example is 
the case of temporal logic where the worlds are taken to be instants in time. A frame, then, 
is a pair (W, R) where Wis some set of worlds and R is some relation on W, for example 
R may be the identity relation on W, or the empty relation on W, or some sort of order 
relation on W (perhaps expressing temporal succession). 
The second part of a model, namely a valuation, serves to connect the members of W 
with assignments of truth values to atoms: for each world win W, the valuation will specify 
which atoms are true in w. 
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To summarise: A frame is defined as a pair (W, 'R) where W is a non-empty set and 'R 
is a binary relation on W. The relation 'R is called an accessibility relation. For w1, w2 E W, 
we say 'world w2 is accessible from world w1' iff ( wi, w2) E 'R. 
A valuation in a frame (W, 'R) is a function v with domain W x P and range {T,F}. 
Recall that P is the set of atoms. Intuitively v( w, p )=T means that p is true at the world 
wEW. 
A model is a triple M = (W, 'R, v) where (W, 'R) is a frame and v is a valuation in 
it. We call a model M = (W, 'R, v) explicit iff W ~ V, the set of assignments of truth 
values to the atomic sentences of the language, and v is defined in the obvious way namely 
v( w,p) = w(p) for all w E Wand p E P. 
Once truth values are assigned to atoms, truth values of all formulae can be found. We 
write M 11-w A with the intended meaning of 'The wf A is true at world w of the model 
M.' We write M ~w A with the intended meaning of 'The wf A is not true, i.e. is false, 
at the world w in the model M.' So, let M = (W, 'R, v) be a model. Then the following 
holds: 
M 11-w p iff v(w,p) = T where p E P 
M 11-w ·B iff M ~w B 
M 11-w (B V C) iff M 11-w B or M 11-w C 
M 11-w (B /\ C) iff M 11-w Band M 11-w C 
M 11-w (B-+ C) iff M 11-w C or M ~w B 
M 11-w (B +--+ C) iff either M 11-w B and also M 11-w C, 
or M ~w B and also M ~w C 
iff M II-w' B for all worlds w' E W which are accessible from w. 
The last item above specifies that a wf DA is true at a world win a model M = (W, 'R, v) 
iff the wf A is true at all worlds w' such that ( w, w') E 'R. This is one useful way to give 
meaning to D. Other ways will be described in later chapters. 
Let us look at an example. Say we have the language with P = {p, q} and we consider 
the model 
M = (W,'R,v) = ({wi,w2,w3,w4},{(wi,w2),(w1,w3),(w1,w4),(w2,w2),(w2,w4)},v) 
where the function v is defined as follows: 
v(wi,p) =T, v(w2,p) =T, v(w3,p) =F, v(w4,p) =F, 
v(wi,q) =T, v(w2,q) =F, v(w3,q) =T, v(w4,q) =F. 
Is the wf A = D (p V •q) true at world w1? Well, the wf (p V •q) is true at worlds W1, w2 
and w4, but it is false at world w3. Because worlds w2, w3 and w4 are all accessible from 
world w1 and (p V •q) is not true at all these worlds, the wf D(p V •q) is not true at world 
w1. Note, however, that D(p V •q) is true at world w2 because (p V •q) is true at the two 
worlds accessible from world w2, namely w2 itself and w4 . Further note that D(p V •q) is 
also vacuously true at worlds w3 and w4 - no world is accessible from either of them. 
Let us keep the model as above and consider the wf D(D(p V •q)). Is this wf true at 
world w1? Well, we have already seen that the wf D(p V •q) is true at worlds w2, w3 and 
w4, i.e. is true at all three worlds accessible from wi, so the wf D( D(p V •q)) is true at 
world w1 . The wf D(D(p V •q)) is also true at world w2 because (as we have seen above) 
the wf D(p V •q) is true at the two worlds accessible from w2, namely at worlds w2 and W4. 
Furthermore, the wf D(D(p V •q)) is vacuously true at worlds w3 and w 4 because no world 
is accessible from these two worlds. This means that the wf D(D(pV •q)) is true at all four 
worlds of the frame of this model. 
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A wf A which is true at all words w of the model M = (W, n, v), such as the last 
example above, is said to be valid (or globally true) in the model M and we write it as 
M If- A. Assume that some set of models is chosen (for example, the set of all models 
M = (W, n, v) associated with the frame (W, R) ). Relative to this semantics, it is possible 
to define notions of entailment and provability, and to examine the relationship between 
the notions. 
A wf A is entailed by a set r of wfs iff A is valid in every model (of the chosen semantics) 
in which each member of r is valid. We write it as r Fpw A where the pw serves to remind 
us that truth is defined in terms of possible worlds. Cn(f) is the set of all wfs entailed by 
r. As before we can construct a proof architecture and write r f-- A if A is provable from 
the set r. The set of all wfs provable from r is indicated by Th(f). The approach will be 
sound iff Th(f) ~ Cn(f) and it will be complete iff Cn(f) ~ Th(r). 
1.4 Logics of Belief 
Given a modal propositional language, how well can the knowledge or beliefs of an agent (or 
several agents) be represented in it? In order to read DA as 'The agent knows A' or 'The 
agent believes A', what restrictions or adaptations to the semantics would be necessary? 
What properties do we expect the accessibility relation to have? Let us investigate this last 
question. 
Consider any complex system that needs to be controlled. Examples are a nuclear 
powerplant, a chemical factory and a submarine. We think of such a system as having a 
control room manned by an agent. The control room is separate from the system but receives 
information about the system via sensors that monitor (some of the) components. A state 
of the system will be represented by an assignment f for a language with an appropriate 
set of atoms, say P = {pi,p2 , .•• ,pn}· The information available to the agent in the control 
room would give the values f (Pi) for (usually) some of the atoms. Without loss of generality 
we may assume that the control room reveals the values of f(p1), f(p2 ), ••• , f(Pk) for some 
k ~ n. 
Let V be the set of all possible assignments f : P --+ {T ,F}. Now assume that the system 
is in the state represented by assignment f. The only information available to the agent is 
that which is provided by the control room. As far as the agent is able to say, therefore, the 
system may be in any state that is represented by an assignment f' such that J'(p1) = f(p1), 
f'(p2) = f(P2), ... , f'(Pk) = f(Pk)· In other words the set V is partitioned into disjoint 
nonempty subsets, each of which contains the assignments which agree on pi, p2, . .. , Pk· 
(If, for example, n = 7 and k = 3 we will have eight equivalence classes, each containing 
sixteen assignments.) If k = 0 the partition consists of a single subset namely V since all 
assignments agree on pi,p2 , ••• ,pk for this value of k. If k = n the partition consists of 
the singleton subsets of V since no two assignments can agree on all Pi· We see that the 
agent's knowledge (or beliefs) may be represented with the help of an equivalence relation 
on V. The more limited the information provided by the control room, i.e. the closer k is 
to 0, the closer the equivalence relation is to (the trivial) V x V. The more complete the 
available information, i.e. the closer k is to n, the closer the equivalence relation is to the 
identity relation on V. 
Let M = (V, n, v) where n is the equivalence relation induced by such a partition on V 
and v the obvious valuation given by v(J, Pi) = f(Pi) for each i ~ n. In terms of our earlier 
definition M if- f DA iff M If-f' A for every assignment f' such that (!, J') E n. This 
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expresses the intuition that when the system is in the state (represented by) f, the agent, 
being unable to distinguish between f and the members f' of the set {J' I (!, f') ER}, will 
believe those wfs A that hold in all the equivalent states f'. For example let k < n and let 
the system be in state f with f(Pi) =T for all i ::; n. Then the agent will believe the wf 
Pi f\ P2 f\ ... f\ Pk, i.e. it will be the case that M If-f D (p1 f\ p2 f\ ... f\ Pk). The agent, however, 
will not believe P1 f\ P2 f\ ... f\ Pk f\ Pk+l even though this wf is true in the state J because 
there exist assignments f' which are equivalent to f but where this wf is false. Formally, 
M lf J D(p1 f\ p2 f\ ... f\ Pk f\ Pk+i) because there exists a state represented by J' such that 
(!, f') E R and M lf f' (Pi f\ P2 f\ ... f\ Pk f\ Pk+l ). We could just take the assignment J' 
such that f'(p;) = f(p;) for all i-:/:- k + 1 and J'(Pk+i)=F. 
Thus, given a model and a specific world, an agent knows or believes A if A is true in all 
worlds which he considers may be the actual state of the system, based on the information 
that he has. (Note that the use of the masculine singular pronoun is generic and not 
gendered.) 
1.4.1 One Ideally Reasoning Agent 
The above example shows that there may be situations where it is appropriate to choose 
the accessibility relation R to be an equivalence relation on the set W of worlds. As we 
know, an equivalence relation is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. What does this mean 
in terms of an agent and his beliefs? 
Suppose R is reflexive, i.e. the pair ( w, w) is a member of R for every w E W. This 
means that if the actual situation is w, the information available to the agent is such that 
he does not exclude the possibility that world w is the 'real' state of the system. In the 
example of the agent in the control room of a nuclear powerplant the real state w will be 
represented by an assignment agreeing on the atoms p1 , P2, ... , Pk with the information that 
is available to the agent. Thus the sensors are functioning correctly and the agent believes 
the information provided to him. 
For symmetry we have that for all w, w' E W, if ( w, w') E R, then also ( w', w) E R. 
Suppose the actual state of affairs is world w and the agent cannot distinguish between 
worlds w and w'. (His information is such that he considers w' as possibly the case while 
the situation actually is w.) Symmetry implies that if the actual situation were w', the 
information available to him would be such that he would consider world w as possibly the 
case. In the above example it means that the assignments representing states w and w' 
agree on atoms Pl, p2 , ••• , Pk and if either of the two states is the actual state of the system, 
the agent will include the other in the set of states that he considers possible. 
Assume the relation is transitive, i.e. for all w,w',w" E W, if (w,w'), (w',w") ER, 
then ( w, w") ER. What does this mean for our agent? Well, if the agent cannot distinguish 
between worlds w and w' when the actual state of affairs is w, and also cannot distinguish 
between worlds w' and w" when the actual state of affairs is w', transitivity suggests he will 
not be able to distinguish between states w and w" if the actual situation is w. Consider 
again the agent in the control room of the nuclear powerplant. If the assignments repre-
senting states w and w' agree on atoms p1 , p2 , .•• , Pk and those representing states w' and 
w" agree on pi, p2, ... , Pk, then the assignments representing states w and w" also agree on 
Pi, P2, ···,Pk· 
Suppose we restrict the accessibility relation to be an equivalence relation. What kind 
of beliefs will an agent have in such a case? It may be of help if we answer the following 
question: Which wfs will be valid in such frames? 
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First of all, consider a nonmodal wf A. We saw examples of such wfs that were valid in 
the nonmodal frame V consisting of all the truth assignments f: P-+ {T,F }. An example 
of such a wf is p V •p. We can easily show that such wfs are also valid in every modal frame 
(W, 'R). We do it as follows: 
Suppose M = (W, n, v) is any model relative to the frame (W, 'R) and A is any non-
modal wf valid in the nonmodal frame V. Then we have, for all w E W, that M \1-w A. 
Why? The reason is that the truth of (the nonmodal) A at w is determined in the usual 
manner by the valuation that extends the truth assignment f EV defined by f(p) = v(w,p) 
for every p E P. Note that the argument is independent of whether n is an equivalence 
relation or not. So the result holds for all accessibility relations. 
What can be said of the validity of wfs involving D in a frame with n an equivalence 
relation? It has been shown in the literature, for example [Goldblatt 1992], that given 
certain properties of a relation, certain schemas are valid in the corresponding frames, and 
vice versa. For example, when the accessibility relation of a frame is reflexive the schema 
DA-+ A is valid in that frame (see below), and conversely, if the schema DA-+ A is valid 
in a frame the accessibility relation of the frame is reflexive. 
In order to get a dearer picture of an agent's beliefs we select the following four modal 
schemas which are known to characterise frames (W, n) where n is an equivalence relation: 
1. (DA/\ D(A-+ B))-+ DB 
2. DA-+ A 
3. DA-+ DOA 
4. ·DA -+ 0-,DA 
As an exercise in applying the concepts of section 1.3 we show that all instances of these 
schemas are valid in such frames. Let M = (W, n, v) be a model with nan equivalence 
relation and let w E W. 
A wf of the form (DA/\ D(A-+ B)) -+ DB can only be false at world w if DB is false 
at w but DA/\ D(A-+ B) is true at w. Suppose this is the case. This means that the wf 
B is false at at least one world accessible from w, say at w'. For the wf DA/\ D(A -+ B) 
to be true at w, both DA and D(A -+ B) must be true at w. So the wf A must be true 
at all worlds accessible from w, thus also at w'. Similarly the wf A -+ B must be true at 
all worlds accessible from w, thus also at w'. Since A is true and B is false at w' this is, 
however, impossible. We have thus shown that this (first) schema is valid. Note that it is 
valid in any frame; it does not depend on the properties of the accessibility relation. 
A wf of the form DA-+ A can only be false at world w if DA is true at w but A is false 
at w. For DA to be true at w, A must be true at all worlds accessible from w, so also at w 
itself because of reflexivity. So DA -+ A cannot be false at w. 
Suppose a wf of the form DA -+ DOA is false at world w. This can only be the case 
if DA is true but DOA is false at w. For DOA to be false at w, the wf DA must be false 
at at least one world accessible from w, say at world w'. This means that the wf A must 
be false at at least one world accessible from w', say at world w". On the other hand, for 
the wf DA on the lefthand side of the original wf to be true at w, A must be true at both 
world w' and world w" (which are both accessible from w, because of transitivity). Since 
A cannot be both true and false at w" this is not possible. 
Finally a wf of the form -,DA -+ 0-,DA can only be false at world w if -,DA is true at 
w but 0-,DA is false at w. Suppose this is the case. For the wf 0 DA to be true at world 
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w, the wf DA must be false at w, i.e. A must be false at some world accessible from w, say 
world w'. For the righthand side wf to be false at w, the wf ·DA must be false at a world 
accessible from w, say at w". This means the wf DA must be true at w" and this means that 
the wf A must be true at all worlds accessible from w". Which worlds are accessible from 
w"? Well, we know that ( w, w"), ( w", w ), ( w, w') E n - remember the relation is symmetric 
- and so also ( w", w') E n because of transitivity. This then leads to a contradiction: A is 
both true and false at world w'. 
We have now shown that the four given modal schemas are valid in all frames with n 
an equivalence relation. All wfs which are valid in such frames can be deduced from these 
four axiom schemas and the following two rules (see for example [Fagin et al 1995]): 
from A and A-+ B infer B (modus ponens) and 
from A infer DA (necessitation). 
What do the four modal axiom schemas suggest about the beliefs or knowledge of an agent, 
given a model and a specific world? 
The fact that the agent knows or believes a wf A when the system is in state w is 
expressed by M lrw DA. Since the second axiom schema, DA -+ A, is valid, it follows 
that M lrw DA-+ A. Thus M lrw A, i.e. A really is true in state w. The axiom schema 
DA -+ A represents the notion that the agent knows (believes) only wfs that are true. This 
is usually taken as the key axiom when making a distinction between knowledge and belief. 
It seems feasible to have such an axiom in logics of knowledge, i.e. the agent can only 
know something if that something is true. In logics of belief, however, this is too strict a 
constraint - it is quite possible for an agent to believe something that is actually not true. 
Suppose the system is in state w and the agent knows or believes A, i.e. suppose 
M lrw DA. Since the schema DA-+ DOA is valid, M lrw DA-+ DOA, thus M lrw ODA 
which means that the agent knows that he knows A. The third schema above therefore 
represents the notion that the agent is able to perform positive introspection. Similarly, 
suppose the agent does not know or believe A when the system is in state w, i.e. suppose 
M lrw --,DA. Since the schema --,DA -+ 0--,DA is valid, M lrw --,DA -+ D 0 DA, thus 
M lrw 0--,DA, which means that the agent knows that he does not know A. So the fourth 
schema above represents the fact that the agent is able to perform negative introspection. 
Intuitively these two axiom schemas say that the agent is able to look at his knowledge base 
and be conscious of everything he knows and of everything he does not know. 
The schema (DA/\ D(A -+ B)) -+ DB together with the rule of necessitation (from 
A infer DA) ensures that the agent is logically omniscient. For example, necessitation 
expresses the fact that if M Ir A, then M Ir DA. In other words, if A is valid then the 
agent knows A. Furthermore, suppose the agent knows A and also knows A -+ B. One 
would then expect a suitably gifted agent to know B, and this is guaranteed by the first 
axiom schema, namely if M lrw DA and M lrw D(A-+ B), then M lrw DB. 
In this section we have therefore described a situation where an agent has knowledge 
(rather than beliefs which may be mistaken), knows what he knows and what he does not 
know, and further knows all the consequences of the things that he does know. Is this a 
good approximation of the situation in 'real life'? We will investigate the question in the 
next section. 
1.4.2 Points of Criticism 
In the previous section we have assumed that the accessibility relation n of the frames we 
considered were equivalence relations. This, however, is not always realistic. 
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Let us consider the agent in the control room of a nuclear powerplant and suppose it 
is possible that some of the sensors are malfunctioning. Now we can no longer assume 
that the available information will induce a partition on the set W of possible worlds. Say, 
for example, the sensor providing the information necessary to get f(p1 ) does not work 
correctly. The agent (not knowing this) believes the evidence and does not consider the 
actual state of the powerplant to be a possible state. Thus the accessibility relation is no 
longer reflexive. 
From the above it is clear that it is not realistic to assume that a partition is always 
induced by the information available to the agent, i.e. it is not always realistic to assume 
that the accessibilty relations of the frames are equivalence relations. 
What properties will the knowledge or beliefs of an agent have if we do not require n 
to be an equivalence relation? Well, suppose we consider frames where we do not require 
the accessibility relation to be reflexive. Then the second axiom schema above will fail to 
hold, i.e. not all wfs of the form DA -+ A will be valid in these frames. This means then 
that the restriction that an agent can only know something if it is true falls away. In those 
cases it is more appropriate to speak of believe instead of know. If we do not require the 
accessibility relation to be reflexive, we can include the situation where an agent believes 
something that is actually not true. 
If we do not require the accessibility relation to be symmetric, negative introspection 
falls away because then the fourth axiom schema above will fail to hold. This corresponds 
to a situation where the agent is not aware of everything that he does not believe. If we do 
not require transitivity the third and fourth axiom schemas fail to hold and both positive 
and negative introspection fall away. This corresponds to a situation where the agent is not 
always aware of what he believes. 
It is clear that by changing the properties of the accessibility relation we can remove 
positive or negative introspection and also the restriction that only true things are believed. 
However, the logical omniscience expressed by the first axiom schema and necessitation is 
a consequence of the possible world semantics itself and is unaffected by the properties of 
the accessibility relation n. In order to deal with more realistic agents it will be necessary 
to find an alternative to possible world semantics. 
1.5 Summary 
In this chapter we have briefly looked at the syntax and semantics of classical non-modal 
propositional languages and of (in less detail) classical non-modal predicate languages. In 
the final part of the chapter we have considered classical propositional modal languages - the 
syntax and some aspects of possible world semantics. We have, in particular, investigated 
the possible world semantics when the modal operator is read as 'The agent knows ... ' or 
'The agent believes ... '. 
In the following chapters we are going to take a look at different ways in which authors 
handle modal logics when the meaning of belief is attached to the modal operator. Some 
authors consider propositional modal logics only, while others look at both propositional 
and predicate modal logics. We will handle the latter as and when required. In the final 
chapter of the dissertation we take a brief look at guidelines for changing a set of beliefs 
when new information becomes available. 
Chapter 2 
Moore's Autoepistemic Logic 
There are four sorts of men: 
he who knows not and knows not he knows not: he is a fool - shun him; 
he who knows not and knows he knows not: he is simple - teach him; 
he who knows and knows not he knows: he is asleep - wake him; 
he who knows and knows he knows: he is wise - follow him . 
.Arabian proverb 
Moore [Moore 1985] described a logic called autoepistemic logic for modeling the beliefs 
of an ideally reasoning agent who reflects on his own beliefs. He was particularly interested 
in representing arguments of the following form: 'If I had an elder brother I would have 
known it. I do not know it. So I do not have an elder brother.' Such arguments are 
'defeasible' or 'nonmonotonic' because the agent would have to retract his conclusion (that 
he has no elder brother) if he becomes aware that an older brother does in fact exist. 
More formally, classical propositional modal logic (see section 1.3) is monotonic in the 
sense that, given a wf B, every sentence A valid in the frame determined by a set of 
sentences r will still be valid in the set of models of r U { B}, i.e. if r p A, then f U { B} p 
A. .A system which is capable of handling nonmonotonic arguments such as the above 
would, however, lack this property, i.e. if the set r of axioms is augmented by the addition 
of the new axiom B, then it may be the case that the wf A which was 'entailed' by r 
would no longer be 'entailed' by r U {B}. The possible world semantics of modal logic 
provides a monotonic entailment relation, hence Moore found it necessary to replace it by 
a new semantics of his own invention. The essential idea is that beliefs can be divided into 
two classes: objective beliefs concerned with the state of affairs 'out there' and subjective 
beliefs concerned with the internal state of affairs revealed by introspective reflection. .An 
autoepistemic interpretation would therefore have two components, one representing the 
state of affairs 'outside' the agent and the other representing the internal state of affairs 
revealed by introspection. 
2.1 Autoepistemic Interpretations 
We are interested in sets of autoepistemic wfs which represent the total beliefs of an agent 
capable of reasoning about his own beliefs. .Autoepistemic wfs are just wfs of a classical 
propositional modal language, but the adjective 'autoepistemic' is intended to signal that 
truth values are allocated to wfs in a new way. In classical propositional modal logic the 
17 
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truth value of a wf A without any modal operator depends only on the assignment of truth 
values to atoms; the truth value of a wf DA is determined with the help of an accessibility 
relation on the set of possible worlds but is (eventually) reducible to the truth of nonmodal 
wfs. In autoepistemic logic, however, there is no systematic connection between the truth 
of a wf A (as determined by an assignment of truth values to atoms) and the truth of a wf 
DA. The truth of a belief A where A does not contain the modal operator can (still) be 
checked by looking 'outwards', i.e. at the specified world (truth assignment), but the truth 
of a belief DA should be checked by looking 'inward', i.e. the truth value of DA depends on 
whether A is indeed believed or not. To capture this intuition DA is evaluated with respect 
to a set of wfs representing the beliefs of the agent. Such a set should therefore be explicitly 
included in any autoepistemic interpretation. 
Following Lukaszewicz [Lukaszewicz 1990], we define an autoepistemic interpretation of 
a language as a pair (!, T) where f is an assignment of truth values to the atoms of the 
language and Tis a set of wfs. Intuitively f specifies what is true in the outside world and 
T specifies the wfs which the agent believes. 
We write (J, T) p- A with the intended meaning of 'The wf A is true in the interpretation 
(!, T) '. Following Moore, truth values are given to the wfs of the language by the rules 
below: 
(J, T) If- p iff f(p) = T where p E P 
(J, T) If- ·B iff (J, T) lf B 
(J, T) If- (B v C) iff (J, T) If- B or (!, T) If- C 
(!, T) If- (B /\ C) iff (J, T) If- B and (!, T) If- C 
(J, T) \f- (B-+ C) iff (!, T) \f- C or (J, T) lf B 
(!, T) \f- (B ~ C) iff either (!, T) \f- B and also (!, T) \f- C, 
or (!, T) lf B and also (!, T) lf C 
(!, T) \f- DB iff BET. 
We see a wf DA is true if and only if A is in the set T. Thus the set T itself completely 
determines the truth of all wfs of the form DA, independently of the assignment of truth 
values to the atoms. So the agent and the world together determine an autoepistemic 
interpretation. An autoepistemic model of a set S of autoepistemic wfs is an autoepistemic 
interpretation (!, T) of the language in which all the wfs of S are true. In particular an 
autoepistemic interpretation (!, T) will be a model of T iff all the wfs of T are true in it, 
i.e. iff all the agent's beliefs are actually true in this interpretation. 
Let us look at an example. Say our agent is in the control room of a nuclear power 
station where for simplicity we assume he has only to watch a screen with a green and a red 
light. We use the language with two atoms p and q where we think of pas 'The green light is 
on' and q as 'The red light is on'. Suppose the agent's beliefs are represented by T = {p, q}, 
but the actual situation is that only the green light is on, i.e. f(p) =T but f( q) =F. Clearly 
one of the agent's beliefs (namely q) is false in the interpretation, so (!, T) is not a model 
of his beliefs. The interpretation is, however, a model of (say) the set S = {p, q-+ p, Dq}, 
since (!, T) \f- p and (J, T) \f- q-+ p (because f(p) =T) and (!, T) \f- Dq (because q ET). 
With this semantics in mind, we would like to find out what beliefs an ideally reasoning 
agent should accept on the basis of a set r of initial beliefs. We assume the agent to be ideal, 
in other words we wish to ignore the limitation that resource-boundedness might impose on 
the agent's capacity to be aware of all the consequences of his beliefs. This means the set 
of beliefs should be closed under an appropriate form of entailment. In a monotonic logic 
the set of beliefs would be Cn(f) or Th(f) where r is the set of initial beliefs. What is 
the analogue in autoepistemic logic of the semantic or deductive closure of a set f? Several 
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other questions can also be asked. For example, in classical logic every interpretation has 
associated with it a theory, namely the set of all sentences true in that interpretation. 
Given an autoepistemic interpretation (f, T) and bearing in mind that T is the agent's set 
of beliefs, we may ask whether (f, T) is a model of T. Other questions are whether notions 
analogous to soundness and completeness could be formulated in autoepistemic logic. 
2.2 Belief Sets 
The obvious way to characterise the set of beliefs entertained by an ideally reasoning agent 
on the basis of a set r of initial beliefs would be to define a suitable semantic consequence 
relation I= or a deductive consequence relation f- and to describe the belief set as Cn(f) or 
Th(f ). It is, however, not obvious what would constitute a suitable consequence relation 
and so Moore followed a less direct approach. In fact, Moore gives three different charac-
terisations of such belief sets: as autoepistemic extensions, as stable extensions and as the 
theory determined by a certain kind of possible world model (explicit complete SS-models). 
The definition of an autoepistemic extension is primarily semantic in origin, and relies 
on a clever reformulation of the familiar notions of soundness and completeness. The notion 
of soundness in classical logic, i.e. if r f- A, then r I= A, or equivalently Th(f) ~ Cn(f), 
may be formulated as follows. If we take any A E Th(f), then r I= A, i.e. A is true in 
every model of r. In other words Th(f) is sound if all its members are true in every model 
off, or equivalently, the deductive closure of r, Th(f), is sound iff every model of r is a 
model of Th(r). Now we are able to define soundness in autoepistemic logic. We do it with 
respect to a set of premises: 
• A set T is sound with respect to a set r of premises iff every autoepistemic interpre-
tation (f, T) which is an autoepistemic model of r is also an autoepistemic model of 
T. 
Since we are trying to model the beliefs of a rational agent it seems reasonable to require 
that his set of beliefs should be sound with respect to his initial beliefs: the beliefs should 
be true if the premises are true. 
The notion of completeness in classical logic, i.e. if r I= A, then r f- A, or equivalently 
Cn(f) ~ Th(f), may be formulated as follows. Any wf A E Cn(f) should belong to the 
deductive closure Th(r) of r. Thus we require that Th(f) contains all wfs that are true in 
every model of r. Now we are ready to define completeness of a set: 
• A set T is semantically complete iff T contains every wf that is true in every autoepis-
temic interpretation (f, T) which is an autoepistemic model of T. 
Since we assume that the agent is an ideal reasoner his set of beliefs should be semantically 
complete: his set of beliefs should contain all wfs that are entailed by his original beliefs and 
his awareness that he believes them. By this we implicitly assume that time and memory 
are unbounded. 
From the above it seems reasonable to expect the belief set of an agent to be sound 
with respect to the premises, semantically complete and, finally, to include all the premises. 
This brings us to the definition of an autoepistemic extension of a set: 
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• A set T is an autoepistemic extension of a set r iff 
T is sound with respect to r, 
T is semantically complete and 
r s;; T. 
So, one very natural way to describe the belief set of an ideal reasoner is to regard the terms 
'belief set' and 'autoepistemic extension off' as synonymous. 
The above approach to characterise belief sets does have the drawback of appearing to 
ignore the ideal reasoner's capability to perform introspection. The notion of stable sets 
makes this capability explicit. Informally the belief set of a rational and ideally reasoning 
agent should include every wf A that he could infer either by classical logic or by reflecting 
on what he believes and does not believe. To catch this intuition Stalnaker [Stalnaker 1980] 
has suggested that the belief set of an ideally rational agent should be stable where stability 
is defined as follows: 
• A set T of wfs is stable iff T satisfies the following three conditions: 
if Ai,A2, ... ,An ET and Ai,A2, ... ,An f- B, then BET, 
if A E T, then DA E T and 
if A~ T, then -iDA ET. 
However, the problem remains of how inference should be understood. What is the 
meaning of f- in the first property that stable sets should have? One straightforward 
approach is to interpret f- as the semantic consequence relation involving arbitrary au-
toepistemic interpretations, i.e. to regard A f- B as an abbreviation of 'B is true in every 
autoepistemic interpretation (!, T) that is a model of A'. Since T varies over all sets of 
wfs, one is essentially looking at all possible ways to associate truth values with wfs of the 
form DC. An equivalent approach which has the virtue of emphasising that the truth of 
DC does not in any way depend on the truth of C, is to define a new semantics for the 
language based on the idea of a nonmodal interpretation. 
Let f be any assignment of truth values to the atoms and to the wfs of the form DA of 
the language (in other words, think of wfs of the form DA as being additional atoms). The 
assignment f can be extended in the usual way to a valuation VJ assigning a truth value to 
every wf of the language: 
v1(P) 
v1(DA) 
v1(-iA) 
v1(A VB) 
v1(A /\ B) 
v1(A--+ B) 
v1(A ~ B) 
= f(p) 
= f(DA) 
=T 
=T 
=T 
=T 
=T 
for all p E P, 
for every wf beginning with D, 
iff v1(A) = F, 
iff v1(A) =Tor v1(B) = T, 
iff v1(A) = T and v1(B) = T, 
iff v1(A) =For v1(B) = T, 
iff either v1(A) = T and v1(B) = T, 
or v1(A) = F and v1(B) = F. 
We call such a valuation a nonmodal interpretation of the language. A nonmodal model 
of a set T of wfs is a nonmodal interpretation of the language in which all the wfs of T 
are true. We see nonmodal interpretations and models of a set of autoepistemic wfs are 
precisely those we would get in ordinary propositional logic if we treat all wfs of the form 
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DA as atoms. As before, a wf A is entailed by a set r iff A is true in every model of r 
and we write it as r Fnm A where the nm serves to remind us that the interpretations 
underlying the entailment relation are nonmodal interpretations. We inherit the soundness 
and completeness theorems of propositional logic, i.e. given a set r of wfs, r Fnm A iff 
r I- A. This means then that the first condition that must be satisfied for stability, namely 
'if Ai, A2, ... , An E T and A1 , A2, ... , An I- B, then B E T', may be phrased equivalently 
as 
if Ai,A2, ... ,An ET and Ai,A2, ... ,An Fnm B, then BET. 
Whenever a wf A is entailed in this way by a set r of autoepistemic wfs, i.e. whenever 
it is the case that r Fnm A or (equivalently) r I- A, we will say that A is a tautological 
consequence of r. 
Given a nonmodal interpretation, we define the associated autoepistemic interpretation 
corresponding with it as follows: For every a nonmodal interpretation VJ the associated 
autoepistemic interpretation is (g, T) where g is the restriction of f to the set of atoms 
and Tis the set of all wfs A such that DA is true with respect to VJ· Similarly, for every 
autoepistemic interpretation (!, T) the associated nonmodal interpretation is the valuation 
v9 where g is defined by g(p) =Tiff f(p) =T, for all p E P, and g(DA) =Tiff A E T, for 
all wfs of the form DA. 
Lemma 2.1 For every wf A, A is true in an autoepistemic interpretation (!, T) if! A is 
true in the associated nonmodal interpretation v9 • 
The result follows directly from the definition of associated interpretations. • 
Let r Fae A abbreviate the assertion that the set r autoepistemically entails the wf A, 
i.e. that A is true in every autoepistemic interpretation (!, T) which is an autoepistemic 
model of r. Then the following corollary follows from lemma 2 .1: 
Corollary 2.1 r Fnm A if! r Fae A, in other words Fnm = Fae• 
Assumer Fnm A. From lemma 2.1 we know that all the members of the set rand the 
wf A will be true in all the associated autoepistemic interpretations of the nonmodal models 
of these wfs. Can it be the case that there exists some other autoepistemic interpretation 
in which all members of r are true but in which the wf A is false? No, because then the 
members of r would be true and the wf A false in the associated nonmodal interpretation 
and this contradicts the assumption that r (nonmodally) entails A. A similar argument is 
used to prove the corollary in the opposite direction. • 
From the corollary above it follows that the first condition that must be satisfied for 
stability, namely if Ai, A2, ... , An E T and Ai, A2, ... , An Fnm B, then B E T, may be 
phrased equivalently as 
if Ai, A2, ... , An ET and Ai, A2, ... , An Fae B, then B ET. 
It seems clear that the belief set of an ideal reasoner should be stable. A stable belief set 
contains all the beliefs of the agent in the sense that no further conclusions can be drawn. 
However, the stability conditions say nothing about what should be excluded from T. If we 
specify merely that the belief set should be stable, beliefs that in no way can be built up 
from the initial beliefs of the agent are not excluded. We need a constraint specifying that 
the only wfs which may be members of the belief set should be the premises and those wfs 
required by the stability conditions. This is where groundedness in a set of premises comes 
m: 
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• A set T is grounded in a set r iff T is included in the tautological consequences of 
r u {DA I A ET} u { -iDA I A~ T}. 
From the above it seems reasonable to expect the belief set of an agent to be stable and 
grounded in his set of initial beliefs r. This brings us to the definition of a stable extension 
of a set: 
• A set T is a stable extension of a set r iff 
r ~ T, 
T is stable, and 
T is grounded in r. 
So, a second very natural way to describe the belief set of an ideal reasoner is to regard the 
terms 'belief set' and 'stable extension off' as synonymous. 
Are the above-mentioned two natural ways to think of a belief set really different? In 
the next section we show that the two conjectures are in fact equivalent. In section 2.5 we 
examine the third approach which turns out to be very useful in practical applications. 
2.3 Equivalence of Two Approaches 
Let us assume the agent's belief set is stable. The first condition for stability ensures that 
the agent is able to perform all inferences, the second that he is aware of all his beliefs and 
the third that he is aware of everything that he does not believe. Suppose the belief set is, 
in addition to being stable, also consistent. Then the set will also have the following two 
properties: 
if DA E T, then A E T and 
if -iDA E T, then A ~ T. 
Why? Well, if DA E T but A ~ T, then -iDA E T (because of stability) and the set 
T would be inconsistent. Similarly, if -,DA E T, and A E T, then DA E T (because of 
stability) and again T would be inconsistent. 
Suppose we have a stable and consistent belief set T and a nonmodal model of it. Then, 
by lemma 2.1, the associated autoepistemic interpretation will also be a model of T. This 
fact will be needed in some of the remaining proofs of the chapter. 
Now we are going to show that the truth of any wf of a stable belief set T in an au-
toepistemic interpretation (!, T) depends only on the truth of the wfs without any modal 
operator (the so-called objective wfs of T). This means that if the objective wfs of the 
(stable) belief set are true, all the wfs of the set are true. We need the following lemma 
[Lukaszewicz 1990] in the proof of the theorem: 
Lemma 2.2 For any wf A there is a wf 
A' = C1 /\ C2 /\ ... /\ Cn 
where for each Ci there exist k and r such that Ci can be written in the form 
Ai V DA~ V DA1 V ... V DA1 V -iDA1+i V -iDA1+2 V ... V -iDA1+r' 
with Ai objective, which is such that A and A' have the same modal depth (i.e. their 
modal operators are nested to the same depth), I- A ..-+ A' and, for any set T closed under 
tautological consequence, A E T iff A' E T. 
By taking all occurrences of the form DB as atoms, the result follows directly from the 
fact that every classical propositional wf is equivalent to a wf of the form C1 /\ C2 /\ ... /\ Cn 
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where all Ci, i = 1, ... , n, are disjunctions of atoms or negations of atoms. • 
Now we are ready to prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.1 Given a stable set T and an autoepistemic interpretation (!, T) of the lan-
guage, if the interpretation is a model of the objective wfs of T, then it is a model of T. 
Suppose first that T is a stable belief set and (!, T) is an autoepistemic interpretation 
of the language and suppose further all the objective wfs of Tare true in this interpretation 
(thus the interpretation is a model of the objective wfs ). Tis consistent, because otherwise 
it would include all wfs of the language but not all the objective wfs of the language are 
true in the interpretation (for example the wf (p /\ •P) is not true). Let A be any wf in T. 
We may assume that A is in the form C1 /\ C2 /\ ... /\ Cn, where, for each of these wfs Ci, 
there exist k and r such that the Ci can be written in the form 
Ai V DA~ V DA~ V ... V DAi V --iDAi+i V --,DAi+2 V ... V --,DAi+r' 
where Ai is an objective wf. Now we have two possibilities: 
(i) At least one of DA~, DA~, ... , DAi, --iDAi+l' --,DAi+2 , •.• , --iDAi+r is in the set T. 
But we know that if a wf of the form DB is in T, then B E T (because of stability and 
consistency), so DB is true in any autoepistemic interpretation (!, T) of the language. 
Further, if a wf of the form ·DB is in T, then B rf. T (again because of stability and 
consistency), so DB is false in any autoepistemic interpretation, therefore -,OB is true in any 
autoepistemic interpretation(!, T). It follows then that Ci is also true in the interpretation. 
(ii) Say (i) does not hold. Because Tis stable, it will contain all of -,DA~, ·DA~, ... 
, --iDAi, DAi+l , DAi+2 , •.• , DAi+r· Then Ai must be a member of T because Ci E T. 
But A1 is true in the interpretation (it is an objective wf), so it follows that Ci is also true 
in the interpretation. 
We have shown that every Ci is true in the interpretation. We may thus conclude that 
A is true in the interpretation and, because A was an arbitrarily chosen wf of T, the inter-
pretation is an autoepistemic model of T. • 
This theorem means then that any stable set is sound with respect to its objective wfs. 
Now we can prove that the (syntactic) property of stability is equivalent to the (semantic) 
property of completeness: 
Theorem 2.2 A set T of autoepistemic wfs is semantically complete iff T is stable. 
First we assume that we have a stable belief set T and want to show that this set is 
semantically complete, i.e. that the set contains all wfs that are true in all autoepistemic 
models (g, T) of T. We do it by showing that if a wf A rf. T, then there is an autoepistemic 
model (g, T) of Tin which A is false. So, let A be any wf not in T and again we assume 
A is in the form C1 /\ C2 /\ ... /\ Cn where each Ci is in the form 
Ai V DA~ V DA~ V ... V DAi V ·DAi+i V --,DAi+2 V ... V --iDAi+r' 
where Ai is an objective wf. Since T is stable and A rf. T, at least one of the Ci is not 
in T. Let Ct rf. T. This means that none of the wfs Ai, DA~, DA~, ... , DAi, --iDAi+i, 
·DAi+2 , ••• , --,oAt+r can be in the set T. We are now going to show that there exists an 
autoepistemic model (g, T) of T in which all these k + r wfs are false. We look first at the 
wf Ai and then at the other disjuncts. 
Consider Ai. Because Tis st~ble and Ai rf. T, Ai cannot be a tautological consequence 
of the objective wfs of the set. By the completeness theorem for propositional logic, there 
must be a truth assignment f to the atoms of the language which is such that Ai is false, but 
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all the objective wfs of T are true. Now consider the autoepistemic interpretation (!, T). 
We will have (!, T) ~Ai and (!, T) jl- B for all objective wfs BET. So, by theorem 2.1, 
(!, T) is an autoepistemic model of T in which Ai is false. 
Now consider the other disjuncts of Ct. We have already seen that none of them is in T, 
thus they must all be false in any autoepistemic interpretation (g, T) of T, also in (!, T). 
Therefore all the disjuncts of Ct are false in this autoepistemic model of T, which means 
then that also Ct is false in this interpretation. We may conclude that the autoepistemic 
interpretation (!, T) is a model of Tin which the wf A is false. 
To prove the theorem in the opposite direction, we assume T is semantically complete: 
any wf A which is true in every autoepistemic model (g, T) of T, will be in T. Let (!, T) 
be an arbitrary autoepistemic model of T. If we show that a wf A is true in this model, it 
must be true in every autoepistemic model (g, T) of T because the model was arbitrarily 
chosen. The wf A will then be in T because of the semantic completeness of the set. We 
now show that the three conditions for stability hold. 
Suppose Ai, A2, ... , An E T and Ai, A2, ... , An l=nm B. Because (!, T) is an au-
toepistemic model of T, Ai, A2, ... , An will all be true in the model and, because B is a 
tautological consequence of Ai, A2, ... , An, B will also be true in the model. Thus B E T. 
Let us look at the second property that must hold and suppose A E T. Because (!, T) is an 
autoepistemic interpretation, DA will be true in it, thus DA E T. Thirdly, suppose A ~ T. 
Because (!, T) is an autoepistemic interpretation, DA will be false in it, which means -.DA 
will be true, thus ·DA E T. We therefore conclude that Tis stable. • 
We have seen that stability of an agent's belief set is equivalent to its semantic com-
pleteness. Now we show that groundedness is equivalent to soundness. 
Theorem 2.3 A set T of autoepistemic wfs is sound with respect to a set of premises r if! 
T is grounded in r. 
Suppose first that T is grounded in r. This means that every wf A E T is included 
amongst the tautological consequences of r U {DB I B ET} U {·DB I B ~ T}. We want to 
show that T is sound with respect to r, i.e. that every autoepistemic interpretation (g, T) 
which is an autoepistemic model of r is an autoepistemic model of T. 
Suppose (!, T) is any autoepistemic interpretation of the language in which all the wfs 
of f are true and suppose A E T. If A E f, then A is trivially true in the interpretation. 
If A is of the form DB where B E Tor if A is of the form --,OB where B ~ T, then A is 
true in (!, T) (from the definition of an autoepistemic interpretation). So, all members of 
r u {DB I B E T} u {·DB I B ~ T} are true in the interpretation, so all their tautological 
consequences are also true in the interpretation. Since all wfs of T are included in this set, 
the interpretation is an autoepistemic model of T. But (!, T) was an arbitrarily chosen 
interpretation in which all the wfs of r were true, so every autoepistemic interpretation 
(g, T) which is an autoepistemic model of r is an autoepistemic model of T, i.e. Tis sound 
with respect to r. 
To prove the theorem in the opposite direction, we assume T is sound with respect to 
r, i.e. every autoepistemic interpretation (g, T) which is a model of r is an autoepistemic 
model of T. We must show that T is grounded in r, i.e. that every wf A E T is a 
tautological consequence of the set T' = r U {DA I A ET} U {·DA I A~ T}. 
Let v J be any nonmodal model of T'. Further, let g be the restriction of f to the atoms 
of the language. For any wf A ET, we will have DAE T', so DA will be true in VJ. Also, 
for any wf A ~ T, we will have --,DA E T', so DA will not be true in VJ· This means DA 
Moore's Autoepistemic Logic ------------------------25 
is true in VJ iff A E T, thus (g, T) is the associated autoepistemic interpretation of VJ. 
Because r ~ T' it follows from lemma 2.1 that (g, T) is a model of r. So, by soundness, the 
interpretation is an autoepistemic model of T. But, again from lemma 2.1, we know that 
every wf A that is true in (g, T) is true in VJ· Because VJ was chosen arbitrarily, every wf 
in T is true in every nonmodal model of T'. By the completeness theorem for propositional 
logic, every wf in Tis therefore a tautological consequence of T'. So, Tis grounded in r . 
• 
In this section we have shown that the two sets of properties that intuitively seemed 
appropriate for characterising the belief set of an ideal reasoner are equivalent. The belief 
set T of such an agent should be the autoepistemic extension of the set r of initial beliefs. 
These sets will grounded in r and will be stable, i.e. will be stable extensions of r. 
Will it always be possible to construct a belief set from a given set of initial beliefs? The 
answer is no. Some sets of premises do not have any stable extensions, some have one and 
some have more than one stable extension. An example of a set with no stable extension is 
the following: Suppose the set of premises of the agent is r = { •Dp --+ p} and suppose S 
is a stable set which includes the set r. Now p ES because if p ~ S, then °Dp ES which 
leads to a contradiction. But, if p E S, the set S would not be grounded in r. Why not? 
Well, S would not be sound with respect to f: one model of r is an interpretation making 
both p and 0 Dp false and this interpretation will certainly not be a model of S. Thus r 
has no stable extension. 
Suppose we have two agents, both ideal reasoners. The belief set of each contains 
objective wfs, representing beliefs about the outside world, and modal wfs. Suppose the 
two agents have exactly the same beliefs about the outside world. Will their belief sets be 
the same? 
2.4 Objective Wfs Determine Stable Sets 
We have seen in theorem 2.1 that any stable set is sound with respect to its objective wfs. 
We can go even further: a stable set is uniquely determined by its objective wfs. This is 
formally stated by the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.4 If two stable sets contain the same objective wfs, then the two sets are 
identical. 
Suppose two stable belief sets Ti and Ti. contain the same objective wfs. If Ti contains 
all wfs, the objective wfs p and •P will both be present, but then Ti. will also consist of all 
wfs, so in this case we have that Ti = Ti,. So we assume the two sets are both consistent. 
Suppose now A E Ti. We want to show that then A E Ti,. We do it by induction on the 
modal depth of A. 
If the modal depth of A is 0, the result follows immediately because A is an objective 
wf. Now suppose the modal depth of A is d > 0 and that, if two stable belief sets contain 
the same objective wfs, then they contain exactly the same wfs of modal depth less than d. 
We may assume that A is in the form C1 /\ C2 /\ ... /\ Cn, where, for each of these wfs 
Ci, there exist k and r such that the Ci can be written in the form 
Ai V DA~ V DA~ V ... V DAi V 0 DAi+i V 0 DAi+2 V ... V 0 DAi+r• 
where A{ is an objective wf and where none of these wfs has a modal depth of more than 
d. We have to consider three possible cases for each Ci: 
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(i) DA~ E 7i for some j, 2:::; j ~ k. Then, because of stability and consistency, Aj E 7i_. 
Since the modal depth of A~ is one less than the modal depth of DAj, it is certainly less 
than d and so, because of the induction hypothesis, Aj E 72. But then DA~ E 72 (stability), 
hence also G_; E 72 as it is a tautological consequence of DAj. 
(ii) 0 DAj E 7i for some j, k + 1 ~ j ~ k + r. Then, because of stability and consistency, 
A~ r/. 7i_. Since the modal depth of A~ is one less than the modal depth of ·DA~, it 
is certainly less than d and so, because of the induction hypothesis, Aj rf. 72. But then 
·DA~ E 72 (stability), hence also C; E 72 as it is a tautological consequence of --,DA~. 
(iii) Suppose neither (i) nor (ii) holds. Because 7i_ is stable it must contain all of ·DA~, 
--,DA~, ... , •DAi, DAi+l' DAi+2, ... DAi+r. But A~ is a tautological consequence of 
these wfs and Ci, so that Ai E 7i_. Since Ai is an objective wf, also Ai E 72. But C; is a 
tautological consequence of Ai, so we conclude that C; E 72. 
In each of the three cases we have shown that C; E 72. This will be true for all 
i, 1 ~ i ~ n, so we have that A E 72. Since A was chosen arbitrarily, every wf in 7i_ is 
also in 72. In the same way we can show that every wf in 72 is also in 7i_ from which we 
conclude that the two sets contain exactly the same wfs. • 
Does this theorem mean that two agents with fi and f 2 as their respective sets of initial 
beliefs will have exactly the same belief set if f i and f 2 contain the same objective wfs? 
No. Say, for example, f i = {p, D·q} and f 2 = {p, Dq}. Then the stable extension off i 
will include the wf •q and the stable extension of f 2 will include the wf q, i.e. the first 
agent will believe •q and the other one will believe q. According to the theorem the two 
agents will have identical beliefs, though, if all their objective beliefs are the same. So if 
the two sets of initial beliefs are such that (i) they contain the same objective wfs and (ii) 
the objective wfs which can be deduced from these sets are the same, then it will be the 
case that the respective belief sets are identical. 
2.5 A Link with Possible World Semantics 
In section 1.3.2 we described the possible world semantics of a classical propositional modal 
language. A model M was defined as a triple (W, R, v) for some set W of possible worlds, 
some accessibility relation R ~ W x W and some valuation v specifying, for each w E W, 
which atoms are true. Let T be the set of all wfs valid in a possible world model M. An 
obvious question now arises: Is T a belief set? In general the answer is no, but Moore 
[Moore 1984] shows that if M is a possible world model of a certain kind, then T is very 
close to being a belief set. 
Suppose M = (W, R, v) is such that R = W x W. This means that R is an equivalence 
relation and further that every world is accessible from every world. Such models are called 
complete SS-models. Our first theorem is the following: 
Theorem 2.5 A set T of wfs is stable iff T is the set of all wfs which are valid in some 
complete SS-model. 
Suppose Tis the set of wfs which are true in every world of some complete S5-model, 
M. We want to show that T is stable. The first property to be checked is that of closed-
ness under tautological consequence, i.e. we must check that, if Ai, A2, ... , An E T and 
Ai, A2, ... , An l=nm B, then B E T. Let r = {Ai, A2, ... , An} and suppose M 11-w f and 
r l=nm B. We want to show that M 11-w B. Now let f be the assignment which is such 
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that, for all p E P, we have f(p) =T iff M lf-w p and, for all wfs of the form DC, we 
have f(DC) =Tiff M lf-w DC. The extended valuation VJ satisfies exactly those wfs A for 
which it is the case that M lf-w A. (This is easily proved by noting that the assertion holds 
for atoms and wfs of the form DC from the definition off and then by using induction.) 
Thus it satisfies all members of r, hence also B (because r nonmodally entails B) and so 
M lf-w B. 
The second property to be checked to establish that Tis stable is that DA E T if A E T. 
Well, if A E T it means that A is true in every world w E W which means that DA is true 
in every world w E W, so DA E T. The third property necessary for stability is that, if 
A r/. T, then -,DA E T. If A rf. Tit must be the case that there is some world Wk (say) 
where A is not true. This means then that DA cannot be true at any world because Wk is 
accessible from all worlds, so ·DA is true at all worlds and therefore ·DA E T. We have 
thus proved that T is stable. 
To prove the theorem in the other direction, we assume we have a stable set T. Let To 
be the set of all the objective wfs of T. We want to show that T consists of all wfs which 
are true in some complete SS-model. If T contains all wfs of the language, these wfs are 
all true in the complete SS-model where W is empty. We thus assume T does not contain 
all wfs of the language, i.e. we assume the set is consistent. Let V be the set of all truth 
assignments f such that f(A) =T for all A E To. (The set V cannot be empty because 
T is consistent.) Suppose C is an objective, valid wf which is entailed by To in the sense 
of classical propositional logic, thus To l=nm C. Then T l=nm C and this means C E T 
(because Tis stable, it is closed under tautological consequence), thus C E To. Consider 
now the explicit complete SS-model (V, R,v) with v(w,p) = w(p) for every w EV and every 
p E P. (So this is the model where we identify each possible world with a particular truth 
assignment which will make all the objective wfs true and where vis compatible with this.) 
The set To is exactly the set of (objective) wfs which are true in every world of this model. 
By applying the first part of this theorem, this means that To contains all the objective wfs 
of some stable belief set T' (say) which are true in every world of the model. But, according 
to theorem 2.4, T = T'. Therefore we may conclude that T is the set of wfs true in every 
world of a complete SS-model. • 
The theorem shows that every stable set of wfs may be characterised by an explicit 
complete SS-model M = (W, n, v), i.e. a complete SS-model in which W ~ V, the set 
of assignments of truth values to the atoms of the language, and where v is defined as 
v( w, p) = w(p) for all w E W and p E P. Let T be the set of all sentences valid in such a 
model M and let f E V. Then (!, T) is an autoepistemic interpretation of the language. 
Is (!, T) a model of T? The answer is yes provided that the assignment f is chosen to be 
compatible with M, i.e. provided that f E W. This is stated formally in the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 2.6 Given an explicit complete SS-model M = (W, n, v) with T the stable set of 
wfs valid in M, and an autoepistemic interpretation (!, T). Then the following holds: 
(i) If f E W, then the autoepistemic interpretation (!, T) is an autoepistemic model of 
T. 
(ii) If the autoepistemic interpretation (!, T) is an autoepistemic model of T, then 
f E W, provided that there are only finitely many atoms in the language. 
( i) Suppose f E W. (Hereby we implicitly assume the set Tis consistent, otherwise W 
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would be empty.) Then every wf A E T, i.e. every wf A that is valid in M, will also be 
true in world f, thus A will be true in the autoepistemic interpretation (!, T). For atoms, 
it follows directly. For more complex wfs a straightforward inductive argument suffices. By 
way of illustration, consider the case A = DB and assume A E T. Then B E T because T 
is stable and consistent. Thus A is true in (!, T). This means then that the interpretation 
is an autoepistemic model of T. 
(ii) In the opposite direction, suppose f rf. W. This means that for each world Wi E W, 
there will be some atom, Pi (say), for which f(Pi) :/:- v( Wi,Pi) = Wi(Pi)· (The Pi are not 
necessarily distinct.) For each i, take either Pi (if v(wi,Pi) =T) or -ipi (if v(wi,Pi) =F) and 
form their disjunction, B (say). This will be a finite disjunction because there are only a 
finite number of atoms in the language, thus only a finite number of possible worlds. The 
wf B will be true in every world w E W, so BET, but it will be false inf. Thus(!, T) is 
not an autoepistemic model of T. • 
We have now seen that under certain circumstances the semantics of Moore's autoepis-
temic logic is compatible with the possible world semantics described in chapter 1 of this 
dissertation. This fact gives us a useful tool for the construction of stable extensions. This 
will be illustrated in the next section. 
2.6 Examples of Belief Sets 
As mentioned before, a set of autoepistemic wfs may have none, one or more stable exten-
sions and we looked at an example of a set with none. Let us now consider a set which has 
two stable extensions, using the language with two atoms, p and q. Say the premises of the 
agent are the set r = {-iDp --+ q, -iOq --+ p }. (Let us think of p as 'I am able to win' and 
of q as 'I am going to lose'. Then the agent believes that, if he does not believe that he is 
able to win, he will lose and, if he does not believe that he will lose, he will be able to win.) 
We are going to show that this set has two stable extensions, one containing the belief p 
(and not the belief q) and the other containing the belief q (and not the belief p). Let us 
examine the explicit complete SS-models that can be constructed. In only two cases will 
the stable set associated with the model be a stable extension of r. 
Let fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, be the following assignments of truth values to the atoms: ft (p) = 
fi(q) =T, h(p) =T and h(q) =F, h(p) =F and h(q) =T and f4(p) = f4(q) =F and, 
initially, W = { wi, w2, w3 , w4 } where each Wi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, is the world represented by fi· 
The accessibility relation R is the cartesian product of the set of worlds, so we have an 
explicit complete SS-model M = (W, R,v). According to theorem 2.S the set T of all wfs 
true at each of the four worlds will be a stable set. A stable extension, however, includes 
the premises. This is not the case with T, for example at w2 the wf -iOp is true but the wf 
q is false. The same problem occurs when we take any combination of three of the worlds 
as our set W. 
Suppose we take w = { Wi, w2}. Then M = (W' n, v) with n = w x w is an explicit 
complete SS-model. According to theorem 2.S there will be a stable set T of autoepistemic 
wfs which are true at every w E W. Furthermore, the initial beliefs are both true at these 
two worlds and therefore belong to T. Is the set T a stable extension of the premises f? 
Well, we know it is semantically complete (because it is stable) and we know the premises 
are included. Further, Tis sound with respect to the premises r since from theorem 2.6 we 
know that the autoepistemic interpretations (!1 , T) and (h, T) that are models of r are 
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models of T because in each case fi E W. So, T is indeed a stable extension of the initial 
beliefs of the agent. We see that p E T because p is true at every world of the model M 
and that q rj. T because q is not true at every world of the model M. 
Let us write down a few of the wfs that the agent will believe in this case. 
• All propositional wfs entailed by p must be included: 
(p v -ip), (p v q), (p v -iq), p. 
• Because of stability we have to include 
D(p V -ip), D(p V q), D(p V -iq), Op. 
• The following objective wfs are not included: (-ip V q), (-ip V -iq), q, (p +-+ q), (p + q), 
-iq, -ip, (p /\ q), (p /\ -iq), ( -ip /\ q), (-, /\ -iq), ( -ip /\ p), so the following wfs must be in 
the set because of stability: 
-iO(-ip V q), -iO(-ip V -iq), -iOq, -iO(p +-+ q), -iO(p + q), -,0-,q, -,0-,p, -iO(p /\ q), 
-iO(p /\ -iq), -iO(-ip /\ q), -iO(-i /\ -iq), -,0(-ip /\ p ). 
(Note that (p + q) abbreviates (p /\ -iq) V (-ip /\ q).) 
Suppose we take W = { w1 , w3 }. Again both initial premises are true at these two 
worlds. M = (W, 'R, w) with 1?, = W x Wis an explicit complete SS-model and, as above, 
there will be a stable set T of autoepistemic wfs which are true at every w E W. The 
autoepistemic interpretations (!1 , T) and (h, T) are autoepistemic models of T. The set 
T includes the premises r and, as in the argument above, we can show that it is a stable 
extension of the premises. But this set will include the wf q as a belief (because it is true 
at all worlds of the model M) and not p. 
We have found two different belief sets which are both stable extensions of r. What 
about other combinations of worlds: will they perhaps result in other stable extensions? If 
we take any other combination of two worlds, neither premise is included in the set T and 
so we do not get a stable extension. What about sets of worlds containing only one world? 
Let us consider W = { w1}. Both premises are included in T, but we encounter a different 
problem: we have that p E T and q E T but the autoepistemic interpretation (/4, T) is a 
model of the initial premises but not of T since p and q are not true in the interpretation. 
This means then that the set is not sound with respect to the set of initial beliefs, thus T 
is not a stable extension of the premises. The same kind of problem occurs if we choose 
W = { w2} or W = { w3}, and if we choose W = { w4}, the premises are not included in T. 
Finally, suppose we take Was the empty set. The stable set T of wfs true at each world of 
this set is the set of all wfs. But although the set of all wfs does contain r it is not a stable 
extension of r because it is not grounded in r. 
From the above we see that it may be the case that an ideal reasoner can end up with 
one of several possible belief sets, all based on the same set of premises! Moore raised 
the question of, given the fact that a set r of premises may lead to more than one stable 
extension, how autoepistemic logic should be viewed as a logic ([Moore 1985]). Suppose we 
were to view r as a set of axioms, what would be the analogue of Cn(f) or Th(f)? In the 
case where r has a unique stable extension T, it would be natural to regard T as the set of 
'consequences' or 'theorems' of r. (The use of the term 'theorem' would however commit 
us to the construction of a suitable proof theory.) What if r has more than one stable 
extension? A proposal originally made by McDermott and Doyle in the context of their 
own nonmonotonic logic ([McDermott et al 1987]) would involve forming the intersection 
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of all the stable extensions of r. An outside observer, informed only of the agent's initial 
beliefs, would have no way of picking out the stable set that constitutes the agent's belief 
set. But the sentences in the intersection are precisely those that the outside observer could 
be sure must belong to the agent's belief set. 
To illustrate the way in which this intersection captures the intuitive notion of 'conse-
quence', albeit with the aid of a very simple example, consider formalising the argument 'If 
I had an elder brother I would have known it. I do not know it. So I do not have an elder 
brother.' The premises of the argument are taken to be the initial beliefs of the agent (in 
this case a single wf), so r = {p--+ Dp} where we think of pas 'I have an elder brother'. 
The wf -.Op becomes a belief of the agent because of stability (pis not a belief). We claim 
that the conclusion of the argument, -.p, belongs to the intersection of all stable extensions 
of r. To see this it is sufficient to construct all explicit complete S5-models and to exam-
ine their associated stable sets. Let us use the language with one atom namely p. When 
W = 0 the stable set of wfs true at every world of W (namely the set of all wfs) will not 
be grounded in r, thus will not be a stable extension. Suppose we take W = { w1, w2} and 
let fi(p) =T represent the world w1 and fz(p) =F represent the world w2 , the first premise 
will not be valid in the model (W, 'R, w). If W = { w1 } the second premise will not be valid 
in the model. For W = { w2}, however, both premises will be valid in the model and we 
get a stable extension T that contains the wf -.p. So the belief 'It is not the case that I 
have an older brother' is in the belief set of the agent. We have constructed all possible 
stable extensions (actually only one) and the sentence -.p is in their intersection, as claimed 
above. 
Suppose at some stage an older brother does appear on the scene with convincing docu-
mentation. The agent, being rational, believes the evidence and revises his set r of premises 
to, for example, {p--+ Dp,p}. His belief set, namely the stable extension of r, will now 
include p --+ Dp, p and Dp, but will no longer include the wf -.p. In this sense autoepistemic 
logic is nonmonotonic. 
2.7 Summary 
Autoepistemic logic was the first satisfactory use of modal logic to describe nonmonotonic 
inference, [Ginsberg 1987]. What about other features of logics of belief? 
In chapter 1 we saw that providing a modal language with a possible world semantics 
in which the accessibility relation 'R was an equivalence relation resulted in a picture of an 
agent capable of positive and negative introspection, aware of all the consequences of his be-
liefs, and whose beliefs were all true (i.e. embodied knowledge rather than mere conviction). 
The notion of a stable extension in Moore's autoepistemic logic fits the picture of an agent 
still capable of positive and negative introspection and still aware of the consequences of his 
beliefs (although the word 'consequence' means something a little different). But, while in 
the context of a possible world semantics, sentences of the form DA --+ A were globally true, 
in autoepistemic logic we have a weaker version. The agent's beliefs are not necessarily true 
(consider, for example, the belief set containing all sentences), but the agent believes that 
they are: every stable extension will contain all wfs of the form DA --+ A, representing the 
agent's confidence in himself - he believes that whenever he believes a sentence A, then A 
is the case. 
A second difference is that autoepistemic logic provides no proof theory representing a 
way in which an agent might construct his belief set from a set r of initial beliefs. In the 
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context of possible worlds in chapter 1 an agent in a world w who believed a wf would be 
able to deduce further beliefs with the aid of valid sentences such as DA -+ A and rules 
of inference such as modus ponens and necessitation. This aspect is addressed in the next 
chapter where the approach of Levesque [Levesque 1990] is discussed. 
Although Moore focusses on rational, ideally reasoning agents the semantics itself does 
not depend on that. For example no connection is made between the truth of a wf D(p /\ q) 
in some interpretation and the truth of the wfs Op and Dq. But how the belief set of an 
irrational agent or of an agent who is not an ideal reasoner should be constructed is not 
obvious. The sets will neither be stable nor grounded in the initial premises. Moore himself 
[Moore 1984] suggests that the only way out is simply to list all wfs of the form DA which 
are true in some interpretation. We will return to this in a later chapter when Konolige's 
approach is discussed [Konolige 1986]. 
Chapter 3 
Levesque's Version 
'Tis with our judgments as our watches; none 
Are just alike, yet each believes his own. 
Pope. 
In the previous chapter we saw that, in Moore's autoepistemic logic, the beliefs of 
an agent were the members of a set of wfs satisfying certain requirements or constraints, 
for example positive introspection. These constraints were given in the metalanguage. Is 
it possible to express such requirements in the object language, i.e. the relevant modal 
language? Let us consider the somewhat simpler constraint expressing the idea that A is 
believed whenever A is true. A natural first attempt would be to include all instances of the 
schema A---+ DA in the belief set of the agent. But a member of the belief set of the form 
A ---+ DA actually expresses the notion 'The agent believes that if A is true, then A will be 
believed' instead of the constraint 'If A is true then A is believed'. Perhaps it would be easier 
to express constraints if it were possible to distinguish beliefs from other wfs in a syntactic 
way instead of semantically by having some set T to which they must belong. This is a key 
feature of Levesque's approach: if T is a belief set then the fact that A E T is equivalent 
to the condition that DA is true in the situation under consideration ([Levesque 1990]).The 
constraint 'A is believed whenever it is true' now seems to be adequately captured by the 
axiom schema A ---+ DA which acts to exclude situations or worlds in which A is true but 
not believed. 
This brings us to the second key feature of Levesque's approach, namely a generalisation 
of the possible world semantics. We will find a direct analog of the original idea that A is 
believed in a state w iff A is true in all worlds 'accessible from' w or 'similar to' w. This 
return to a semantics closely related to the possible world semantics produces a monotonic 
logic. And this is the third key feature of Levesque's approach: nonmonotonic patterns of 
reasoning are represented with the help of a new modal operator 0, standing for 'The agent 
knows only ... '. 
Finally, whereas Moore used a propositional language, Levesque uses a predicate lan-
guage. Since it proves to be possible to capture notions like stability in Levesque's version 
one can view· his approach as a generalisation of Moore's autoepistemic logic to predicate 
languages. We will first consider the propositional part and later have a brief look at the 
predicate part. 
32 
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3.1 Belief Sets 
We use the alphabet of classical modal logic with the addition of one letter namely 0. In 
other words our alphabet is S = PU {-i, V, /\, ~, f-+, o, 0, (,)} where Pis the set of atoms. 
The set F of wfs (sentences) of the language is defined as before with the addition of one 
rule, namely 
if A E F, then O(A) E F 
and we omit parentheses if no ambiguity can arise. 
Whereas the operator D is read as 'The agent believes that ... ', the operator 0 is 
supposed to be read informally as 'The agent believes only that ... '. The challenge is to 
define a semantics so that the wf 0 A will be interpreted as 'The agent believes only that 
A' or, equivalently, 'A is all that is believed by the agent'. 
The objective wfs of the language are those containing neither D nor 0, the basic wfs 
are those that do not contain the 0 operator and the subjective wfs are those wfs all of 
whose atoms occur inside the scope of D or 0. Examples of subjective wfs are -,O(p /\ q), 
0( q V Op) and Op ~ Op. A wf like p V Dq is basic and a wf like p V Oq is neither objective, 
nor basic, nor subjective. 
Let w be an assignment, i.e. a function from the set P to the set {T ,F} and let V 
be the set of all assignments. Levesque's semantics develops two ideas met in chapter 1: 
possible worlds will, as in the case of explicit models, be taken to be assignments, and 
beliefs will still be seen as sentences true relative to a set of worlds (intuitively those worlds 
the agent considers 'accessible'). Instead of using an accessibility relation to associate with 
each world w a set of similar worlds, we will work directly with pairs W, win which W ~ V. 
Following Halpern and Lakemeyer [Halpern et al 1995] we call a pair W, w a situation and 
write W,w If- A with the intended meaning of 'The situation W,w satisfies the wf A' or, 
equivalently, 'A is true in the situation W, w '. (Nate that it is not necessarily the case that 
w E W.) Formally we have the following definition: 
W,w If- p 
W,w If- -,A 
W,w If- (AV B) 
W,w lf-(A/\B) 
W,w If- (A~ B) 
W,wlf-Af-+B 
W,w If- DA 
W,w If- OA 
iff w(p) = T where p E P 
iff W,w ~A 
iff W, w If- A or W, w If- B 
iff W, w If- A and W, w If- B 
iff W, w ~ A or W, w If- B 
iff either W, w If- A and also W, w If- B, 
or W,w ~A and also W,w ~ B 
iff for every w' E W, W, w' If- A 
iff W, w If- DA and 
for every w', if W, w' If- A then w' E W. 
We see, for example, that the wf Op is true in a situation W, w iff p is true at every 
world in W and the wf Op is true in a situation W, w iff p is true at every world in W 
and at no other world. The truth of a subjective wf A in a given situation W, w does not 
depend on w, so in that case we often write W If- A instead of W, w If- A and similarly we 
often write w If- A when A is an objective wf. Note that the truth of OA is defined in terms 
of DA. As soon as we have specified which wfs of the form DA, with A basic, are true, the 
truth or falsity of all wfs of the form 0 A is determined. 
Informally the beliefs entertained by the agent in a situation are those sentences that 
are true in all worlds w E W. The formal definition of a belief set is the following: 
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• A set Tis a belief set for W iff T = {A I A is basic and W If- DA}. 
The key idea of the semantics above is that sentences can be matched with sets of 
worlds. In a language with a finite number of atomic sentences every set of worlds can be 
distinguished from every other set of worlds by looking at sentences true in the respective 
sets. However, in a language with infinitely many atomic sentences, there may be several 
sets of worlds in which precisely the same sentences are true. (This becomes obvious when 
we reflect upon cardinalities; the language has countably many sentences but there are 
uncountably many assignments.) Levesque thus defines the notion of equivalence between 
sets of worlds and gives a standard way to pick representatives of the equivalence classes. 
The formal definition of equivalent sets of assignments is the following: 
• A set W1 is equivalent to a set W2 iff 
for every basic A we have that W1 If- DA iff W2 If- DA. 
Each set W of assignments has a unique largest superset w+ which is equivalent to it 
(proven below) and this set is used as the representative of the relevant equivalence class. 
A corollary tells us how this maximal set can be constructed from W, namely 
• w+ = {w I for every basic A, if w If- DA, then w, w If- A}. 
Suppose T is a belief set for W. Then w+ satisfies DA for every A E T and is maximal 
with respect to this property. 
In the next section we prove the existence and uniqueness of a largest equivalent superset 
ofW. 
3.2 Maximal Sets 
In this section we show that the equivalence class of a set W of assignments always contains 
a unique maximal element and then illustrate the importance of these maximal elements 
for a suitable definition of satisfiability and entailment. 
We start by defining the set w+, given any set W of assignments. 
• For any set W of assignments, w+ = { w I W is equivalent to WU { w }}. 
From the definition it follows that the set w+ is the set of all assignments that can be 
added to the set W without changing any beliefs. Clearly W ~ w+. It remains to show 
that w+ is equivalent to w' that w+ is maximal in this regard and that the equivalence 
class of W has no other maximal members. 
Lemma 3.1 Given two equivalent sets W1 and W2 , the following holds for any basic A and 
any world w: 
Wi, w If- A iff W2, w If- A. 
The result follows immediately for atomic sentences and by induction for negations, 
conjunctions, et cetera, as well as for sentences of the form DB (from the definition of 
equivalent sets). • 
The second lemma is non-intuitive but the result is needed in later proofs. 
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Lemma 3.2 Let W and W* be any two sets of assignments. Suppose that for every w E W* 
and every basic A such that W If- DA, we have that W, w If- A. Then W is equivalent to 
W*UW. 
Let W and W* be any two sets of assignments and assume for every w E W* and every 
basic A such that W If- DA, we have that W, w If- A. We are going to use induction to 
show that for any w and any basic A, 
W,w If- A iff (W* U W),w If- A. 
This clearly holds for atomic sentences and by induction for negations, conjunctions, et 
cetera. What about sentences of the form DB? Well, suppose firstly for some w we have 
W, w If- DB, in other words W If- DB. By the definition of satisfiability it then follows that, 
for every W1 E W, we have W, w1 If-Band, by the induction hypothesis, (W*UW), w1 If- B. 
But, from the initial assumption we know that because W If- DB, it is the case that W, w2 lf-
B for all W2 E W* and hence, again by the induction hypothesis, (W* U W), w2 If- B. Thus, 
for every w3 E W* U W, we have that (W* U W), w3 If- B, thus that (W* U W) If- DB, so 
(W* U W),w If- DB. 
To prove the assertion in the opposite direction, suppose for some w, (W*UW), w If- DB, 
in other words (W*UW) If- DB. Then, for every w1 E W*UW, we have (W*UW), w1 If- B, 
thus for every w2 E W, (W* U W), w2 If- B. By induction it follows that, for every w2 E W, 
W, W2 If- B, hence W If- DB, so W, w If- DB. • 
Now we are ready for the theorem stating that every set of assignments has one and 
only one equivalent largest superset. 
Theorem 3.1 w+ is the unique largest superset of a set W of assignments which is equiv-
alent to it. 
We first prove that W is equivalent to w+. Consider any w E w+ and any basic A 
such that w If- DA. From the definition of w+ it follows that w is equivalent tow u { w} 
and thus (WU { w}) If- DA and hence (WU { w} ), w If- A. But by lemma 3.1 then also 
W, w If- A. We arbitrarily chose the world w E w+ and the basic sentence A, so by lemma 
3.2 it follows that W and Wu w+ are equivalent. However, W ~ w+ and thus W is 
equivalent tow+. 
Now we prove that any other set which is equivalent to Wis a subset of w+. Suppose W' 
is such a set and w E W'. Consider any basic A such that W If- DA. Then also W' If- DA 
because Wand W' are equivalent sets. So W', w If- A and, by lemma 3.1, W, w If- A. Then, 
by lemma 3.2, it follows that W is equivalent to Wu { w }. From the definition of w+ it 
then follows that w E w+. So we have that W' ~ w+. 
We have thus succeeded in showing that w+ is the unique largest equivalent superset 
ofW. • 
Theorem 3.1 shows that there is one and only one way to extend a set of assignments 
to make it as large as possible. This extension will not change the truth value of any basic 
sentence, so will also not change in a given situation whether a sentence is a belief or not 
(by lemma 3.1, since the two sets are equivalent). Such maximal sets have the following 
characterisation: 
Corollary 3.1 For every set W of assignments, 
w+ = {w I for every basic A, if w If- DA, then W,w If- A}. 
Let W* = { w I for every basic A, if W If- DA, then W, w If- A}. We first show that 
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W* ~ w+. Let w be any element of W*. Then, for every basic A, if W Ir DA, then 
W, w Ir A. But from lemma 3.2 we know that then Wis equivalent to WU { w }, thus from 
the definition of w+ we have w E w+. 
Now we show that w+ ~ W*. Let w be any element of w+. So Wis equivalent to 
WU { w }. Consider any basic A such that W Ir DA. Then (WU { w}) Ir DA, therefore 
(WU {w}),w Ir A, thus (by lemma 3.1) W,w Ir A. This means that for every basic A, if 
W Ir DA, then W,w Ir A, and hence w E W*. • 
A set r is satisfiable iff there is a maximal set W and an assignment w such that, for 
every A E r' it is the case that w' w If- A . We write w' w If- r. Further' a set r entails a 
wf A, written as r f= A, iff the set r U {-.A} is not satisfiable, and a wf A is valid iff it is 
entailed by the empty set. 
Is the maximality of W in the definition of entailment necessary? Suppose we were to 
change the given definition of satisfiability by dropping the requirement that W be maximal. 
This would make no difference to basic wfs. It will, however, make a real difference in 
the case of a wf containing the 0 operator. Let us illustrate this, using a language with 
countably many atoms Pi, i = 1, 2,.. .. Consider the wf p1 ahd let W be the set of all 
assignments that map p1 onto T. The set W is maximal, because if we add any world 
w (j. W to it, it will no longer be the case that W Ir Dp1 , i.e. the wf p1 will no longer be 
believed. Now define the set r to be 
r = {DA I A is basic and w Ir DA} u {-.DA I A is basic and w Ir -.DA}. 
The notation W Ir -.DA is a convenient alternative to W ~DA. 
We have that w Irr. Because w Ir Dp1 and also, if w Ir Pl then w E w, it follows 
that W Jr Op1. Thus both Dp1 and Op1 are satisfied by W. Further, Dp1 is entailed by 
the set r. Is Op1 also entailed by f? Yes, because r u { -.Opi} is unsatisfiable. We show it 
as follows: 
Suppose it is not the case, i.e. suppose ru{ -.Opi} is satisfiable. Then there is a maximal 
set W' (say) and an assignment w such that W', w Ir A for every A Er and W', w Ir -.Op1. 
This means that we will have 
W', w Ir Dp1 (because Dp1 Er) and W', w Ir -.Op1, 
i.e. 
W', w Ir Dp1 and W', w ~ Opi, 
i.e. 
W', w' If- P1 for all w' E W' and W', w" If- P1 for some w" (j. W'. 
But we know W' ~ W because W contains all w where p1 is true, and, for the same reason, 
w" E W. From corollary 3.1, however, we see that W' is not maximal since we can add w" 
to W' because p1 is true at w". This contradicts the choice of W'. 
We have shown that Op1 is entailed by r. Now we will show that if the maximality 
requirement in the definition is dropped, then Op1 is no longer entailed by r. We will do 
this by constructing a non-maximal set W* which is equivalent to the (maximal) set W 
above. 
Let w1 be the member of W which maps all Pi, i = 1, 2, ... onto T and consider the set 
W* = W \ { w1}. This set is equivalent to W and although Levesque only states the fact, 
we will prove it here for completeness sake. We therefore want to show that, for every basic 
A, W Ir DA if and only if W* Jr DA. The result from left to right follows easily because 
W* ~ W, but the other direction, i.e. if W* Ir DA, then W Ir DA, is less simple to prove. 
First note that the sentence A can only contain a finite number of atoms which will be 
amongst pi,p2, ... ,pm for some m. Let Fm~ F be the set of sentences generated by these 
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m atoms. In order to prove the result we need two lemmas. 
Lemma 3.3 Suppose C is a basic sentence of Fm. Let v1 and v2 be two worlds coinciding 
on all the atoms in C. Then the following holds for any set V of worlds: 
V, V1 If- C iff V, V2 If- C. 
We are going to prove the result by induction. Suppose X is the subset of Fm con-
taining all the basic sentences A for which the result holds. First we have to show that 
{pi,p2, ... ,pm} ~ X. So, suppose V,v1 II- Pi for any 1 ~ i ~ m. Then V,v2 II- Pi trivially. 
Similarly, if V, V2 II- Pi, then V, V1 II- Pi· Thus Pi E X for every i. Suppose now A E X. Is 
it the case that ·A E X? Well, assume V, v1 II- •A. Then V, v1 [,JL A and by the induction 
hypothesis, V, v2 [,JL A, so V, v2 II- •A. Also, if V, v2 II- •A, then V, v2 [,JL A and by the 
induction hypothesis, V, V1 [,JL A, so V, v1 II- •A. Thus •A E X. The results for the other 
connectives can be proved in a similar way. Let us look at the case where A E X and 
investigate whether DAE X. Suppose V, v1 II- DA. Then we immediately get V, v2 II- DA 
since V1 and v2 do not play any role. Similarly, if V, v1 [,JL DA, then V, v' [,JL A for some 
world v' EV and we will have V,v2 [,JL DA because (again) v1 and v2 do not play any role. 
Thus DAE X. • 
Lemma 3.4 Suppose C is a basic sentence of Fm. Then the following holds with the sets 
W and W* as defined above and v arbitrary: 
W, v I 1- C iff W*, v I 1- C. 
We are going to prove the result by induction. Let X be the subset of Fm containing all 
the basic sentences A for which the result holds, i.e. W, v II- A iff W*, v II- A for all worlds 
v. First we have to show that {pi,p2 , .•• ,pm}~ X. So suppose for any 1 ~ i ~ m we have 
W, v I 1- Pi. Then W*, v I 1- Pi and similarly in the other direction. Thus Pi E X for all i ~ m. 
Suppose A E X. Is it the case that •A E X? Well, assume W, v II- •A. Then W, v [,JL A, 
i.e. W*, v [,JL A (by the induction hypothesis), thus W*, v II- •A. Similarly, if W, v [,JL •A, 
then W,v II- A, so by the induction hypothesis W*,v II- A. Thus we have W*,v lJL •A. So 
•A EX. Suppose A,B EX. Is it the case that AV BEX? Well, suppose W,v II-AV B. 
Then W, v II- A or W, v II- B, thus W*, v II- A or W*, v II- B by the induction hypothesis, so 
W*, v I 1- A V B. Similarly, if W*, v I 1- A V B, then W*, v I 1- A or W*, v I 1- B, thus W, v I 1- A 
or W, v II- B by the induction hypothesis, so W, v II- A VB. Thus AV B E X. The results 
for the other nonmodal connectives can be proved in a similar way. Let us look at the case 
where A EX and investigate whether DAE X. Suppose W,v II- DA. Then we have that 
W,v' II- A for all v' E W. By the induction hypothesis we have that W*,v' II- A for all 
v' E Wand so, since W* ~ W, that W*,v' II- A for all v' E W*, thus W*,v II- DA. In the 
other direction, suppose W, v [,JL DA. Then there exists a world v" E W (say) such that 
W, v" [,JL A and, by the induction hypothesis, W*, v" [,JL A. Now we have two possibilities: 
either ( i) A is not satisfied at some situation W*, v" where v" is a world in W* or (ii) A is 
satisfied at W*, w for all worlds w E W* and not satisfied at W*, v" where v" (j. W*. In the 
first case, i.e. if W*, v" [,JL A where v" E W*, we can conclude that W*, v [,JL DA. Suppose, 
however, we have case (ii). Then v" can only be world wi, i.e. the world mapping every 
atom Pi of F onto T. Now we construct a world namely w2 coinciding with w1 on all the 
atoms of Fm ~ F. So, define w2 E W* ~ W as the world that maps pi, p2, ... , Pm onto 
T and all other atoms onto F. Now we have W*,w1 [,JL A, but W*,w2 II- A. But this is 
impossible according to lemma 3.3. We conclude thus that v" E W* and so W*, v [,JL DA. 
Thus we have that DA E X. • 
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At last we are in a position to show that if W* If- DA, then W If- DA. But now the 
equivalence of the two sets W and W* follows immediately from lemma 3.4 above. 
We know that W* is not maximal. We still have W* If- r (easily seen by applying lemma 
3.4) and r I= Dp1, but it will no longer be the case that r I= Qp1 . Why not? Let us see: 
W*, W1 If- Pl 
W* ~ Qp1 (because there is a world which is not a member of W* where p1 is true) 
W* If- ...,Qpl 
W* If- r u ...,Qp1, 
which means that the set r U { -,Qpi} is satisfiable. 
This example shows that if, when discussing satisfiability, we do not specify that the 
set W of worlds should be maximal, we may have a set of worlds that is artificially small: 
worlds are excluded but there is no additional information to account for it. In the example 
world w1 was excluded but there is no basic wf that is true in the smaller set of worlds and 
not true in the original set of worlds. By restricting ourselves to maximal sets this problem 
is avoided. We conclude the section with the following summarising theorem: 
Theorem 3.2 The maximality requirement in the definition of satisfiability is a necessary 
condition. 
The result follows immediately from the counterexample and lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 above . 
• 
3.3 Stability 
In order to relate a belief set as defined by Levesque to the belief sets of Moore's autoepis-
temic logics we need the notion of stability, which depends on a suitable entailment relation. 
As in chapter 2 we use valuations which treat sentences of the form DA or QA as atoms. 
Levesque uses a slightly different notation where he splits the function into two disjoint 
sets: an assignment w mapping the members of Ponto the set {T,F} and a second function 
e mapping all wfs of the form DA and QA onto {T,F}. Let e, w If-nm A abbreviate the 
assertion that the pair 8, w nonmodally satisfies (called 'first-orderly satisfies' by Levesque) 
the wf A. Then the following rules hold: 
e, w If-nm P iff w(p) = T where p E P 
e,w If-nm ·A iff 8,w ~nm A 
e, w If-nm (Av B) iff e, w If-nm A ore, w If-nm B 
e, w If-nm (A/\ B) iff e, w If-nm A and e, w If-nm B 
e, w If-nm (A-+ B) iff e,w ~nm A or e,w If-nm B 
e' w If-nm A .....,. B iff either e, w If-nm A and also e, w If-nm B, 
or(}, w ~nm A and also(}, w ~nm B 
e, w If-nm DA iff O(DA) = T 
e, w If-nm QA iff O(QA) = T. 
A set r is nonmodally satisfied by e, w iff for every A E r we have that (}, w If-nm A. 
A set r nonmodally entails a wf A iff the set r U {-,A} is not nonmodally satisfiable and 
we write it as r Fnm A. If a set of wfs is satisfiable, it will be nonmodally satisfiable. (We 
simply specify 8 in such a way that it is compatible with W: O(DA) =Tiff W, w If- DA and 
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B(OA) =Tiff w, w If- OA.) 
Now we are able to give the definition of a stable set: 
• A set T of basic wfs is stable iff the following three conditions hold: 
if T Fnm A, then A ET, 
if A E T, then DA E T and 
if A (j. T, then --,DA E T. 
As before we see a stable set is closed under (nonmodal) entailment and positive and negative 
introspection. 
We are going to show that a stable set corresponds exactly to the notion of a belief set 
as defined by Levesque but first have to prove another result for which we need the notion 
of an adjunct of a set. 
• A set S is an adjunct of a set T iff 
S ={DA I A is basic and A ET} U {·DA I A is basic and A (j. T}. 
We give some interesting and useful results connected with an adjunct of a set. 
Lemma 3.5 A stable set includes its adjunct. 
The result follows immediately from the definitions of adjunct and stability. • 
Lemma 3.6 Suppose T is a belief set of W and S the adjunct of T. Then W If- S. 
For A = DB E S we have that B E T (from the definition of an adjunct) and thus 
W If- DB, i.e. W If- A. For A= --,OB ES we have that B (j. T (from the definition of an 
adjunct) and thus W lJl- DB, thus W If- ·DB, i.e. W If- A. • 
We know that every belief set T is defined in terms of a set W of assignments and by 
theorem 3.1 we know that W can be taken as maximal without loss of generality. Is it pos-
sible that distinct belief sets can be associated with the same W or that distinct maximal 
sets can be associated with the same belief set T? The answer is no, proved in the following 
lemma, suggested by corollary 2.9 in [Levesque 1990]: 
Lemma 3. 7 The mapping between maximal sets of assignments and belief sets is bijective. 
From the definition of a belief set it follows directly that distinct belief sets cannot be 
associated with the same maximal set of assignments. 
To prove the lemma in the opposite direction, let T = {A I A is basic and W If- DA} 
with W maximal and with adjunct S = {DA I A is basic and A E T} U {•DA I A is basic 
and A (j. T}. Then W If- S from lemma 3.6. Suppose now some other maximal set W* of 
assignments is such that T = {A I W* If- DA}. Then it will also be the case that W* If- S, 
again from lemma 3.6. But then Wand W* are equivalent and hence identical because both 
are maximal. Why are they equivalent? Well, if W If- DB, then BET and so W* If- DB, 
and if W* If- DB, then BET and so W If- DB. • 
Lemma 3.8 Suppose S is a set of basic sentences which contains an adjunct to a stable 
set. Then S is satisfiable iff it is nonmodally satisfiable. 
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We know that if S is satisfiable, then it will be nonmodally satisfiable. To prove the 
theorem in the other direction, we assume S contains an adjunct to a stable set T and is 
nonmodally satisfiable by (), w, so (), w If-nm S. Let W = { w' I (), w' If-nm T}. We are going 
to show that for any w' and any basic wf A we have that W, w' If- A iff 0, w' If-nm A. It 
clearly holds for atomic sentences (because then only w' plays any role) and by induction 
also for any objective sentence. What about sentences of the form DA? Let us see. 
Suppose first that (), w' If-nm DA, i.e. O(DA) =T. Can it be the case that -iDA E S? 
No, because if it were the case we would have that -,DA is nonmodally satisfied by (), w', 
so DA will not be nonmodally satisfied which means that O(DA) would have to be F. But 
this then means that A E T. (Why? Well, if A tJ. T, then -,DA would be in the adjunct of 
T which is a subset of S.) From the definition of Wit then follows that for every w' E W 
we have that 0, w' If-nm A. By induction then W, w' If- A and so W If- DA. 
Suppose secondly that (), w' lfnm DA, i.e. O(DA) =F. Reasoning as above we then 
have that DA tJ. S and so A tJ. T. But T is a stable set and thus closed under nonmodal 
entailment, so TU { -iA} is nonmodally satisfiable. This means that there must be a pair 
()*, w' such that()*, w' If-nm TU { -iA}. But the functions() and()* cannot differ on basic wfs: 
both satisfy all wfs in T and T contains either DA or -iDA for all basic A (by stability). 
So we have 0, w' If-nm TU { -iA}. But this means then that w' E W (from the definition of 
W). Thus there exists aw' E W such that(), w' If-nm -iA. By induction then W, w' If- -iA. 
Therefore W If- -,DA. 
So, for every w' we have that W, w' If- A iff (), w' If-nm A. Therefore we have W, w If- S, 
thus S is satisfiable. • 
Suppose S is a set of basic sentences containing an adjunct to a stable set and A is any 
basic sentence. It then follows from the above theorem that S I= A iff S l=nm A. Now we 
are able to prove that stable sets and belief sets (as defined by Levesque) are one and the 
same. 
Theorem 3.3 Suppose T is a set of basic sentences. Then T is stable iff T is a belief set. 
Suppose first that Tis a belief set for W, i.e. T ={A I A is basic and W If- DA}. Say 
T l=nm A. Is it the case that A E T? Well, suppose it is not the case. Then W lf DA, 
so there exists aw E W such that W, w lf A which means that W, w If- -iA. We know 
W, w If- T, so TU {-,A} is satisfiable, thus also nonmodally satisfiable. But this means 
that T does not entail A and this is a contradiction. What about the other two properties 
that must be satisfied for T to be a stable set? Suppose A E T. Then DA E T, because if 
W If- DA, then also W If- ODA. Suppose A tJ. T. We want to show that -,DAE T. Suppose 
this is not the case, i.e. W lf 0--iDA. Then there exists aw E W such that W, w lf -,DA, 
thus W, w If- DA but this is a contradiction. So we have shown that a belief set is stable. 
To prove the theorem in the other direction we assume T is stable. We have two cases: 
the set is either satisfiable or unsatisfiable. Suppose T is satisfiable. Then there exists a 
situation W, w such that W, w If- T. For any basic wf A, if A E T, then it follows from 
stability that DA E T, so W If- DA. If, on the other hand, A tJ. T, then it follows from 
stability that -iDA E T, so W If- -,DA. Therefore A E Tiff W If- DA, in other words Tis 
a belief set. 
Suppose now Tis unsatisfiable. We noted above (lemma 3.5) that the adjunct of a sta-
ble set is contained in the set, so T contains the adjunct to T. Then it follows from lemma 
3.8 that Tis also not nonmodally satisfiable. This means that, for every basic sentence A, 
we have that TU { -iA} is not nonmodally satisfiable, so T l=nm A for every basic A. By 
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the definition of stability it follows that A E T, thus T contains every basic wf. So in this 
case Tis the belief set of the empty set of assignments. • 
We have now shown that belief sets as defined by Levesque are stable sets and vice 
versa. As in the case of Moore's autoepistemic logic the sets are uniquely determined by 
their objective subsets. But Levesques 's belief sets are not the same as the belief sets defined 
by Moore. In addition to being stable Moore's belief sets were grounded in a set r of initial 
premises so that only beliefs that could be derived in some way from r were entertained. 
How does Levesque handle this? This is discussed in the next section. 
3.4 Relation to Stable Extensions 
We saw that one of the (equivalent) ways in which Moore describes the belief set of an agent 
is to specify it as the stable extension of a set r of initial premises. Levesque also gives a 
definition of a stable extension (equivalent to Moore's definition): 
• A set T is a stable extension of a set r iff T satisfies the equation 
T = {A I A is basic and 
r u {DB I BE T} u { -iDB i B \i T} Fnm A}. 
Suppose we are given a maximal set W of assignments with T as its belief set and S as 
the adjunct to T and further suppose the set r has only one member namely the sentence 
B. Then the stable extension of {B} relative to W will be the set of all basic wfs which are 
nonmodally entailed by the union of {B} and S. Now we are ready to prove that a stable 
extension corresponds with only knowing. 
Theorem 3.4 For any basic sentence A and any maximal set W of assignments, W If- OA 
iff the belief set of W is a stable extension of {A}. 
Let W be a given set of assignments and let T be its belief set and S the adjunct to 
T. We thus have that W if- S (from lemma 3.6). We want to show that W If- OA iff Tis 
the set of all basic wfs that are nonmodally entailed by {A} U S. To do this we may use I= 
instead of l=nm' from lemma 3.8. Thus we need to show the following: 
W If- OA iff for every basic B we have B ET iff {A} US I= B, 
or, equivalently, 
W If- OA iff for every basic B we have W If- DB iff {A} US I= B. 
We first assume that W If- OA. We have to prove an 'if' and an 'only if' part. For 
the 'if' part, assume {A} US I= B and let w be any element of W. Since W If- OA, we 
have that W, w If- {A} US, and therefore, W, w If- B. So, for every w E W we have that 
W, w If- B which means that W If- DB. 
For the 'only if' part, assume W If- DB. To show that {A} US I= B, let W' be any 
maximal set of assignments and w be any assignment. Suppose W', w If- ({A} US). Then 
W' = W because S is an adjunct of the belief set for W (so any maximal set W' which 
is such that W' If- S must be equivalent to W and hence equal to it). This means then 
that W,w if- A, thus w E W because W if- OA. But if w E W, then W,w If- B because 
W If- DB. So we have shown that for any W' and w, if W', w If- ( {A}US), then W', w If- B, 
therefore {A} U S) I= B. 
Now assume that for every basic B we have W If- DB iff {A} US I= B. First we must 
show that W if- DA, i.e. that A is true at every w E W. It follows directly from the fact that 
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{A} US I= A. Next we must show that if W,w Ir A then w E W. So suppose W,w Ir A. 
Then W,w Ir {A} US because W Ir S. Now consider any B such that W Ir DB. We 
have that {A} us I= B (from our assumption) and thus w, w Ir B, sow E w+ (from the 
definition of w+). Because Wis maximal, w E W. Thus we have shown that for every w, 
if W, w Ir A, then w E W, therefore W Ir OA. • 
From this theorem then follows that 'only knowing a wf A' means that the total beliefs 
of an agent are the members of a stable extension of {A}, in other words what is believed 
is derivable from A using nonmodal logic and introspection. We have a semantic account 
(closely related to the semantics of possible worlds) for the (syntactic) notion of stable ex-
tensions which Moore used in describing nonmonotonic logic. It is also possible to state 
how many stable extensions of a wf A exist: 
Theorem 3.5 A sentence A has exactly as many stable extensions as there are maximal 
sets of assignments where 0 A is true. 
We know from lemma 3.7 that the mapping between maximal sets of assignments and 
belief sets is bijective. Thus the mapping between maximal sets of assignments and stable 
sets is bijective (from theorem 3.3) and thus (from theorem 3.4 above) there will be a stable 
extension of A corresponding with every maximal set of assignments. • 
3.5 Proof Theory 
By making use of the operator 0 derivations can be done inside the logic. In order to do 
this a proof theory must be given. Such a theory for the basic part of the language (i.e. wfs 
without the 0 operator) is formed by the following axiom schemas and inference rules: 
(1) All substitution instances of valid sentences. 
(2a) DA where A is a valid sentence. 
(3a) D(A--+ B)--+ (DA--+ DB). 
(4a) (A--+ DA) where A is subjective. 
(5) From A and (A--+ B), infer B. 
What about O? Before giving axioms and rules involving the 'only know' operator, we add 
an additional letter, namely N, to the alphabet and an additional rule for constructing the 
set :F of wfs, namely 
if A E F, then N(A) E F. 
and we omit parentheses if no ambiguity can arise. The addition of N will simplify the 
rules and axioms involving 0. We give the following definition: 
W, w Ir NA iff for every w' <f. W we have W, w' Ir A. 
Keeping in mind the definitions of DA and 0 A, we are able to write 0 in terms of D and 
N: OA =(DA/\ N·A). Let W be the set of all assignments w not in W. Then we have 
W, w Ir NA iff for every w' E W we have W, w' Ir A. 
We see that the operators N and D are similar with the important difference that the 
definition of satisfaction of a wf starting with either of them is in terms of the complement 
of the set of worlds where the other is satisfied. In possible world terms we range over 
inaccessible worlds when dealing with N and accessible worlds when dealing with D. Now 
we are ready for the axiom schemas and rules of inference where we include all the modal 
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operators. Subjective wfs are redefined as wfs where all atoms p E P occur inside the scope 
of Dor 0 or N. 
(1) All substitution instances of valid sentences. 
(2a) For every valid sentence A, DA. 
(2b) For every valid sentence A, NA. 
(3a) D(A--+ B)--+ (DA--+ DB). 
(3b) N(A--+ B)--+ (NA--+ NB). 
(4a) (A-+ DA) where A is subjective. 
(4b) (A--+ NA) where A is subjective. 
(5) From A and (A--+ B), infer B. 
(6) For every objective sentence A which is not valid, NA--+ --,DA. 
(7) For every sentence A, OA abbreviates (DA/\ N 0A). 
A wf B is provable from a set f of wfs (written as f f- B) iff there exists a sequence 
Ai, A2, ... , An of n wfs such that each Ai is an instance of one of the above axiom schemas 
or is a member of r or is formed according to one of the above inference rules. Levesque 
proved the completeness of the proof architecture in detail and sketched the proof for sound-
ness. Let us investigate the validity of the rules (2b ), (3b) and ( 4b) above: 
(2b) For every valid sentence A, NA: 
If a sentence A is valid it means that W, w if- A holds for every situation W, w, thus 
also for all situations W, w' where w' rJ. W, hence for all situations W, w we will have 
W,w if- NA. 
(3b) N(A--+ B)--+ (NA--+ NB): 
Such a sentence can only be false if for some situation W, w, we have that W, w lf-
N( A--+ B) and W, w ~(NA--+ NB). Suppose it is the case. Then W, w' If- A--+ B for all 
w' rJ. W and this can only be the case if for every w' rJ. W, either W, w' ~ A or W, w' If- B. 
But we assumed W, w ~(NA--+ NB), i.e. W, w if-NA and W, w ~NB, thus there is a 
w' r/. W such that W, w' If- A and W, w' ~ B. This is a contradiction, hence the original 
sentence cannot be false, i.e. is valid. 
( 4b) A --+ NA where A is subjective: 
Such a sentence can only be false if for some situation W, w, we have that W, w If- A 
and W, w ~NA. Suppose it is the case. Then, because A is subjective, we have W if- A. 
Further, W, w' ~ A for some w' rJ. W. But again w' does not play any role, thus we have 
W ~ A. This is a contradiction, hence the original sentence cannot be false, i.e. is valid. 
In the next section we illustrate the usefulness of the given proof theory. 
3.5.1 An Example 
Let K be the knowledge base of an agent, in this case containing only one member namely 
the objective wf p. This wf is believed to be true and does not entail the wf q. Suppose 
the agent believes that q is false unless required to be true by what is believed. Suppose, 
finally, that this is all that is believed. Is it the case that q is believed to be false? In other 
words, if O(p/\ (•Dq--+ •q)), is it the case that D--,q? 
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Let us first approach the problem semantically. The argument could be as follows: 
Assume Wis a maximal set of assignments such that W Ir O(p/\ ( •Dq -t •q)) and let w be 
some assignment such that w Ir (p /\ •q). (There exists such an assignment because p does 
not entail q.) Thus W, w Ir (p /\ (•Dq -t •q)) and sow E W. Further, W Ir -,Dq because 
w Ir •q. But for every w' E W we have that W, w' Ir ( •Dq ___,. •q), so also w' Ir •q. 
Therefore W Ir D•q. 
Let us tackle the same problem syntactically: 
1. O(p /\ ( •Dq -t •q)) Assumption 
2. D(p /\ ( •Dq -t •q)) Line 1, and (7) 
3. D(-,Dq -t •q) Line 2 
4. 0-,Dq -t 0-iq Line 3, and (3a) 
5. -iDq -t 0-iDq ( 4a) 
6. -iDq -t 0-iq Lines 4 and 5 
7. N•(p/\ (•Dq -t •q)) Line 1, and (7) 
8. N( •p V •( •Dq -t •q)) Line 7 
9. N(p -t •( •Dq -t •q)) Line 8 
10. N(p -t •(Dq V •q)) Line 9 
11. N(p -t ( •Dq /\ q)) Line 10 
12. N(p ___,. q) Line 11 
13. -iD(p -t q) Line 12, and (6) 
14. •(Dp -t Dq) Line 13, and ( 3a) 
15. Op Line 2 
16. -iDq Lines 14 and 15, and (5) 
17. 0-iq Lines 6 and 16, and (5) 
So we have shown that it is indeed the case that the agent believes that q is not true 
and this was done inside the logic itself. 
3.6 Predicate Logic 
Let us consider a richer language than a propositional one. As before we do not include 
any function constants in the first order languages that we are going to consider, but the 
alphabet S does include the following symbols: 
• for each positive integer n, zero, one or more predicate constants of arity n, indicated 
by Pr, 
• a special two-place equality symbol, =, 
• a countably infinite set of individual variables, indicated by Xi, 
• a countably infinite set of individual constants called standard names, indicated by 
ai, 
• the connectives •, V, A, -t, +-+, 
• the modal operators D, 0, N, 
• punctuation symbols ( and ), 
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• quantifier symbols V and 3. 
Levesque allows the occurrence of propositional letters in the alphabets of these languages 
but we exclude that possibility without any loss of generality. Except for the addition of 
the equality symbol and the three modal operators D, 0 and N, Levesque's languages also 
differ from the predicate languages of chapter 1 in that the individual constants are taken 
to designate members of the universe of discourse distinctly and exhaustively, i.e. inter-
pretations are restricted to those with countably infinite universes of discourse. Without 
loss of generality we may assume the set of standard names to be precisely the universe of 
discourse. (Such interpretations are called term models). Wfs are formed in the obvious 
way and scope is defined as before. There is no restriction on the scopes of quantifiers or 
modal operators. A sentence is a wf with no free variables. (So, again, there are wfs that are 
not sentences.) The equality symbol and the standard names are considered to be logical 
symbols. Objective sentences are those without any D, 0 and N operators. Basic sentences 
are those without an 0 operator and subjective wfs are those where all predicate constants 
occur within the scope of a D or 0 or N operator. Finally, again similar to the substitution 
approach in chapter 1, we write A~ to indicate the formula consisting of A with all free 
occurrences of x replaced by standard name a. Let A be the set of atomic sentences, i.e. 
predicate constants in which no variables appear. 
By defining the language as above it is possible to combine the semantics met in chapter 
1 with Levesque's semantics involving situations. In chapter 1 an interpretation (or world) 
of a predicate language was defined as a triple ( </>, f, U) where U is the universe of discourse 
and </> a mapping from the individual constants of the language to U. We now restrict 
ourselves to interpretations where U is the set of standard names and </> is the identity. f 
can be any function from the set of atomic sentences A to the set {T,F}. Since U and</> are 
fixed, interpretations are determined by the assignment f. In accordance with our previous 
notation we use w instead off. 
Let w be a function of the atomic sentences to the set {T ,F} and let W be a set of 
assignments. As before we write W, w If- A to abbreviate the assertion that the sentence A 
is true in the situation W, w or (equivalently) that the situation W, w satisfies the sentence 
A. It is not necessarily the case that w E W. Formally we have the following definition: 
W,wlf--A iff w(A) = T where A EA 
W, w If- ( ai = a j) iff a; is the same name as aj 
w, w If- ·A iff W,w~A 
W,w If- (AV B) iff W, w If- A or W, w If- B 
W,w If- (A/\ B) iff W,w If-A and W,w If- B 
W,w If- (A-+ B) iff W, w ~ A or W, w If- B 
W,wlf--A+-+B iff either W,w If- A and also W,w If- B, 
or W,w ~A and also W,w ~ B 
W,w lf-Vx(A) iff forallai, W,wlf-(A~J 
W, w If- 3x(A) iff for some ai, W, w If- (A~;) 
W,w If- DA iff for every w' E W, W, w' If- A 
W,wlf--NA iff for every w' rf. W, W, w' If- A 
W,w lf--OA iff W, w If- DA and 
for every w', if W, w' If- A then w' E W. 
The definitions of the equivalence of sets Wand W' of assignments, of satisfiability and 
of entailment are the same as in the propositional case. What about nonmodal satisfaction? 
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We only have to replace the rule involving proposition constants with a rule involving atomic 
sentences and add two rules involving quantifiers to those given in section 3.3, namely: 
(), W If-nm A 
(), W If-nm VxA 
(), W If-nm 3xA 
iff w(A) = T where A EA 
iff If-nm (A~;) for every ai 
iff If-nm ( A~i) for some ai. 
All the other definitions stay the same. The theorems about the correspondence between 
stable sets and belief sets and the correspondence between 'only knowing' and a stable 
extension which were proved in sections 3.3 and 3.4 still hold. There is, however, one major 
different result, namely stable sets are no longer uniquely determined by their objective 
subsets. 
What effect does the enrichment of the language have on the proof theory given in 
section 3.5? First of all we have to add one rule to those listed in section 3.5: 
(8) From A~1 , A~2 , ••• , A~k infer \fxA if the ai 
range over all names in A and one not in A. 
The new proof theory is again sound (proved by Levesque) but it is, contrary to what he 
expects, no longer complete. This was proved by Halpern and Lakemeyer [Halpern et al 1995]. 
In the next section we give an example of the use of the proof theory when we show that 
an agent does believe that the ever-popular Tweety flies. 
3.6.1 An Example 
Assume that an agent believes that Tweety is a bird and that if a bird can be consistently 
believed to fly, then it flies. Is it possible to show, using classical logic, that the agent 
believes that Tweety flies? The answer to this question is no, because at the very least the 
agent has to believe that Tweety can be consistently believed to fly. If, however, it is known 
that all that is believed is that Tweety is a bird, it is possible to draw the conclusion that 
the agent believes that Tweety flies. It is done as follows, based on an abbreviated version 
in [Levesque 1990]. 
We use the language with two predicate constants, both of arity one and indicated by 
Bird and Fly, and one standard name, indicated by tweety. Assume the agent has the 
knowledge base 
K = {K} = {Bird(tweety)} 
and let A be the sentence 
A= \fx((Bird(x) /\ -.0-.Fly(x))-+ Fly(x)). 
We want to show that 0(1( /\A)-+ DFly(tweety). 
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1. 0(1( /\A) Assumption 
2. D(K /\A) Line 1, and (7) 
3. --.D--.Fly(tweety)-+ 0--.D--.Fly(tweety) ( 4a) 
4. DA Line 2 
5. D((Bird(tweety) /\ --.D--.Fly(tweety))-+ Fly(tweety)) Line 4 
6. DBi rd( tweety) Line 2 
7. D(--.D--.Fly( tweety) -+ Fly( tweety)) Lines 5 and 6 
8. D(--.D--.Fly( tweety)) -+ DFly( tweety) Line 7, and (3a) 
9. --.D--.Fly(tweety) -+ DFly(tweety) Lines 3 and 8 
10. N--.(K /\A) Line 1, and (7) 
11. N(--.K V -.A) (1) 
12. N(J(-+ -.A) (1) 
13. N(J(-+ 3x--.((Bird(x) /\ --.D--.Fly(x))-+ Fly(x))) Line 12, and (1) 
14. N(J(-+ 3x--.Fly(x )) Line 13, and (1) 
15. --.D(K-+ 3x--.Fly(x)) Line 14, and (6) 
16. --.o(--.K V 3x--.Fly( x)) Line 15, and (1) 
17. --.D(3x--.Fly( x)) Line 16 
18. --.0(--.Fly( tweety)) Line 17 
17. DFly( tweety) Lines 9 and 18, and (5). 
Note that this theorem depends on the fact that the knowledge base does not entail that 
Tweety does not fly, i.e. it depends on the fact that J( -+ 3x--.Fly( x) is not valid. (Lines 
14 - 17.) When J( = Bird(tweety) this is certainly true, but what will happen when the 
knowledge base is such that some birds may be unable to fly? Let us look at the situation 
where we have two birds, Tweety and Chirpy, and the agent believes that Chirpy cannot 
fly. Will he still believe that Tweety can fly? Yes. We show it as follows, using the same 
language as above but with an additional standard name, chirpy. The knowledge base is 
K = {Bird(tweety),Bird(chirpy),--.Fly(chirpy)}. 
Let 
J( = Bird(tweety) /\Bird( chirpy)/\ -.Fly( chirpy) 
and 
A= Vx((Bird(x) /\ --.o--.Fly(x))-+ Fly(x)). 
We want to show that O(K /\A)-+ DFly(tweety). The proof is again based on an abbre-
viated version in [Levesque 1990]. 
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1. 0(1( /\A) Assumption 
2. D(I( /\A) Line 1, and (7) 
3. --,0--,Fly(tweety) -t 0--,0--,Fly(tweety) (4) 
4. DA Line 2 
5. D((Bird(tweety) /\ --,0--,Fly(tweety)) -t Fly(tweety)) Line 4 
6. D( Bird( tweety)) Line 2 
7. D( ·D·Fly(tweety) -t Fly(tweety)) Lines 5 and 6 
8. D(--iD-.Fly(tweety)) -t DFly(tweety) Line 7, and (3a) 
9. --,0--,Fly(tweety) -t DFly(tweety) Lines 3 and 8 
10. D·Fly(chirpy) Line 2 
11. ND·Fly(chirpy) (2b) 
12. N •(K /\A) Line 1, and (7) 
13. N(•K V ·A) Line 12 and (1) 
14. N(I( -t ·A) Line 13, and (1) 
15. N(I( -t 3x--,((Bird(x) /\ --,0--,Fly(x)) -t Fly(x))) Line 14, and (1) 
16. N(I( -t 3x(( ·D·Fly(x )) /\ ·Fly(x ))) Line 15 and (1) 
17. N(K -t 3x((x =/=chirpy)/\ ·Fly(x))) Lines 11 and 16, and (1) 
18. ·D(K -t 3x((x =/=chirpy)/\ •Fly(x))) Line 17, and (6) 
19. --,0--,Fly(tweety) Line 18, and (1) 
20. DFly(tweety) Lines 9 and 19, and (5). 
3.7 Only Know About 
In the example above the agent argues as follows: 'If all that I know is that Tweety is a 
bird and a default about birds, then ... ', i.e. the argument starts from the sentence 
O(Bird(tweety) /\ Vx((Bird(x) /\ --,0--,Fly(x )) -t Fly(x )) 
The agent's knowledge base/( is the set {Bird(tweety)}. But, while D( ... ) is too weak to 
draw the conclusion that DFly(tweety), 0( ... ) is too strong: we are able to arrive at the 
belief that Tweety flies but in addition to that it forces us to rule out all other beliefs, even 
it they are totally unrelated to birds and their ability (or not) to fly. It would be more 
convenient if the argument could start with 'If I believe the default and further all I know 
about Tweety is that he is a bird, then ... '. Levesque suggested that the operator 0 could 
be modified to identify the subject matter of the belief. Lakemeyer, [Lakemeyer 1991), 
investigated this further. 
Returning to a propositional language with the previously defined semantics, we add 
an infinite set of modal operators: an operator O(<l>) for each finite set <l> of atoms of the 
language. Suppose we have a situation W,w, when will a wf O(<l>)A be true? In other 
words, given W,w, when is it the case that A is all that is believed about the atoms in <l>? 
In order to answer the question we first define a set of worlds W4> which one may think of 
as obtained from W by forgetting everything that is irrelevant to <l>. Before we can formally 
define W4> we need a lemma for which we need the notions of literals and clauses. Literals 
are either atoms or negated atoms and clauses are disjunctions of literals. 
Lemma 3.9 Belief sets are uniquely determined by their objective clauses. 
The result follows directly from the facts that belief sets are uniquely determined by 
the objective sentences they contain, that beliefs have equivalent conjunctive normal forms 
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and that D(A1 /\ A2 /\ ... /\An) --+ DA1 /\ DA2 /\ ... /\ DAn is valid. • 
We want to characterise what, relative to W, is believed about <I>. Suppose <I> = {p}. By 
the above lemma we may restrict ourselves to the question of what clauses relative to W are 
believed about p. Say one of the beliefs in the belief set for Wis a clause C which mentions 
p or •p, does this qualify as a belief about p? No, it is not sufficient: Suppose all the agent 
knows is q. Then he also believes the clause p V q, but that does not tell us anything about 
p. (Actually the agent knows nothing about p.) Thus for a clause C to be a belief about p, 
it must not depend on other beliefs which do not mention p. We go even further, namely in 
order to characterise all the beliefs about p we consider only minimal clauses in the sense 
that, while C is believed, no clause C' contained in C is believed. Formally we define such 
clauses as follows: 
• Given a set of worlds W and a clause C, C is called W-minimal iff 
W If- DC and for all clauses C' contained in C, we have W lf- DC'. 
Let us look at an example, using the language with two atoms p and q. The possible clauses 
are p, •p, q, •q, p V •p, p V q, p V •q, •p V q, •p V •q, q V •q, p V •p V q, . . .. Let 
w1(P) = w1(q) =T, w2(P) =T and w2(q) =F, w3(p) =F and w3(q) =T, W4(p) = w4(q) =F. 
Then, for W = { w1}, the W-minimal clauses are p and q. For W = { wi, w2} the W-minimal 
clauses are p and qV •q. For W = {wi, w2, w3 } the W-minimal clauses are pV •p and qV •q 
and p V q, et cetera. 
• The beliefs relative to W about a set of atoms <I> are now defined as those W-minimal 
clauses which are believed and which mention p for some p E <I>. 
Now we are ready to define the set of worlds characterised by these beliefs: 
Given a set of worlds W, 
• W<I> = { w I w If- C for all W-minimal clauses C such that C mentions some p E <I>}. 
So the worlds in W<1> are those worlds in which everything which does not follow from 
the beliefs about <I> is automatically 'forgotten'. Note that it will always be the case that 
w~w<f>. 
At last we are ready to give the semantics of these new operators: 
• W, w If- O(<I>)A iff W<t>, w If- OA and W If- DA. 
Lakemeyer shows that the new concept O(<I>) has reasonable properties. Here are four 
interesting ones: 
(i) The sentence O(<I>)A--+ DA is valid, i.e. if all the agent knows about the atoms in <I> is 
A, then he definitely believes A. 
The result follows immediately from the definition of the satisfaction of a wf starting 
with O(<I>). 
(ii) Unless •O(<I>)A is valid, the sentence O(<I>)A--+ OA is not valid. The reason for this is 
that the agent may, for example, believe something about an atom q in neither <I> nor A. 
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We show that the result holds by giving a counterexample. Let A = p, <I> = {p} and 
W = { w I w If- p /\ q}. The only W-minimal clause that contains p is p itself, thus 
W<1> = {w I w if- p}. We see W if- Op and W<1> if- Op, hence W if- O(<I>)p. But W ~Op. 
(Actually W If- O(p /\ q).) 
(iii) The sentence O({p,q})p--+ O({q})(q V •q) is valid, i.e. if all the agent knows about p 
and q is p, then he actually knows nothing about q. 
Let <I> = {p,q} and W If- O(<I>)p. Assume W ~ O({q})(q V •q). Then, because 
W If- D( qV •q), we have that W{q} ~ 0( qV •q), thus W{q} is not the set of all worlds. This 
means that there exists a clause C which is W-minimal and mentions q but which is not a 
tautology. This clause does not contain p because pis itself W-minimal. According to the 
definition of W<1> we have that Wq, if- DC. But Wq, = {w I w If- p}. So we have a world 
w' E Wq, which does not satisfy C (because C does not contain p) which is a contradiction. 
(iv) The sentence -,Q ( {p} )q is valid, i.e. something totally independent of p cannot be all 
the agent knows about p. 
Assume that there does exist a set W such that W If- 0 ( {p}) q. Then we have that 
W{p} If- Oq, i.e. w{p} = { w I w If- q}. Also, w If- Dq and therefore q is W-minimal and 
thus no W-minimal clause containing p can contain q. So there exists a world w' (say) that 
satisfies all W-minimal clauses mentioning p but does not satisfy q. This world must be a 
member of the set W{p} but this is a contradiction. 
We conclude this section by showing that the result about Tweety follows easily, using a 
propositional language where for convenience two of the atoms are indicated by bird and fly. 
(We think of bird as 'Tweety is a bird' and of fly as 'Tweety can fly'.) Let <I>= {bird, fly}. 
Now let A be the wf 
((bird/\ -,0-,fly)--+ fly)/\ bird. 
Let W be some set of worlds where this wf is believed, thus W, w If- DA, i.e. A is one of 
the members of the belief set for W. We want to show that 
W,w If- O(<I>)A--+ Dfly. 
Which worlds are members of the set W<1>? Well, we know that if W, w If- O(<I>)A, then 
W<1> If- OA, i.e. Wq,, w If- A for all w E W<1> and for now tj. Wq,. This means that we must 
have w If- bird for every w E Wq,. Furthermore, we must have W<1>, w If- (bird/\ -,D-,fly)--+ 
fly for all w E Wq,. If w If- fly for every world w E Wq,, then everything works out. 
Suppose, however, at some world w' E W<1> we have that w' ~ fly. Is it then the case 
that Wq,, w' ~ bird/\ -,0-,fly? We know bird is true at w', so the question is whether 
Wq,, w' ~ -,D-,fly. Well, if this is the case, it means that Wq,, w' If- 0-,fly, thus that 
w" If- •fly for all w" E Wq,. Thus we conclude that the set W<1> is such that either 
w If- bird/\ fly for every w E Wq, or w If- bird/\ •fly for every w E W<1>. We assert that the 
first case holds. Why? Well, suppose w if- bird/\ •fly for every w E Wq,. Then there exists 
a world w' tj. Wq, such that w' If- bird/\ fly and also Wq,, w' If- (bird/\ -,0-,fly) --+ fly. 
But this is a contradiction because A may not be true at a world outside Wq,. Therefore 
W<1> = { w I w If- bird/\ fly}. 
Now assume W If- O(<I>)A. Then Wq, if- OA. But fly is true in every world of W<1> (as 
seen above), so Wq, If- Dfly. Since W ~ Wq,, it follows that W If- Dfly. We have therefore 
proved that, if the agent believes only A about bird and tweety, he believes that Tweety 
flies. 
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3.8 Generalisation to Arbitrary Sentences 
All the theorems in this chapter have only dealt with basic sentences or sentences like 0 A 
with A a basic sentence. Levesque [Levesque 1990) generalised these theorems to deal with 
arbitrary sentences. We redefine the notions of belief sets and stability. 
• A set T is a generalised belief set for W iff T = {A I A is any sentence and W If- DA}. 
• A set T of sentences is a generalised stable set iff the following three conditions hold: 
if T J= A, then A ET, 
if A E T, then DA E T and 
if A rJ. T, then --,DA E T. 
The only change in the definition is the closure under entailment (instead of nonmodal 
entailment). 
Theorem 3.6 A set T of wfs is a generalised belief set iff T is a generalised stable set. 
The proof is identical to the proof of theorem 3.3 but without the diversion through 
lemma 3.8. • 
• A set T is a generalised stable extension of a set r iff T satisfies the equation 
T = {A I A is basic and 
ru {DB I BE T}u {·DB I B rt. T} I= A}. 
The only difference is that the entailment relation is no longer nonmodal. 
Theorem 3. 7 For any wf A and any maximal set W of assignments, W jf- 0 A iff the 
generalised belief set of W is a generalised stable extension of {A}. 
The proof is similar to the proof of theorem 3.4. • 
3.9 Summary 
We have seen that Levesque's version of autoepistemic logic has several advantages when 
compared with Moore's. It is, for example, possible to express constraints on the agent's 
beliefs directly in the relevant modal language. An important shortcoming is that the agent 
is (still) an ideal reasoner. This aspect is addressed in the next chapter when we look 
at the deduction structures defined by Konolige. Furthermore, the semantics as defined 
by Konologe makes provision for more than one agent - another issue not investigated by 
Levesque. (Lakemeyer [Lakemeyer 1991a], though, does address the issue of only knowing 
in the framework of a multi-agent autoepistemic logic. This later paper provides a for-
malisation of all an agent knows about a certain subject matter based on possible world 
semantics in such a logic.) 
Chapter 4 
The Deduction Model of Konolige 
Chuangtse and Hueitse had strolled onto the bridge over 
the Hao, when the former observed, 'See how the small fish 
are darting about! That is the happiness of fish.' 'You are 
not a fish yourself,' said Hueitse. 'How can you know the 
happiness of the fish?' 'And you not being I,' retorted 
Chuangste, 'how can you know that I do not know?' 
Chuangtse, c. 300 B.C. 
Unlike the systems of Moore and Levesque the deduction model devised by Konolige 
([Konolige 1986)) makes provision for more than one agent and in addition these agents 
need not be ideal reasoners. In the case of Moore and Levesque the belief sets of all 
agents were assumed to be closed under logical consequence: the agents were aware of all 
the consequences of their beliefs. But from experience we know that neither human nor 
robot agents are really ideal reasoners. Because of constraints on time and space there are 
inferences which are logically possible but which the agent does not make. Furthermore 
the agent's rules by which he derives 'new' beliefs are often incomplete so that even with 
unlimited time he cannot arrive at all the consequences. 
The possible world approach is compatible with ideal reasoning. So by using such a 
semantics we can predict what consequences an agent can possibly derive but not what 
consequences will actually be derived by a non-ideal reasoner. In Konolige's deduction 
model of belief he addresses the problem of non-ideal reasoners or limited agents. His 
semantics was developed in an effort to define accurate models of the beliefs of robots. By 
considering robots the (incomplete) set of rules of the agent is available to us, the outside 
observers. The semantics involves a set of initial beliefs and some algorithm which can be 
applied to these beliefs in order to derive new beliefs. This algorithm may for example 
be based on a rule of inference like modus ponens which may be applied only a limited 
number of times. The only assumption made about the algorithm is that the agent will 
apply it whenever possible. By doing this the agent will arrive at all the possible inferences 
(from this algorithm). We therefore do not assume that the set of beliefs generated by the 
algorithm is closed under logical consequence but do assume that it is deductively closed 
in the sense that applying the algorithm any further will not produce new beliefs. If the 
algorithm is not logically complete, being deductively closed is not the same as being closed 
under logical consequence. Deductive closure is a much weaker condition than consequential 
closure. A key feature of Konolige's approach is that the deduction process of an agent can 
be as different as we like from those of other agents. It is even possible that the agent's set 
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of available rules is empty, i.e. he is equipped with the trivial algorithm with no rules of 
inference. 
4.1 Proof Theory for Bounded Reasoning 
In the definition of belief sets Konolige makes use of 'deduction structures'. These deduction 
structures consist of two parts namely a set of initial or base beliefs and some algorithm 
for generating new beliefs from old ones, typically an algorithm based on rules like modus 
ponens. Suppose we have some logical language L. The formal definition of a deduction 
structure is then as follows: 
• A deduction structure VS is a pair (f, DR) where r is a set of sentences of L, the 
base beliefs, and DR is a set of deduction rules. 
What is meant by a deduction rule? Well, following Konolige, a rule of inference is 
deductive if it has the following two properties: 
(i) Provinciality: The number of premises of the rule is fixed and finite. 
(ii) Effectiveness: The rule is an effectively computable function of its premises. 
The proof theory given in chapter 1 is an example of the use of deduction rules: modus 
ponens is a two-premise rule and the axioms can be thought of as zero-premise rules. An 
example of a rule of inference which is not provincial is 'Given any finite set r of sentences, 
infer the conjunction of the members of the set'. An example of a rule of inference which is 
not effective is 'Given two sentences A and B of a predicate language, infer A --+ B when 
Bis a semantic consequence of A'. 
• Let DR be the agent's set of deduction rules. Then we abbreviate the notion 'A can 
be derived from the set f by applying the rules in DR' by f f-vn A. 
Suppose we have an algorithm based on modus ponens but time is limited - say only 
n applications of the rule are permitted for some fixed n. How can such a situation be 
formalised? Well, one way would be to attach a label N ( k) to each proposition where k 
is the minimum number of applications of modus ponens required to infer the proposition 
from the set of initial beliefs. Then a deduction rule representing a suitable modification of 
modus ponens would be the following: 
'For all k and m such that k + m + 1 ::; n, if the label associated with A is N(k) and 
the label associated with A --+ B is N ( m), then B may be inferred.' 
We assume closure under deduction, i.e. that the rules are applied exhaustively so that 
all possible conclusions are drawn. Before giving a formal definition of deductive closure we 
define the belief set of an agent relative to a deduction structure. 
• The belief set of an agent relative to a deduction structure VS= (f, DR) is 
bel(DS) = bel((f,DR)) ={A Ir f-vn A}. 
We often abbreviate 'belief set of an agent relative to a deduction structure' to 'belief set 
of a deduction structure'. 
Now we can define deductive closure: 
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• A deduction structure DS = (f, DR) is deductively closed iff 
rs;;; bel((f,DR)), and 
if f 1---vn A and r, A 1---vn B, then r 1---vn B. 
Remember that we work with 1---vn and that the last condition does not state that if r 1---vn A 
and f, A 1-- B, then f 1---vn B. Deductive closure guarantees that all the base beliefs of the 
agent are in the belief set and that any sentence derivable from the base beliefs can take 
part in further derivations. 
Suppose bel(DS) is the belief set of an agent. If the sentences A and -,A are both 
members of bel(DS), then the belief set is inconsistent and we call it contradictory. (A and 
-,A may be base beliefs, i.e. members of r, or may be derived beliefs.) If, on the other hand, 
A E bel(DS) and -iA is a logical consequence of bel(DS) but cannot be derived from the set 
of initial beliefs by applying the agent's deduction rules, then the set will (still) be logically 
inconsistent but not contradictory. This contrasts with the approaches of previous chapters 
where logically inconsistent belief sets were contradictory due to the logical omniscience of 
the agents. 
We have not said anything yet about which language will be used. The deduction model 
of Konolige is such that nested beliefs are possible, i.e. beliefs about beliefs. Furthermore, 
these beliefs need not be entertained by one and the same agent, for example agent A may 
have beliefs about the beliefs of agent B. Konolige uses a (nonmodal) predicate language 
without function constants as 'internal' language and then defines a modal language, called 
LB, and a variation of the modal language, called LBq. In order to focus on the essential 
features of the construction we will, however, first use a propositional internal language, 
define a modal external language and give a few examples of its use, and then consider 
predicate internal languages. 
4.2 Semantics 
Let L be some propositional language, called the internal language, and S1, S2, ... , Sn be n 
agents. Define an external language L' based on L as follows: 
• L' includes the sentences and formation rules of L and 
• if A is a sentence of L, then [Si]A is a sentence of L'. 
A belief atom is a sentence [ Si]A and if a sentence of L' does not include a belief operator, 
it is called an objective or ordinary sentence. Suppose we want to represent beliefs about 
beliefs, i.e. we want to allow sentences like [S2][S2]A and [S2][S3]A. The natural choice 
for an internal language would then be L' itself, i.e. 'L' in the above definition would be 
substituted by 'L'' and the definition would become recursive. Unless otherwise stated, 
however, we will take the definition as is and assume L to be a nonmodal propositional 
language. 
Suppose we have three agents. Here are four examples of sentences of the language L' 
based on the propositional language L with two atoms, p and q: 
q--+ p 
-i[S2]q 
p /\ [S3]q 
[S2](qV -ip)--+ [S1](-ip). 
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Informally we read a belief atom [5;]A as 'Agent 5; believes A' or, equivalently, 'A is 
a member of the belief set of agent 5; '. By this we mean that A is either a member of 
the set of base beliefs of agent 5; or is derived by the rules of the deduction structure of 
agent 5;. Suppose we read pas 'The green light is on' and q as 'The red light is on'. An 
interpretation of L' above must then be such that the sentence [52](qV -ip)-+ [51](-ip) will 
be understood as 'If agent 5 2 believes that either the red light is on or the green light is 
not on, then agent 51 will believe that the green light is not on'. 
Consider an internal language L. Then we construct an interpretation of L' by combining 
an interpretation of L with a set of deduction structures, one for each agent. Suppose f is 
an assignment of truth values to the atoms of L. In chapter 1 an interpretation of L was 
defined as a valuation VJ which extended f to all the sentences of L. Let p( i) be a function 
which gives the set of deduction rules of agent 5;, so p( i) = 'DR;. An interpretation m' of 
L' is called a B(L,p)'-model and it is defined as follows: 
• A B(L,p)'-model m' of L' is a tuple(!, VS*) where f is an assignment of truth values 
to the atoms of the internal language L and VS* = {'DS1 , 'DS2, .. . } is a sequence 
of deduction structures (r;,p;), one for each agent, where the members off; are 
sentences of L. 
Let m' If- A abbreviate the assertion that the sentence A has truth value T under the 
interpretation m'. Then truth values are given to the sentences of the language L' by the 
following rules: 
• m' If- A if A is atomic and J(A) =T, 
• m' If- -,A iff m' ~A, 
• m' If- (AV B) iff m' If- A or m' If- B, 
• m' If- (A/\ B) iff m' If- A and m' If- B, 
• m' If- (A-+ B) iff m' ~A or m' If- B, 
• m' If- (A+-+ B) iff m' If- A and m' If- B, or m' ~A and m' ~ B and 
• m' If- [5;]A iff A E bel('DS;). 
Let us look at four examples. 
• In the first example we take L to be the language with two atoms. Suppose we have 
three agents. Given f(p) =T and J(q) =F, let m' be the B(L,p)'-model consisting of 
f and three deduction structures. Is the sentence p /\ [53]q true in m'? In order to 
answer the question we need the deduction structure of agent 53 • Suppose 
'DS3 = (f 3, 'DR3) = ( { q}, { From a sentence p V q derive p} ). 
We now investigate the truth of the sentence p /\ [53]q. From the definition of J we 
know m' If- p. Is [53]q also true in m', in other words is it the case that q E bel('DS3)? 
Well, we see that q is a member of the set r 3 (the base beliefs of agent 53), hence we 
conclude that m' If- [S3]q. Note that this is a case of mistaken belief because q is not 
true in m'. The sentence p /\ [S3]q, however, is true in m'. 
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• For the second example we take L as the language with three atoms p, q and r. Let 
J(p) = J(q) = J(r) =T. Suppose we have only one agent. Let his base beliefs be the 
following set: 
f1 = {p,p ___, q,(p/\q) ___, r} 
and let his two deduction rules be ( i) modus ponens which may not be applied more 
than once and (ii) from A and B infer A /\ B, in other words 
DR1 = { From A and A___, B infer B, but the rule can only be applied once. From 
A and B infer A/\ B. }. 
Let m' = (!, DS1) where DS1 = (fi, DR1). Is the sentence [S1]r true in m'? Let us 
see: m' jf- [S1]r iff r E bel(DS1 ). We know r is not a base belief of agent S1. Can it 
be derived? Well, we have 
p,p ___, q f-Pl q, 
so q E bel(DS1 ) and also 
p, q f- Pl p /\ q' 
sop/\ q E bel(DS1 ). If the agent were able to apply modus ponens more than once, 
the following deduction would have been possible: 
p /\ q' (p /\ q) ___, r f- P1 r' 
so then r would have been a belief of agent S1 and the sentence [S1]r would have been 
true in m'. This is, however, not the case and the sentence [S1]r is therefore false in 
m'. 
• For the third example we take Las the language with two atoms, and the assignment 
J(p) =T and J(q) =F. Suppose we have two agents with the following deduction 
structures: 
DS1 =({},{If A is a belief of agent S2, then A.}) 
DS2 = ({q}, {From q infer p.}). 
Is the sentence •q /\ ([S1]p ___, q) true in the model constructed from the given f and 
the two deduction structures? Well, •q is certainly true. For [S1]p ___, q to be true 
[ S1]P has to be false since f ( q) =F, thus p should not be a belief of agent S1 . It is not 
a base belief but it can be derived: 
q f- P2 p, 
sop is a belief of agent S2, thus 
[ S2]P f- Pl p. 
Hence the sentence •q /\ ([S1]p ___, q) will be false in m'. 
• For the last example we assume we have two agents and that the language L has two 
atoms, p and q. Suppose we iterate the construction of L' from L and construct a 
new external language L" based on L', in other words a wf like [ Si]A with A E L' is 
a sentence of L". An example of such a sentence is [S2][S1](p /\ q). Suppose f(p) = 
J ( q) =T and that the two agents have the following deduction structures: 
DS1 = ({p,p ___, q}, {From A and A___, B infer B. From A and B infer A/\ B.}) 
DS2 = ({}, {If A is believed by agent Si, infer A. From A infer [S1]A.}). 
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Let m' be the model constructed from the given f and the two deduction structures. 
Is the sentence [S2)[S1)(p A q) true in m'? Let us see: 
m' II- [S2)[S1)(pA q) iff [S1)(pA q) E bel(1JS2). We know [S1)(pA q) is not a base belief 
of agent S2, but it can be derived: 
p,p--+ q f-Pl q, 
so both p and q are beliefs of agent S1 , thus 
p, q I-P1 PA q. 
So, because p A q is believed by agent S1 , p A q will become a belief of agent S 2 and 
hence 
p A q I-p2 [S1](p A q), 
thus [S1)(p A q) E bel(1JS2), thus the sentence [S2)[S1)(p A q) is true in m'. 
These examples illustrate the flexibility of Konolige's approach. Some very interesting 
results are obtained when the internal language L is not restricted to being propositional. 
This is taken up in the following sections. 
4.3 The Language LB 
Consider a predicate language without function constants where, as in chapter 1, we follow 
the substitution approach to quantification. As before an interpretation w of such a language 
is a triple ( </>, f, U) where U is the universe of discourse, </>is a mapping from the individual 
constants of the language to U and f is an assignment (i.e. a function from the the set of 
U-atoms to the set {T,F} ). To refresh our memories, remember that we formed a set U' 
consisting of all the original individual constants together with U and that a U-atom is a 
ground atom containing only elements of U. 
Let us introduce an example, called the 'tennis example', which will be useful for illus-
trating purposes: 
• As internal language we use the predicate language with two predicate constants P[ 
and P.J and four individual constants ci, c2 , c3 and c4. We take as our universe of 
discourse U ={Adam, Betty, Cecilia}. Then the set of U-atoms will be 
{P[(Adam, Adam), P[(Adam, Betty), P[ (Adam, Cecilia), 
P[ (Betty, Betty), P[ (Betty, Adam), P[ (Betty, Cecilia), 
P[ (Cecilia, Cecilia), Pf( Cecilia, Adam), P[ (Cecilia, Betty), 
Pi(Adam), P}(Betty), Pi(Cecilia)}. 
We further specify the mapping</> as follows: <f>(c1 ) =Adam, </>(c2 ) =Betty, <f>(c3) = 
Cecilia and <f>(c4) =Betty. Finally, let f be defined as follows: f(P[(Adam,Cecilia)) 
=T, f(P}(Adam))=f(P:}(Betty)) =T, with all other U-atoms mapped onto F. Let 
us agree to indicate Pf(x,y) by Likes(x,y) and Pi(x) by PlaysTennis(x). Then the 
assignment f maps all U-atoms onto F except Likes(Adam,Cecilia), PlaysTennis 
(Adam) and PlaysTennis(Betty). 
To be able to represent beliefs our language must be enriched by a mod<11 operator or 
operators. We only allow the operator( s) to be placed in front of sentences of the relevant 
internal language. The enriched language is called LB, the sentences of which are formally 
defined as follows: 
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• Given a predicate language L and one or more agents indicated by [Si], a sentence of 
LB based on L is defined by the following rules: 
(i) LB includes the sentences and formation rules of L and 
(ii) if A is a sentence of L, then [Si]A is a sentence of LB. 
As before a belief atom is a sentence [Si]A and if a sentence of LB does not include a belief 
operator, it is called an objective or ordinary sentence. Suppose we want to represent beliefs 
about beliefs, i.e. we want to allow a sentence like [S2](S3]A. Having constructed LB one 
may in that case take LB itself as the internal language and construct the enriched language 
LBB as external language. Unless otherwise stated, however, we will take the definition as 
is and assume L to be a (nonmodal) predicate language. 
Suppose we have three agents. Here are four examples of sentences of the language LB 
based on the predicate language given in the tennis example: 
P}(c2) /\ (S3]P[(c4,c1) 
'VxiP{(xi, c3) 
•[ S2]3xiP} (Xi) 
[S2]Pi(ci)-+ [Si]P}(c3) 
or, as agreed, PlaysTennis(c2) /\ [S3]Likes(c4,c1) 
or 'VxiLikes(xi, c3) 
or •[S2]3xiPlaysTennis(xi) 
or [S2]PlaysTennis(c1)-+ [S1]PlaysTennis(c3). 
The following formulae are not sentences of the language: 
[S1][ S3]P{( c4, c1) or 
[S2]P](x2) or 
3xi[S1]P}(xi) or 
[S1][S3]Likes( c4, c1) 
[ S2]PlaysTennis( X2) 
3xi[ S1]PlaysTennis( xi)· 
The first formula, [S1][S3]Likes( c4 , c1 ), is not a sentence of LB because a modal operator 
may only be attached to a sentence of the internal language. The formula [ S2]PlaysTennis 
(x2) is not a sentence of LB because PlaysTennis(x2) contains a free variable and thus is not 
a sentence. For the same reason the third formula above namely 3xi[S1]PlaysTennis(xi) 
does not qualify - S1 is attached to a formula containing a free variable. This (third) formula 
is an example of 'quantifying-in': 3xi in front of a modal operator followed by a formula 
containing the free variable Xi. This topic will be discussed in the next section. 
Informally we read a belief atom [Si]A as 'Agent Si believes A' or, equivalently 'A is a 
member of the belief set of agent Si'. By this we mean that A is either a member of the 
set of base beliefs of agent Si or is derived by the rules of the deduction structure of agent 
Si. An interpretation of the language must be such that, in the tennis example above, 
the sentence PlaysTennis(c2) /\ [S3]Likes(c4,c1) will be understood as 'c2 has property 
PlaysTennis and agent S3 believes that c4 and c1 are related by property Likes'. It seems 
as if an interpretation of LB should include an interpretation of the internal language (so 
that the truth or falsehood of 'c2 has property PlaysTennis' can be determined) and also 
the base beliefs and deduction rules of all the agents (so that the truth or falsehood of 
'Agent S3 believes that c4 and c1 are related by property Likes' can be determined). 
Formally we construct an interpretation of LB by combining an interpretation of the 
internal language L (say) with a set of deduction structures, one for each agent. L is the 
internal language of all the deduction structures. Let p( i) be a function which gives the 
set of deduction rules of agent Si, so p( i) = DRi. An interpretation of LB is called a 
B ( L, p )-model. It is defined as follows: 
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• A B( L, p )-model m of LB is a tuple ( </>, f, U, JJS*, ry*) where the first three elements 
are an interpretation of the internal language L, JJS* = {1JS1 , 1JS2, .. . } is a sequence 
of deduction structures (fi, Pi), one for each agent, where the members of ri are 
sentences of L, and ry* = {ry1 ,ry2 , ... } is a sequence of functions on U, one for each 
agent. 
The sequence ry* of functions will only start playing a role when we consider quantifying-in. 
We ignore it in the rest of this section. 
Let m If- A abbreviate the assertion that the sentence A has truth value T under the 
interpretation m. Then truth values are given to the sentences of the language LB by the 
following rules: 
• m If- A if A is a ground atom and f(A<f>) =T where A¢ is the string in which every 
constant c in A has been replaced by cf>(c), i.e. A¢ is the U-atom corresponding, under 
the mapping </>, to the original atom A, 
• m Jf- ·A i:ff m lf- A, 
• m Jf- (AV B) i:ff m If- A or m Jf- B, 
• m Jf- (A/\ B) i:ff m if- A and m Jf- B, 
• m if- (A--+ B) i:ff m lf- A or m Jf- B, 
• m If- (A f--+ B) i:ff m If- A and m If- B, or m lf- A and m lf- B, 
• m lf-Vx(A) i:ff for all u EU, m If- (A~), 
• m If- 3x(A) i:ff for some u E U, m If- (A~) and 
• m If- [Si]A i:ff A E bel(JJS;). 
Let us look at an example. Assume we have the language and interpretation of the 
tennis example and suppose the deduction structure of agent [S3] is the following: 
1JS3 = (f 3, JJR,3) = ({Likes( ci, c2), VxiPlaysTennis(xi)}, {From a sentence Vx;A de-
duce that A~2 .}). 
Is the sentence PlaysTennis( c2 ) /\ [S3]Likes( c4 , c1 ) true? Well, let m be the B(L, p )-model 
consisting of the interpretation in the tennis example and three deduction structures, only 
one of which, namely 1JS3, is relevant here. We now investigate the truth of the sen-
tence PlaysTennis(c2) /\ [S3]Likes(c4 , c1 ). First we find that J((PlaysTennis(c2))<f>) = 
f(PlaysTennis(cf>(c2)) = f(PlaysTennis(Betty)) = T. Now we must decide whether the 
sentence Likes( c4, c1) is a member of the belief set of agent S3. It is not a base belief - the 
only base belief of agent S3 involving the predicate Likes is Likes( ci, c2). Is it possible to 
derive Likes(c4 ,c1 )? No, because application of the only deduction rule will not produce it. 
Therefore the sentence PlaysTennis(c2) /\ [S3]Likes(c4 , c1 ) is not true in the interpretation 
m. 
The internal language, L, and the deduction rules, given by p*, are fixed in a B(L, p )-
model, but not the interpretation of L. We say a sentence is B(L, p )-satisfiable if it is true 
in some B(L,p)-model and B(L,p)-validif it is true in all B(L,p)-models. 
Let us agree that if A = {Ai, A2 , •.• , An} is a set of sentences, then [S;]A stands for 
{[Si]Ai, [Si]A2, ... , [S;]An} and •[Si]A stands for { •[Si]Ai, •[Si]A2, ... , •[Si]An}· There 
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is an important relation between the satisfiability of sentences containing belief operators 
in the external language and derivations in the internal language. This is stated by the 
following lemma, called the attachment lemma. 
Lemma 4.1 The denumerable set {[Si]A, •[Si]C} is B(L, p )-unsatisfiable iff for some Cj E C 
we have A f- p(i) Cj. 
Assume first that for some sentence Cj E C we have A f- p(i) Cj. Now suppose the 
set {[Si]A,•[Si]C} is B(L,p)-satisfiable. This means that there must be some deduction 
structure VSi = (ri, p( i)) such that all members of A are members of the belief set of agent 
Si and no element of C is a member of the belief set of agent Si· But, from the closure 
property of deduction structures, we know that Ci must be in the agent's belief set. From 
this contradiction we thus conclude that {[Si]A, •[Si]C} is B(L,p)-unsatisfiable. 
Conversely, assume {[Si]A, •[Si]C} is B(L, p)-unsatisfiable. Now suppose for all sen-
tences Cj E C we have that A f(p(i) Cj. Then we can construct a deduction structure 
VSi = (A,p(i)) which is such that no member ofC is in bel(VSi)· So for the B(L,p)-
model m = (</>,f,U,{ ... ,VSi,···},TJ*) we will have that m lf-[Si]Aj for every Aj EA and 
m ~ [S;]Cj for every Cj E C, thus m If- •[Si]Cj for every Cj E C. But this contradicts 
the unsatisfiability assumption, hence for some sentence Ck E C we must have A f- p(i) Ck. • 
The lemma is called the attachment lemma from the way it attaches the question of 
satisfiability in the external language L 8 to the derivation process in the internal language 
L. 
It is possible to define classes of B( L, p )-models. Some of the classes are defined by the 
form of the deduction rules and some by placing conditions on the belief sets. The latter will 
be indicated by specifying certain schemas that are characteristic of the class: all instances 
of the schema will be satisfied by every model in the class and every model not in the class 
will falsify some instance of the schema. We close this section by discussing a few classes. 
Saturation. We call a deduction structure saturated iff the set of deduction rules is sound 
and complete with respect to the semantics of the internal language. A class of B( L, p )-
models is called saturated if p is such that it associates with every agent a sound and 
complete set of deduction rules. The belief sets of saturated deduction structures are closed 
under logical consequence, in other words in these cases we have ideal reasoners. This is 
stated by the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.1 Let p be such that the class of B(L,p)-models is saturated. Let m be a 
member of the class and A a set of sentences from L. If the sentence C of L is a logical 
consequence of A (i.e. A I= C ), then for all agents Si we have that m If- [Si]A -+ [S;]C. 
Suppose A I= C. Then A f- p(i) C because the deduction structures are saturated. By 
lemma 4.1 it follows that if all members of A are in the belief set of agent Si, then C will 
also be a member of the belief set. • 
Corollary 4.1 Given a saturated class of B( L, p )-models, we have that 
(i) for every valid sentence A of the language L, [Si]A is B(L,p)-valid and 
(ii) the sentence [Si](A-+ C)-+ ([Si]A-+ [Si]C) is B(L,p)-valid. 
The results follow immediately from the above theorem. • 
Thus the belief sets of ideal reasoners will contain all valid sentences of the language 
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and will be closed under modus ponens. In the case of a non-ideal reasoner, valid sentences 
may be absent from his belief set and even if both A and A -t B are members of his belief 
set, B may be absent (for example if the set of deduction rules is empty). 
Knowledge. Let us consider knowledge as true belief, i.e. let us consider the class con-
sisting of just those B( L, p )-models in which the agent's beliefs agree with the facts of the 
'outside' world. A B( L, p )-model m = (</>, J, U, VS*, 77*) is in this class iff for every deduc-
tion structure vsi E VS*' if A E bel(VSi), then m If- A. The schema which characterises 
this class is 
[Si]A -t A. 
Noncontradiction. We have seen that a belief set may be inconsistent and contradictory 
(containing some sentence A and also --iA) or inconsistent without being contradictory. Con-
sider the class consisting of just those B( L, p )-models in which no belief set is contradictory. 
A B(L, p )-model m = (</>, f, U, VS*, 77*) belongs to this class iff for every deduction structure 
VSi E VS*, if A E bel(VSi), then --,A (j. bel(VSi). The schema which characterises this 
class is 
[Si]A -t --i[Si)--,A. 
Note that the belief set of an agent whose deduction structure is both noncontradictory and 
saturated will be consistent. 
Introspection. Suppose the internal language L contains a belief operator [Si]· A B(L,p)-
model m = (</>, f, U, VS*, 77*) is in the positive introspection class iff for every deduction 
structure VSi E VS*, if A E bel(VSi), then [Si] A E bel(VSi). The schema which charac-
terises this class is 
[ Si]A -t [Si][ Si]A. 
Similarly, a B( L, p )-model m is in the negative introspection class iff for every deduction 
structure VS; E VS*, if A (j. bel(VSi), then --i[Si)A E bel(VSi). The schema which charac-
terises this class is 
--i[Si)A -t [Si]--,[S;)A. 
4.4 Quantifying-in and Naming Maps 
We have seen that 3x;[S1 ]PlaysTennis( xi) was an example of an impermissible wf of the 
language LB, the reason being that a modal operator may only be attached to a sentence 
of the internal language. So the notion that agent S1 believes a certain individual to have 
the property of PlaysTennis cannot be expressed in the language LB. Note that the above 
is not the same as saying that agent S1 believes merely in the existence of somebody who 
has the property PlaysTennis. The latter notion can be expressed, namely by the sentence 
[S1]3x;PlaysTennis(x;). In (nonmodal) predicate logic a sentence 3xA is satisfiable iff the 
sentence A~ is satisfiable where c is a Skolem constant not occurring in A. If we, however, try 
to apply the same technique here we will get in both cases the sentence [S1 ]PlaysTennis(c) 
which is not satisfactory - sentences with very different meanings are transformed into the 
same sentence. 
What is actually meant by the two sentences above? Well, the second sentence, namely 
[S1]3xiPlaysTennis(xi), is understood to mean that 3xiPlaysTennis(xi) is a member of 
the belief set of agent S1 . The first sentence, namely 3xi[S1]PlaysTennis(xi), is under-
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stood to mean that there exists an individual such that agent S1 believes this particular 
individual to play tennis. So in this case agent S1 has the sentence PlaysTennis( c) in 
his belief set where c represents agent S1 's way of identifying the relevant individual, i.e. 
c is an id constant whose intended denotation is the appropriate value of Xi. (Konolige 
uses the term 'id constant' as an abbreviation for 'identifiable constant'. These constants 
are, loosely speaking, computationally significant because they contain all the information 
necessary to identify the relevant individual.) Thus the sentences [S1]PlaysTennis(c) and 
3xi[S1]PlaysTennis(xi) say the same as long as c refers to the appropriate value of x;. 
This is where the functions 'f/i in a model m = ( </>, f, U, VS*, 17*) come in. Every agent S; 
associates every member of the universe of discourse U with some constant. 
• The function 'f/i maps U onto a subset of the individual constants of the language. 
The members of the subset are called the id constants of agent Si and we call the 
function 'f/i a naming map. 
We may allow 'f/i to be a partial map when agent S; does not know every individual in U. 
We may even let 'f/i be a relation rather than a function if agent Si associates more than 
one id constant with the same individual. Unless otherwise stated, however, we take 'f/i as 
a total function. 
Let m be the (L,p)-model consisting of the interpretation in the tennis example and a 
deduction structure for agent S1 . Intuitively m If- 3xi[S1]PlaysTennis(xi) should be true 
iff [S1]PlaysTennis( u) is true for some u E U. Further, [S1]PlaysTennis( u) is true iff there 
is a sentence in the belief set of agent S1 asserting that u has property PlaysTennis. Unfor-
tunately sentences of the belief set are sentences of the language L, thus PlaysTennis(u) 
cannot be in any belief set. However, if L has an id constant denoting u, a sentence 
that expresses the same information could well be in the belief set, namely the sentence 
PlaysTennis(c) where 171(u) = c. 
Suppose agent S1 has the following naming map: 171(Adam) = c1, 171(Betty) = c4, 
'T]1(Cecilia) = c3. Suppose further that his deduction structure is the following: 
DS1 = ({Likes(ci,c4),PlaysTennis(c3 )},{}). 
Then the sentence 3x;[S1]PlaysTennis(x;) will be true in the model m: take u E U as 
Cecilia, then 171(Cecilia) = c3 and we have PlaysTennis(c3 ) as a (base) belief of agent S1 . 
(Note that this is a misplaced belief because PlaysTennis( c3 ) is not true in m.) 
The naming map must be defined in such a way that the function <f> always takes the 
id constant of an individual back to that specific individual. By this we mean that for all 
agents Si and all u E U, we have that </>( 'f/i( u)) = u. So the naming map is the partial 
inverse of the function ef>. It is, however, not necessarily the case that 'f/i( <f>( c)) = c. In the 
example above we have 
but 
</>( 7]1 (Adam)) = <f>( c1) = Adam, 
<f>(171(Betty)) = ef>(c4) =Betty, and 
</>(171(Cecilia)) = ef>(c3) =Cecilia, 
'f/1(ef>(c2)) = 'TJ1(Betty) = C4 -I C2. 
In the special case where 17 is the inverse of <f> the id constant is called a standard name. 
4.5 The language LBq 
We now extend the language L 8 by permitting quantifying in and introducing an additional 
operator. Suppose the internal language L contains constants. Then the language L• is 
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identical to L except that the number of constants is doubled by having •Ci as an additional 
constant for every individual constant Ci. In order to get an external language we extend 
the language LB to the language LBq, formally defined as follows: 
• Given an internal language L and one or more agents indicated by [Si], a wf of LBq 
based on L is defined recursively by the following rules: 
(i) LBq includes the sentences and formation rules of L and 
(ii) if A is a wf of L•, then [Si]A is a wf of LBq. 
We see that in the language LBq wfs of the language L• are used as the arguments of belief 
atoms while in LB we had sentences of L as the arguments. 
Let us look at an example. Let L be the language given in the tennis example. The lan-
guage L• is identical to L except that the individual constants are now ci, •ci, c2, •c2, c3, •c3, 
c4, •c4. Suppose we have three agents. Here are a few sentences of the language LBq based 
on L: 
PlaysTennis(c2) /\ [S3]Likes(c4, •c1) 
V'xi[S1]Likes(xi, c3) 
-i[ S2]3xiPlaysTennis( Xi) V 3xi[S1]Likes( •c2, Xi) 
[S2]PlaysTennis( •ci) ---+ [S1]PlaysTennis( c3 ). 
The following formulae are not sentences of the language LBq: 
[S1][S3]Likes( c4, •c1) 
PlaysTennis( •c2), 
the first formula because [S1] may only be attached to a formula of the language L• and 
the second because bullet operators may only appear in belief atoms. 
We define an interpretation of the language LBq in exactly the same way as an inter-
pretation of LB namely as a tuple m = (r/>,f,U,DS*,TJ*). The difference comes in when 
we give the rules by which truth values are given to the sentences of the language. As in 
the case of the language LB we want to follow a substitution approach to quantification. 
In other words, we want the truth of 3x[Si]A to be determined by the truth of ([Si]A)~ 
for some u E U. However, the truth of ([Si]A)~ should in turn be determined by whether 
A~;(u) E bel(DSi)· As substitution of terms for variables is of general importance (for exam-
ple, if one adopts a proof theory involving quantifier elimination), and as the substitution 
of Skolem constants is inadequate to cope with quantifying-in, we define substitution in 
such a way that the id constant •c is substituted instead of c when necessary. Formally we 
proceed as follows: 
Let A be any wf of LBq. For every variable x and individual constant c the formula A~ 
is given by the following rules: 
• If A is an atom, then A~ is the result of substituting c for every occurrence of x in A. 
• For any wf A, (-iA)~ = -iA~. 
•For any wfs A and B, (A8B)~ = (A~8 B~) where 8 E {V,/\,-+,+-+}. 
• For any wf A, (Qx(A))~ = Qx(A) where Q E {V, 3}. 
• For any wf A, (Qy(A))~ = Qy(A~) where Q E {V, 3} and x =J y. 
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• For any wf A, 
([Si]A)~ = [Si]A;c 
([Si]A)~ = [Si]A~ 
for c a constant of L 
for c EU. 
For a set r of wfs we sometimes use the notation r~ by which is meant that x is replaced 
by c in all members of r according to the rules above. 
Given the above rules, what will be a sensible way of allocating truth values to sentences 
of the language LBq? As before we generalize the definition of substitution and take A¢ to 
be the string that results when all constants c in A have been replaced by</>( c ). Analogously 
we define A 'Iii as A with all occurrences of u E U replaced by 77i( u) and all occurrences of 
•c replaced by 77i(</>(c)). (Note that if c is a standard name, 77i(</>(c)) = c.) Then the rules 
for giving truth values are the following: 
• m If- A iff A is a ground atom and J(A1') =T where A¢ is the U-atom corresponding, 
under the mapping </>, to the original atom A as explained above, 
• m If- -.A iff m [f- A, 
• m If- (AV B) iff m If- A or m If- B, 
• m If- (A/\ B) iff m If- A and m If- B, 
• m If- (A -t B) iff m [f- A or m If- B, 
• m If- (A+-+ B) iff m If- A and m If- B, or m [f- A and m [f- B, 
• m If- \lx(A) iff for all u E U, m If- A~, 
• m If- 3x(A) iff for some u E U, m If- A~ and 
• m If- [Si]A iff A'lli E bel(VSi)· 
Let us look at an example, using the internal language Land the interpretation ( </>, f, U) 
of the tennis example. Suppose we have three agents and are interested in agent S3 . We 
assume the deduction structure of agent S3 is 
VS3 = ({Likes(ci,c3),PlaysTennis(c3)},{}) 
and the naming map is 773(Adam) = c1, 773(Betty) = c4, 773(Cecilia) = c3. Is the sentence 
PlaysTennis(c2)A[S3]Likes(c4,•c1) truein m = (</>,f,U,VS*,77*)? 
The truth value of the first part of the sentence is easily determined: ( PlaysTennis( c2) )¢ 
= PlaysTennis(</>(c2)) = PlaysTennis(Betty) which is mapped onto T by f. In order to 
find the truth value of [ S3]Likes( c4, •c1) we have to investigate whether (Likes( c4, •c1) )'173 
is a member of bel(VS3). According to the definition of A'lli we have that (Likes( c4, •c1))'173 
= Likes( c4, 773( </>( c1))) = Likes( c4, 773( Adam)) = Likes( c4, c1) which is not a member of the 
belief set of agent S3 and thus the sentence is not true in m. 
We look at a second example, this time involving quantifying-in. Is 3xi[S3]Likes( •ci, Xi) 
true in m? Following the rules we have to find out 
whether there exists au E U such that m If- ([S3]Likes( •Ci, xi))~i, 
i.e. whether there exists au EU such that m If- [S3](Likes(•ci,xi))~i, 
i.e. whether there exists au E U such that m If- [S3]Likes( •c1, u), 
i.e. whether there exists au E U such that (Likes( •c1, u))'l73 E bel(VS3), 
i.e. whether there exists au EU such that Likes(773(<f>(c1)),773(u)) E bel(VS3), 
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i.e. whether there exists au EU such that Likes(ry3(Adam),rJ3(u)) E bel(VS3), 
i.e. whether there exists au EU such that Likes(c1,ry3(u)) E bel(VS3). 
We know that rJ3(Cecilia) = c3 and that Likes(ci,c3) is a (base) belief of agent S3. Thus 
there does exist a u E U (namely Cecilia) such that Likes( c1, ry3( u)) is in the belief set 
of agent S3 and we (at last) are able to conclude that the sentence 3xi[S3]Likes( •ci, Xi) is 
true in m. 
The substitution and satisfaction rules above are defined in such a way that satisfiability 
is preserved in the sense stated in the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.2 Given a language LBq, an interpretation m with universe U and a wf A 
with n free variables xi, x2 , ••• , Xn· Suppose Ui E U, 1 ~ i ~ n, and individual constants 
Ci, 1 ~ i ~ n, are such that¢>( Ci)= Ui. Then m If- A~; iff m If- A~i 
It is sufficient to show that the theorem holds for n = 1 and we use (unsubscripted) x, 
c and u. The theorem holds for the case where A is a ground atom because in that case 
we have m If- A~ iff J((A~)¢>) =T iff J(Aef;(c)) =T iff f(A~) =T iff m If- A~. For ordinary 
wfs the proof is by induction on the subformulae of A. Suppose now A is of the form [Si]B 
where Bis an ordinary wf. We know ([Si]B)~ = [Si](B!c), so we have to show that (B~)11i = 
( B!c)''li. But this is the case because we replace all occurrences of u on the lefthand side by 
'f/i(u) and all occurrences of •con the righthand side by rJi(</>(c)) = 'f/i(u). Using induction 
we conclude that the theorem holds for every wf of the language. • 
We have seen that the attachment lemma (lemma 4.1) associates satisfiability in LB 
with the derivation process in L. Is it possible to formulate a similar attachment lemma 
for the language LBq7 The answer is yes but some preliminary definitions are necessary. 
The problem is the presence of the bullet operator. A sentence of LBq such as P}( •c) is, 
for example, not a wf of the internal language. Such a sentence has to be replaced by 
some suitable wffrom L. But what wf will be 'suitable'? Well, we know that (P}(•c))"li = 
P}(rJi(</>(c)), so •c refers to the id constant assigned by the naming map 'f/i to the individual 
denoted by c. Because we do not actually know which individual or id constant this is, it 
seems reasonable to uniformly substitute any arbitrary id constant for •c when we apply 
the attachment rule. There are, however, two reservations. 
It is impermissible to use an id constant that is already present in the LBq sentence. 
For example, suppose we have the sentence 
[Si]P}(•c1)-+ [Si]P}(c2) 
where c2 is an id constant. Then we cannot replace •c1 by c2 since it is certainly the case 
that 
{P}(c2)} f-p(i) Pj(c2) 
but the original sentence may not be valid. 
The second reservation depends on the way the agent's deduction rules handle id con-
stants. Suppose, for example, that agent S1 has a rule which he only applies to Betty 
namely 
If PlaysTennis(c2) then VxiLikes(xi,c2). 
where c2 is an id constant for Betty. Now consider the LBq sentence 
[S1]PlaysTennis( •c)-+ [S1]VxiLikes(xi, •c). 
If an arbitrary new id constant may be substituted for •c and if c2 is chosen, it will be the 
case that 
PlaysTennis(c2) f-p(l) VxiLikes(xi,c2) 
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and we will expect the original sentence to be valid which it is not (just pick the denotation 
of c to be, for example, Adam). 
We therefore need id constants that act like any other id constant with respect to the 
agent's deduction rules. These id constants are called schematic constants and the formal 
definition is the following: 
• Given a language L, let p( i) be the deduction rules of agent Si and c an id constant. 
Further, let r be a set of sentences and B be a sentence of L possibly containing 
c, such that r f- p(i) B. Then c is a schematic constant of p( i) if, for every other id 
constant c', we have that r~, f- p(i) B~,. 
The deduction rules of the agent determine which id constants are schematic constants. 
Any id constant that is treated in a special way (like c2 in the example above where certain 
rules apply only to it) cannot be a schematic constant. Schematic constants can be applied 
freely in any derivation. Normally we require that the internal language contains countably 
many such constants. 
Before we can give the attachment lemma for LBq we have to define the bullet deletion 
transform of a set of sentences from L•: 
• Given a language L and a set r of sentences of the language L •, the bullet deletion 
transform of r namely r• is the set formed by uniformly replacing every bullet constant 
•ak of r with a schematic constant Ck not already in r where Ci #- Cj for i #- j. 
The bullet deletion transform of a single sentence A is written as A•. Now the attach-
ment lemma for the language LBq can be stated. 
Lemma 4.2 The denumerable set {[Si]A, -i[Si]C} is B(L, p )-unsatisfiable iff for some Cj EC 
we have A• f- p(i) Cj for all bullet deletion transforms of A and C. 
'If' direction: We will assume that the naming map T/i of agent S; is total. Now, assume 
that for some sentence Cj E C we have A• f-p(i) Cj. Suppose the set {[S;]A, -i[S;]C} is 
satisfiable. Then there is a model m which satisfies it. Let Cj be the sentence of L that is 
denoted by Cj in m, i.e. all bullet constants •Ck in Cj are replaced by T/i( </>(ck)), and let 
A' be the set of sentences denoted by A in m, i.e. all bullet constants •Ck in the sentences 
of A are replaced by T/i( </>(ck)). Further, let 1JSi be the deduction structure of agent Si in 
m. Then it is the case that Cj ~ bel(JJSi) and A' ~ bel(JJSi)· But since A• f- p(i) Cj, it is 
also the case that A' f- p(i) Cj by the definition of schematic constants. Thus because the 
deduction rules are deductively closed Cj E bel(1JS;). From this contradiction we conclude 
that the set {[ Si]A, -,[ Si]C} is unsatisfiable. 
'Only if' direction: To prove the lemma in the opposite direction we assume that the set 
{[Si]A, -i[Si]C} is unsatisfiable. Given a bullet deletion transform of A and C, assume that 
for all sentences C EC we have A• If p(i) c•. We will now construct a model m that satisfies 
the set, thus arriving at a contradiction. Choose an arbitrary f and a denumerably infinite 
U and define</> in such a way that each constant is mapped onto a different individual of U. 
Suppose the bullet deletion transform converts •aj to the schematic constant Cj for agent 
Si. Define the agent's naming map T/i in such a way that T/i(</>(aj)) = Cj. Now it will be 
the case that m if- A iff m if- A• and m if- C iff m if- c•. Then we construct the deduction 
structure 1JSi = (A•, p( i)) which will have the property that no member of c• will be in 
the belief set of agent Si because of the assumption that it cannot be derived. Then, for the 
model m = (</>, f, U, { ... , 1JS;, .. . }, ry*), we have m if- [S;]A for every A E A and m ~ [Si]C 
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for every C EC. This is the contradiction since we assumed that no such model exists. • 
The assumption that the naming map 'r/i is a total function was needed so that Cj would 
be defined in every model. If 'r/i is a partial function, Cj may be undefined in some model 
and the set {[Si]A, •[Si]Cj} would be satisfiable even though the derivation A• r p(i) Cj 
holds. Fortunately it is possible to preserve the attachment lemma by adding the following 
condition to the 'If' direction: 
All bullet constants of Cj are also in A. 
4.6 Some Properties of Quantifying-in 
Suppose agent Sj has a rule From P[(c) infer 3xiP[(xi) where c is a schematic constant, 
in other words the agent is capable of 'existential generalisation'. Then the following holds 
for any B(L,p)-model m: 
m Ir 3xi[Sj]Pf(xi)---+ [Sj]3xiP[(xi)· 
Why? By the rules above 3xi[Sj]P{(x;) is true only if there exists a u E U such that 
m Ir [Sj]P[(u), i.e. if there exists au E U such that (P[(u))11i E bel(DSj), i.e. if there 
exists au EU such that P{(rJj(u)) E bel(DSj), i.e. if Pl(c') E bel(DSj) where c' is some id 
constant. So, suppose for some id constant c', Pl(c') is in the belief set of agent Sj. Then, 
because the agent is capable of existential generalisation, this means that 3xiP{(x;) will 
also be in the belief set. 
The above sentence will also be valid in all saturated models because existential gener-
alisation is a sound rule. Thus, if an ideal reasoner believes that a particular individual has 
a certain property, he will also believe that someone has the property. 
What about the converse, i.e. is it the case that the following holds for any B( L, p )-model 
m: 
m Ir [Sj]3xiP{(x;)---+ 3x;[Sj]P{(xi)? 
The answer is no. Why? Well, if m Ir [Sj]3xiPl(x;) it means (3xiPl(x;))11i = 3x;P[(xi) 
E bel(DSj)· Suppose this is the case, in other words the agent believes someone has property 
P1. Then it is not necessarily the case that the consequent is true in m, because for 
3x;[Sj]P{(x;) to be satisfied by m we must have that for some u E U, [Sj]P{( u) is true in 
m, i.e. for some u EU, (P{(u))11i E bel(DSj), i.e. for some u EU, P{(ryj(u)) E bel(DSj), 
i.e. for some id constant c, P{(c) E bel(DSj) and this is not (necessarily) the case. So, if 
the agent believes that someone has a certain property, he will not necessarily believe that 
a particular individual has that property. This seems quite reasonable. 
Let us consider the sentence Vxi[Sj]P{(xi) ---+ [Sj]VxiP[(x;). Is this sentence or its 
converse valid in all saturated B( L, p )-models? The answer is that it may be the case but 
under very specific circumstances. Note that an ideal reasoner will be able to derive from 
VxiP[(xi) that P[(c) for all c in L, in other words if Vx;P[(x;) is in the belief set of agent 
Sj, Pl( c) will also be in his belief set for all c. Now let us first consider the converse of the 
above sentence, namely 
[Sj]Vx;P{(xi)---+ Vx;[Sj]P{(xi)· 
Suppose Vx;P[(xi) E bel(DSj)· When will the consequent be true? Well, it will be true if 
for all u EU we have that m Ir [Sj]P{(u), i.e. iffor all u EU we have (P{(u))11i E bel(DSj), 
i.e. if for all u EU we have Pl(ryj(u)) E bel(DSj)· So, if every u; EU has an associated id 
constant c;, i.e. if 'r/i is total, then the sentence will be valid. 
Now consider the sentence 
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\lxi[Sj]Pl(xi)-+ [Sj]\lxiPl(xi)· 
The antecedent is true in a model m only if, in the first place, the naming map is total (so 
we assume T/i to be total) and if, in the second place, for all Ui E U we have (Pl(ui))"11 E 
bel('DSj), i.e. if for all Ui EU we have Pl(T/j(ui)) E bel('DSj)· Suppose T/j(ui) =Ci where 
the ui are distinct but the Ci need not be. Now assume each of these Pl (Ci) is in the belief 
set of agent Sj. The consequent will be true in m if (\lxiPl(xi)Y'j E bel('DSj. This will be 
the case if the agent is able to derive \I xi Pl (xi) and this will be possible only if the Ci above 
cover all constants of L. 
4. 7 Proof Methods 
As proof method Konolige uses analytic tableaux with so-called signed formulae. A signed 
formula is a wf preceded by either 'T' or 'F'. In order to show that a sentence B follows 
from a set A= {A1, A2, ... , An} of sentences we start a tableau with F B and TAi, TA2, 
... ,TAn. (These formulae form the 'root' of the tableau.) By following certain rules other 
signed formulae are then produced. It is possible that the tableau will grow into sub-
tableaux or branches. If we succeed in arriving at a contradiction, i.e. having for some 
sentence C both TC and FC in a branch, we close the branch. If all the branches are 
closed, we conclude that it is indeed the case that B follows from A. It will namely be 
impossible to construct an interpretation where B is false and all the members of A are 
true, thus the root cannot be satisfied. 
Under what conditions is the analytic tableau method deductively closed? Recall that a 
deduction stucture is deductively closed iff, in the first place, r ~ bel( (r, 'DR)), and, in the 
second place, if r f-vn A and r, A f-vn B, then r hm B. The first condition is obviously 
satisfied by analytic tableaux and for the second we specify the following: 
• If the two tableaux respectively headed by Tr, FA and Tr, TA, F B both close, then 
the tableau headed by Tr, F B also closes. 
The rules listed below are such that this condition holds. 
Before giving the actual rules let us illustrate the process with an example. We show 
that AV (•A/\ B) V ·B is a tautology where A and B are sentences of a nonmodal language. 
We construct the following tableau: 
( 1) FA v (•A/\ B) V ·B 
(2) FA (1) 
(3) F·A /\ B (1) 
( 4) F·B (1) 
(5) TB (4) 
(6) F·A (3) (8) FB (3) 
(7) TA (6) x (5,8) 
x (2, 7) 
The numbers on the left are the line numbers of the tableau and those on the right indicate 
the (previous) lines from which the current one was derived. Loosely speaking, lines (2), (3) 
and ( 4) follow from line ( 1) since all disjuncts of a false disjunction are false and line ( 5) is 
derived from line ( 4) by observing that, if ·B is false, then B must be true. Line (3) causes 
a split in the tableau (lines ( 6) and (8)) because either conjunct of a false conjunction may 
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be false, i.e. we have two possibilities. When a split occurs two sub-tableaux appear next 
to each other. Line (7) follows from line (6) where we (again) had a false negation. The 
symbol 'x' indicates that a branch is closed. We see that both branches of the tableau are 
closed, thus the given sentence is a tautology. 
Formally we proceed as follows. Assume we have a predicate language L, the internal 
language of agents S;, i = 1, 2, ... , n. Let us now list the rules for deriving signed formulae 
from given signed formulae. They are grouped under four headings. Let A and B be any 
sentence of L. 
• By a conjunctive type rule, if a appears in the tableau, both ai and az are added. 
a ai az 
TA !\B TA TB 
FAV B FA FE 
FA-+B TA FE 
T-.A FA 
F-.A TA 
The second rule of this type was applied in lines (2), (3) and ( 4) of the example above and 
the fifth rule was applied in lines (5) and (7). 
• By a disjunctive type rule, if a appears in the tableau, the tableau splits into two 
branches, one headed by a 1 and the other by az. 
a ai az 
FA!\B FA FE 
TAV B TA TB 
TA-+B FA TB 
The first rule of this type was applied in lines ( 6) and ( 8) above. 
• By a universal type rule a wf A may be instantiated with an arbitrary constant. 
a a(c) 
TVxA TA~ 
F3xA FA~ 
This type of rule may be applied many times to the same signed universal formula by 
choosing all the constants that have already appeared in the tableau. 
• By an existential type rule a wf A may be instantiated with any constant which has 
not occurred previously in the tableau. 
a a(c) 
FVxA FA~ 
T3xA TA~ 
This type of rule is only applied once to each signed existential formula. 
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It is possible to prove that the root of a tableau built up by the above rules is satisfiable 
if and only if one of the branches is satisfiable. This means that the tableau method is sound 
as only contradictory formulae are the roots of closed tableaux. Furthermore, the method is 
complete since it is possible to show that the tableau will close if the root is unsatisfiable. We 
may therefore conclude that every valid sentence A will have an associated closed tableau 
with FA as the root. 
For A = {Ai, A2, .. . }, let T[Si]A stand for the set {T[Si]A1 , T[Si]A2 , ... } of signed 
formulae and similarly for F[Si]A. Let us now consider the external language L 8 and let r 
be a set of sentences and A and B sentences of the language. The rules as given above are 
used with the addition of the socalled attachment rule, namely: 
• A branch with the signed formulae T[Si]f and F[Si]A closes if f I-p(i) A. 
The attachment rule is sound because if r I-p(i) A, then, by lemma 4.1, any branch 
containing the formulae T[Si]r and F[Si]A will not be satisfiable (i.e. will close), so the 
set [Si]r entails [Si]A. It can be shown that these rules are also complete. Informally the 
argument is as follows: Consider any branch containing T[Si]r and F[Si]A. By lemma 4.1 
the set T[Si]r U {F[Si]A} can only be unsatisfiable if r I-p(i) A. Suppose the branch is 
open. Then no such derivation can exist otherwise the branch would have been closed by 
application of the attachment rule above. Thus the formulae are satisfiable. 
As an example of the use of the attachment rule we now prove the following, assuming 
that agent Si has a saturated deduction structure: 
[Si](A - B) - ([S;]A - [S;]B). 
(This was already proved earlier in the chapter, using semantic arguments.) 
(1) F[Si](A - B) - ([Si]A - [Si]B) 
(2) T[Si](A - B) (1) 
(3) F([Si]A - [S;]B) (1) 
( 4) T[Si]A (3) 
(5) F[S;]B (3) 
x 
A,A- B 1-p; B (2,4,5) 
The attachment rule was used to close the table. Because agent S; is an ideal reasoner 
modus ponens is one of his deduction rules or is derivable from his deduction rules. 
Suppose the signed formula F[S;]A is added to a tableau under construction. We know 
the branch will close if we are able to show that A is a belief. In order to try to show that A 
is a belief we then start an auxiliary tableau with FA as root. The main tableau represents 
the outside observer's view of the agent while the auxiliary tableau represents the internal 
proof process of agent i. If n formulae F[ S;]Aj, 1 ::_; j ::; n, are added to the main tableau 
n auxiliary tableaux can be formed with respective roots F Aj. (When there is more than 
one agent the tableaux must be indexed.) 
Now suppose at some point we add a signed formula T[S;]B to a branch of a main 
tableau which has one or more auxiliary tableaux for agent i. Then TB can be added to all 
branches of each of these auxiliary tableaux because B must be one of the agent's beliefs. If 
we succeed in closing an auxiliary tableau it means that the belief sentences which we have 
added to that tableau are inconsistent with the agent's rules and hence the main tableau 
branch from which they have come must also close. 
As a first example let us again prove the following where agent i is an ideal reasoner: 
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[Si](A--+ B)--+ ([Si]A--+ [Si]B). 
(1) F[Si](A--+ B) --+ ([Si]A--+ [Si]B) 
(2) T[Si](A--+ B) (1) 
(3) F([Si]A--+ [Si]B) (1) 
( 4) T[Si]A (3) 
(5) F[Si]B (3) 
x 
(9) FA 
x 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(8) 
(7,9) 
FB (5) 
TA (4) 
TA--+ B (2) 
(10) TB (8) 
x (6, 10) 
The auxiliary tableau headed by F Bin line (6) was constructed after the signed formula in 
line (5) namely F[Si]B was added to the main tableau. Line (7) originates from line 4 and 
line (8) from (2). Because both the branches of the auxiliary tableau close the main tableau 
closes. The purpose of the auxiliary tableau is to do the derivation A, A --+ B f-- Pi B. 
As a second example we show that, if agent Si believes that B follows from A, then, if 
he does not believe B he will not believe A: 
(1) F[Si](A--+ B)--+ (-.[Si]B--+ -.[Si]A) 
(2) T[Si](A--+ B) (1) 
(3) F-.[Si]B--+ -.[Si]A (1) 
(4) T-.[Si]B (3) 
(5) F-.[Si]A (3) 
(6) F[Si]B (4) 
(7) T[Si]A (5) 
x 
(8) FB (6) 
(9) TA (7) 
(10) TA--+ B (2) 
(11) FA (10) (12) TB (10) 
x (9, 11) x (8,12) 
The auxiliary tableau starts in line (8) and splits into two branches which both close. 
As a final example suppose we have two agents. Agent S1 has two base beliefs namely 
-.A and S2 A --+ A (i.e. 'If agent S2 believes the sentence A then A is true'). Suppose agent 
S2 has only one base belief namely A and neither agent has any deduction rules. We assert 
agent S1 will believe A/\ -.A and show it as follows: 
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(1) F[S1](A /\·A) 
(2) T(S1]•A given 
(3) T[S1]([S2]A--+ A) given 
(4) T[S2]A given 
x 
(5) FA/\ ·A (1) 
(6) FA (5) (11) F--,A (5) 
(7) T[S2]A-+ A (3) (12) T--,A (2) 
(8) F[S2]A (7) (10) TA (7) x (11, 12) 
(9) x (4,8) x (6, 10) 
The auxiliary tableau starting in line ( 5) closes because all branches originating from it 
close. Hence the main tableau is also closed and we have succeeded in showing that agent 
S1 believes the contradiction A/\ •A. Note that this does not mean that he believes all 
sentences of the internal language since his deduction structure is not logically complete. 
Is it possible to use this proof method when we have sentences of the external language 
L 8 q? Yes. All that is required is to replace the attachment rule for the language L 8 given 
above by a different attachment rule, namely: 
• A branch with the signed formulae T[S;]f and F[S;]A closes if r• f- p(i) A•. 
As an example of the use of the (new) attachment rule let us show that the following 
holds: 
3x;[Sj]Pl(x;)--+ [Sj]3xiPf (x;) 
where we assume that the deduction rules of agent Sj are such that he is capable of ex-
istential generalisation. (This was already proved earlier in the chapter, using a semantic 
argument.) 
(1) F3x;[Sj]Pf (x;)--+ [Sj]3x;Pf(x;) 
(2) T3x;[Sj]Pf (x;) (1) 
(3) F[Sj]:lx;Pl(x;) (1) 
(4) TPf(•ak) (2) 
x 
Pf(ck) f-P; 3x;Pf(x;) 
The bullet constant •ak in line ( 4) is replaced by a schematic constant Ck by the bullet 
deletion transform of the sentence. 
4.8 Summary 
The main advantage of Konolige's approach is that resource-bounded agents can be de-
scribed. We have seen that no restriction need be placed on the deduction rules except 
that the rules should be applied exhaustively, i.e. that the set of beliefs should be deduc-
tively closed. Furthermore, a predicate language is used where quantifying-in is possible 
and a sound and complete proof theory is given. Other approaches to the problem of logical 
omniscience exist, for example semantics involving impossible or nonstandard worlds. In 
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[Fagin et al 1995a] the authors consider the implications of basing a logic of knowledge on 
a nonstandard logic rather than on standard propositional logic thereby (hopefully) allevi-
ating the logical omniscience problem by an appropriate choice of the nonstandard logic. 
Konolige's approach shares the following omission with the approaches of Moore and 
Levesque: belief sets of agents are considered to be static since no attention is given to 
changes in their beliefs, in other words belief sets are never revised. In the following chapter 
we will take a brief look at belief revision. 
Chapter 5 
Belief Revision 
What I know now is only partial; then it will be complete. 
1 Cor 13:12 
In the preceeding chapters we looked at different ways to describe the beliefs of an agent 
given some initial beliefs. We did not consider the possibility of information that changes 
as new facts become available. In other words we did not consider ways to alter the set 
of beliefs of an agent, either by discarding some of the previous beliefs or by adding new 
beliefs to the set. In this chapter we take a brief look at the revision of belief sets where a 
belief set will be understood to be a set of (nonmodal) propositions closed under entailment. 
Introspective beliefs are specifically excluded, hence a nonmodal language suffices. 
Let K be the belief set or knowledge base of an agent and suppose new information 
becomes available. If the new information is consistent with K the set can simply be 
extended with it. If, however, the new information is inconsistent with K decisions must be 
made on how to handle the situation. Say, for example, the new information casts doubt 
on parts of the knowledge base, i.e. contradicts some wfs in K. Then some kind of revision 
of K becomes necessary. Some of the members. of the belief set will have to be removed. 
Which? Well, the belief set was not easily constructed, so we do not want to discard the 
whole set. We have to decide which of the reasons for the inconsistency must be thrown 
out and which of the consequences must be removed. 
The problem is that K is not a simple set of atomic facts: there are complex logical 
dependencies between the sentences. Logical considerations alone will not be enough to 
decide which wfs have to be removed. Various principles have been proposed to describe 
how a belief set should be revised. We discuss the Alchourr6n-Gardenfors-Makinson (AGM) 
theory ([Blackburn et al 1997]). 
5.1 Kinds of Belief Revision 
Let F be the set of all wfs of some propositional language. A belief set is now formally 
defined as follows: 
• A belief set K ~ F is a set which is closed under entailment, i.e. Cn(K) ~ K. 
A sentence A is accepted by Kif A EK and rejected by Kif ·A EK. 
There seems to be two basic kinds of belief revision, namely (i) to insert or accept 
information (i.e. adding sentences to K) or (ii) to delete information. The question is how 
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and when to perform these basic operations. It can be done in a direct or an indirect mode. 
In the direct mode information is inserted or deleted without bothering about consistency, 
but in order to determine which conclusions can actually be drawn a complex set of inference 
rules must be provided. So the complexity of belief revision is shifted inside the inference 
'engine'. We will, however, follow the indirect approach. 
In the indirect approach one tries to perform belief revision according to (at least some 
of) the following guidelines: 
• Consistency. The sentences of a belief set should be kept consistent whenever possible. 
• Closure. If a sentence A is entailed by the belief set, then A should be a member of 
the set. 
• Minimality. The amount of information lost when the belief set is revised should be 
kept to a minimum. 
• First Things Last. If some beliefs are in some way considered as more important than 
others, the least important beliefs should be discarded first. 
By following these guidelines belief revision becomes highly nontrivial but the advantage is 
that standard logic can then be used as the underlying 'inference engine'. 
The AGM theory is the most prominent example of belief revision in the indirect mode. 
In this approach three main kinds of belief revision are considered. We list them below and 
illustrate each using the language with three atoms p, q and r. We think of p as 'I have an 
elder brother', of q as 'I have an elder sister' and of r as 'I have a younger sister'. Suppose 
now our agent does not, as far as he knows, have an elder brother and has one sister (older 
than him). We think of the agent's belief set as the set of all consequences of his initial 
beliefs, thus JC = Cn( { •p, q} ). 
• Expansion. Suppose new information becomes available in the form of the sentence 
A and suppose A is consistent with the belief set JC. Then JC is expanded with A, 
denoted by JC + A, formally defined as: 
JC+A= Cn(JCu{A}). 
The expanded set will contain JC as a subset. 
In our example, suppose a baby sister is born, i.e. the fact r becomes available. Then 
we will have JC+ A= Cn({•p,q,r}). 
• Revision. Suppose new information becomes available in the form of the sentence A 
and suppose A is inconsistent with the belief set JC. If we simply expand JC with A the 
resultant belief set will be the set of all wfs. Thus expansion is not appropriate. Some 
other operation must be defined so that consistency will be preserved. This means 
some sentences of JC will have to be discarded if A is included. We say JC is revised 
with A and denote the resultant belief set by JC * A. It is possible that this resultant 
set is neither a superset nor a subset of JC. We will not propose any specific revision 
operation but will look at general properties that such operations should satisfy. 
Suppose in our example the fact A = p V •q becomes available. To include this new 
information we will have to revise JC and either •P or q will not be a member of the 
revised set. There is, however, no purely logical reason for choosing which information 
should be discarded. 
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• Contraction. A belief set JC is contracted with A when a sentence A E JC is retracted 
from JC without new information being added. Because of the definition of belief sets 
it will, in general, be necessary to discard further sentences of JC in order to retain 
closure under entailment. The resultant belief set is denoted by JC - A and it will be 
a subset of JC. As in the case of revision we do not propose any specific contraction 
operation but give the AGM postulates that such operations should satisfy. 
In our example the agent might wonder how his life would have been if he did not 
have an elder sister ... 
5.2 Postulates for Revision 
One should note that the following two characteristics are important features of the AGM 
approach: 
• Minimal Change. As much as possible of the original belief set should be retained. 
• Functionality. We assume the operation * is a function from belief sets and sentences 
to belief sets, i.e. we assume that for every belief set JC and sentence A, there is a 
unique belief set JC * A. 
The first rule, called the closure postulate, states that the result of revision should again 
be a belief set: 
• For any wf A and any belief set JC, we have that JC* A is a belief set. (*1) 
The second rule, called the success postulate, states that incoming information has 
priority over old information: 
• A E IC* A. (*2) 
The third and fourth postulates are called the expansion postulates. The third postulate 
ensures that revising with A will never result in more information than expanding with A: 
(*3) 
The fourth postulate is the following: 
• If -,A (j. IC, then (IC+ A)~ (IC* A). (*4) 
The fourth postulate together with the third state that, if A is consistent with the (orig-
inal) belief set, then revising with A and expanding with A yield the same result. This is 
in accordance to the minimality principle. We give it as a remark: 
Remark 5.1 Jj-,A (j. IC, then (IC+ A)= (IC* A). 
The result follows immediately from postulates (*3) and (*4). • 
What will the result be if we revise a belief set with a tautology, i.e. with a wf which is 
valid in all frames? Well, any belief set has all the tautologies as members, in other words 
revising by any of them will not change the set: 
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Remark 5.2 Given any consistent belief set K and any tautology A, it follows that K *A = 
K. 
The result follows immediately. • 
As noted above a belief set should be consistent if at all possible. So K * A should 
be consistent whenever A is. This is the purpose of the fifth rule, called the consistency 
preservation postulate: 
• K * A = :F iff I= ·A. (*5) 
Thus the fifth postulate requires that the result of revising with A should always be consis-
tent except when ·A is a tautology, in other words K *A should be consistent except when 
A is a contradiction (i.e. false in all worlds). 
The sixth postulate, the extensionality postulate, ensures that the syntactic form of A 
does not have any effect when revision is done with it: 
• If I= A +-+ B, then K * A = K * B. (*6) 
The converse of the sixth postulate does not always hold. We can easily see it by considering 
the case K = Cn( {p, q}) and A = p and B = q. 
The above six postulates are the basic rules for the way in which a belief set should be 
revised. We will shortly give two additional ones, but first have a look at some consequences 
of these six postulates. 
Firstly, revision is not 'commutative', thus in general (K *A)* B =/:- (K * B) *A. (Take, 
for example, K = Cn( {p}), A = q and B = •q.) This means that the order in which 
revision is done is important. Furthermore it is generally not the case that (Cn(A)) * B = 
(Cn(B)) *A. (Again we can see it by taking A= q and B = •q.) 
Secondly, recall that the Cn operator is monotonic, i.e. given two sets <I> and r, if <I> ~ r, 
then Cn( <I>) ~ Cn(f ). Then the fourth postulate above is equivalent to stating that K is a 
subset of K *A if A is consistent with K. It can be shown as follows: 
Remark 5.3 The following two rules are equivalent: 
(i) (*4) If A is consistent with K, then (K +A) ~ (K *A) 
and 
(ii) if A is consistent with K, then K ~ K * A. 
First assume (ii) and that A is consistent with K, i.e. ·A fj. K. Then 
K+A =Cn(KU{A}) 
~ Cn((K *A) u {A}) 
~ Cn(K *A) 
= K*A 
Definition of expansion 
By (ii) and the monotonicity of Cn 
Postulate (*2) 
Postulate (*1) 
Secondly, assume that the fourth postulate, i.e. (i), holds and that A is consistent with 
K, i.e. ·A fj. K. Then 
K ~ Cn(K) Definition of Cn 
~ Cn(K +A) Monotonicity of Cn 
=K+A K + A is a belief set 
~ K*A Postulate (*4) • 
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The two additional postulates for revision involve revising a belief set with a conjunction. 
They are called the conjunction postulates. It seems reasonable to expect the result of 
revising a belief set K with a conjunction A /\ B to be equivalent to revising with A and 
then revising with B. This turns out to be the case provided that B is consistent with K *A 
(in which case, of course, (K *A)* B = (K *A)+ B). It is customary to split the result 
into two parts. So we get the following two postulates: 
• K*(A/\B)~(K*A)+B. 
• ·B rf_ K *A, then (K *A)+ B ~ K *(A/\ B). 
(*7) 
(*8) 
Postulates (*7) and (*8) are very powerful. Some of the other postulates become derived 
rules in their presence. We will show two cases: 
Remark 5.4 Postulate (*3) is a special case of postulate (*7), assuming postulate (*6) 
holds. 
Let K be a belief set, A any wf and B a tautology. Then we have 
K *A = K * (B /\A) Postulate (*6) 
~ (K * B) +A Postulate (*7) 
=K+A Remark5.2 • 
Remark 5.5 Postulate (*4) is a special case of postulate (*8}, assuming postulate (*6) 
holds. 
Let K be a belief set, A any wf such that ·A rf_ K and B a tautology. Then we have 
K +A = (K * B) +A 
~ K * (B /\A) 
= K*A 
5.3 Postulates for Contraction 
Remark 5.2 
Postulate (*8) 
Postulate (*6) • 
The idea of contraction with a wf A is to have a belief set which no longer contains A if 
that is at all possible. The very first requirement is that the result of a contraction of a 
belief set should again be a belief set. This is called the closure postulate. 
• For any wf A and any belief set K, we have that K - A is a belief set. (-1) 
The second rule, the inclusion postulate, states that the resultant set should be a subset 
of the original one: 
• For any wf A and any belief set K, we have that K - A~ K. (-2) 
Suppose we contract with a wf A but A rf_ K. Then the belief set should be unchanged. 
This is stated by the third postulate, namely the vacuity postulate: 
• If A rf_ K, then K - A = K. (-3) 
Suppose the wf A with which we contract is a tautology. Then, since belief sets are 
closed under entailment, it will still be in the belief set after contraction. In all other cases, 
though, A should not be a member of the resultant belief set. This is the fourth rule, called 
the success postulate: 
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• If ~ A, then A tf. K - A. (-4) 
If A E K, then it follows from the above four postulates and the monotonicity of Cn 
that (K - A)+ A ~ K whenever A E IC. Can this set inclusion be replaced by an equality? 
In other words, if an agent believes A, is it the case that consecutively removing it from 
the belief set and then adding it again will result in the original belief set? This is what 
the fifth postulate states: enough must be left of the belief set when removing A from it 
so that it can be restored by expanding with A again. This postulate is called the recovery 
postulate. 
• If A E IC, then (K - A)+ A= K. (-5) 
There are, however, situations where one would not want the recovery postulate to 
hold. As an example we give one cited by Hansson ([Hansson 1996]). Suppose we have 
the language with two atoms p and q where we think of p as 'Cleopatra had a daughter' 
and of q as 'Cleopatra had a son'. Let the belief set K of the agent be Cn(p /\ q), i.e. the 
agent believes Cleopatra had both a son and a daughter, information he got when he read 
a book called 'Life and times of Cleopatra'. Both p and q will be members of the set K. 
Now suppose a friend of the agent informs him that 'Life and times of Cleopatra' is a novel, 
not based on historical fact. The agent now contracts his belief set with p V q, i.e. he no 
longer believes that Cleopatra had any child. Suppose after that, however, he learns from 
a (reliable) encyclopedia that Cleopatra actually had a child. Then it would be reasonable 
for the agent to expand his belief set with p V q but without reintroducing either p or q. 
Thus (K - p V q) + p V q =f K since p and q are members of the original belief set K but not 
of the resultant belief set. 
As in the case of revision we expect that the syntax of a wf will have no effect, i.e. that 
contracting with equivalent sentences will result in the same belief set. This is what the 
extensionality postulate, the sixth rule, is all about: 
• If f= A~ B, then K - A= K - B. (-6) 
One might expect that contraction with a logically 'weaker' wf would lead to smaller 
belief sets than contraction by 'stronger' wfs, in other words one might expect that, if 
A f= B, then K - B ~ K - A. (The reason for this intuition is that B is 'easier to deduce', 
so more wfs have to be removed in order not to be able to deduce B.) This is, however, not 
the case. To see this, let us look at an example, using the language with three atoms, p, q 
and r. We think of pas 'James plays rugby', of q as 'Louis plays rugby' and of r as 'Louis 
makes lots of money'. Suppose the agent believes that both James and Louis are rugby 
players and that, if Louis plays rugby, then he makes lots of money. So his belief set is K = 
Cn( {p, q, q-+ r} ). This set will include the wf r. If the agent no longer believes that James 
is a rugby player we intuitively feel that r should still be in his belief set. If he, however, 
gives up his belief that both James and Louis are rugby players, r should no longer be in 
his belief set. (He may still have p V q in his belief set but if he is no longer certain that q, 
he should not haver as a belief.) Sor EK - p, but r tf. K - (p /\ q). Thus, contrary to our 
intuition, we have K - p <l K - (p /\ q). 
An unwelcome result is that monotonicity does not hold for contraction. It is thus not. 
the case that, if K' ~ K, then K' - A ~ K - A. We can illustrate this by considering two 
belief sets, K' = Cn(pV q) and K = Cn(p). We have that K' ~ K. Suppose we contract both 
belief sets by p. Then K' does not change but K - p will be different from K. It may be the 
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case that K - p contains no sentences except the tautologies, hence K' - p g; K - p. The 
absence of monotonicity is an indication that definitions of contraction are much harder 
than definitions of expansion. We do have, however, rather neat postulates on contractions 
with conjunctions. 
The rugby player example above has shown that it is in general not the case that 
(K - A) ~ K- (A/\ B), but the seventh postulate, one of the conjunction postulates, states 
a related rule: 
• (K - A) n (K - B) ~ K - (A/\ B). (-7) 
Is it maybe the case that K - (A/\ B) ~ (K - A)? It holds only when A ~ K - (A/\ B). 
This is the eighth (the other conjunction) postulate: 
• A~ K - (A/\ B), then K - (A/\ B) ~ (K - A). (-8) 
It is possible to prove that, assuming that postulates (-1) - (-6) hold, the conjunction 
postulates (-7) and (-8) hold iff 
K - (A /\ B) = K - B, or { 
K - A, or 
(K - A) n (K - B). 
5.4 Revisions and Contractions 
In any system where two operations are defined the question arises how these operations 
interact. We now consider two postulates which combine revision and contraction. 
In order to revise a belief set K with a wf A it is necessary to remove all wfs B E K which 
contradict A, in other words a contraction needs to be done before A can be added. The 
main reason for a contradiction will be the presence of •A. It therefore seems reasonable 
to regard revision with A as contraction with ·A, i.e. get K - •A, followed by expansion 
with A. This is expressed by the Levi identity ([Blackburn et al 1997]): 
• K *A= (K - ·A)+ A. 
Suppose we have a contraction operation which satisfies the postulates given in the 
previous section and suppose we define revision by the Levi identity. Will it be the case 
that the revision postulates are preserved? Fortunately the answer is positive. If the six 
postulates (-1) to (-6) hold for a contraction function -, then the revision function defined 
by the Levi identity satisfies (*1) to (*6). Also, if the seven postulates (-1) to (-7) hold for a 
contraction function -, then the revision function defined by the Levi identity also satisfies 
(*7) and, if the seven postulates (-1) to (-6) and (-8) hold for a contraction function -, then 
the revision function defined by the Levi identity also satisfies (*8). 
It is also possible to give a definition of contraction in terms of revision, namely by the 
Harper identity ([Blackburn et al 1997]): 
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